

Drinking Wine with Friends: Plato's Lesson for Contemporary Democratic Theory

Eno Trimçev University of Greifswald

Abstract: *Democratic theory tells us that citizens should be engaged, informed, passionate, reasonable, willing to speak up, ready to listen, and militant but also restrained. Yet we are rarely told how they might achieve this. The challenge is particularly relevant for theories that distinguish between the liberal and democratic principles of our regime with their contradictory ideals of citizenship. This article draws on Plato's reflections on drinking wine with friends in the *Laws* to argue that the political psychology suggested therein fits the complex ideal of citizenship in a liberal democracy. Furthermore, it shows how extrapolitical and even disreputable social practices can not only help prepare citizens for political life but also enable them to deal with the inequalities that inevitably contaminate it. Weaving together law, contestation, reason, and passion, the Platonic account articulates the psychological burdens of citizenship in a liberal democracy and suggests ways to cope with them.*

The view that liberal democracy is a diarchy of two conflicting principles has gained ground in recent decades in democratic theory. A healthy liberal democracy, such theories argue, combines the liberal principle of the rule of law and the democratic principle of the rule of the people in a dynamic, uneasy balance. This balance, however, is hard to maintain because each principle naturally seeks to subvert the other (Connolly 2003; Honig 1993; Kalyvas 2008; McCormick 2001, 2011; Mouffe 2000, 2005; Tully 2002; Tushnet 2000). If the classical schema ordered regimes in correct and deviant types according to their standard of lawfulness—for example, kingship → tyranny; aristocracy → oligarchy; polity → democracy (*Statesman* 302c–e)—the liberal democratic regime is now viewed as a hybrid located between two deviant types: lawful juristocracy and lawless democracy.

The challenge of liberal democracy is thus to continuously transform the natural antagonism of its two constitutive principles into a precarious agonism without

hope for a lasting resolution (Wenman 2013, 33). Ideally, liberal democracy is an agonistic diarchy that mixes liberal and democratic principles at every level, with two sets of vocabularies, practices, and institutions living uneasily side by side: rule of law, individual rights, and juridical supremacy on one hand, and popular sovereignty, social and political rights, and political autonomy on the other (Mouffe 2018, 14–18).¹

These agonistic theories emerged from the backlash against accounts that favored the liberal side of the diarchy. They bring back contestation and emotions to counter the perceived hegemony of dispassionate, consensus-driven liberal theories and interest-driven liberal politics (Brown 2006, 13; Honig 2009; Mouffe 2005, 26–35; 1993, 146). Contemporary liberal democracies, they hold, overemphasize the juridical logic of the diarchy (Mouffe 2000, 26–29). While this overreliance arose more immediately from the liberal triumphalism that followed the end of the Cold War, it also goes along with the broader juridification of human relations

Eno Trimçev, Postdoctoral fellow, Chair of Political Theory and History of Ideas, University of Greifswald, Ernst-Lohmeyer-Platz 3, Raum 3.19b, Greifswald 17489, Germany.

Versions of this paper were presented in the *Politics in Strange Places* graduate workshop at the University of Oxford, fourth Braga Colloquium in the History of Moral and Political Philosophy, and the Political Theory Colloquium at the University of Greifswald. I am indebted to Hubertus Buchstein, Sara Gebh, and Milos Rodatos for suggestions and criticisms, Martin Beckstein and Rieke Trimçev for rigorously commenting on several drafts of the paper, and the three anonymous reviewers at the *AJPS*. Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.

¹Most, but by no means all, of these theories are commonly referred to as theories of agonistic democracy.

American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 00, No. 0, January 2023, Pp. 1–12

© 2023 The Authors. *American Journal of Political Science* published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Midwest Political Science Association. DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12761

This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.

in modernity as political decisions are substituted by legal and technocratic decision making (Hirschl 2004; McCormick 1997; Rosa 2020, 18).²

However, the psychological and pedagogical stakes of liberal democracy as an agonistic diarchy have been little noticed by democratic theorists. This is unfortunate because citizens of liberal democracies must bear the immense psychological burdens of permanent strife, radical contingency, and indissoluble injustice in a regime that plausibly claims to be more just than its alternatives. If they live in greater accordance with the democratic archetype of the good citizen, they must be ready to publicly contest everything (Wingenbach 2016, 21) not only with enthusiasm and hope but also with ill will, distrust, and animosity (McCormick 2001). And if they tend toward the liberal archetype, they must still make their peace with a society in which everything may be contested at any time—including the social or private institutions and practices they may treasure most. Good liberal democratic citizens need to be caring, respectful, passionate, informed, and engaged democrats, while also pursuing their own life plans; they must be able to decide with alacrity when to play by the rules and when to bend them, and all this in the full knowledge that most of them can never hope to enjoy the regime's promise of free and equal citizenship (Green 2016).

But how can liberal democracies cultivate such citizens? Answering this challenge is tricky because liberal democracy lacks a precise measure of good citizenship (Green 2016, 4), and attempting to impose one would be illiberal. This article speaks to this conundrum by way of the Athenian Stranger in Plato's *Laws*.³ There is a seemingly trivial practice, he claims, that can be of the greatest civic use (645c; 650b): the ancient Greek symposium or drinking wine with friends.⁴ This article pro-

poses to see in the Stranger's remarks on the symposium an exemplary institution for fostering citizens that may psychologically bear the burdens of liberal democratic citizenship.

More specifically, it argues that the Athenian Stranger sketches a political psychology that fits surprisingly well the contingent, passionate, and collective nature of politics in an agonistic liberal democracy. Stressing citizens' capacity to exercise power over themselves, this psychology, the Stranger says, fosters the ability to rule and be ruled with justice (644a). Counterintuitively, he suggests that self-rule may best be acquired by stimulating its opposite—transgressive and lawless behavior—so that each psyche achieves its individual “due measure” (666a; 691c; 691d).

Furthermore, the article proposes that the symposium's political effectiveness lies in its extrapolitical nature; the symposium bears political fruits only as a byproduct of its deployment for its own pleasurable sake. The small, intimate size of the practice, the drinking of wine, and the friendship of participants give sympotic experiences a dramaturgic quality that resembles a particularly intense version of agonistic political action (Arendt 1998)—drinking wine with friends stimulates both the capacity to venture forth in speech and deed and the potential for extreme discord which are part of this conception of politics. At the same time, these experiences are free of the burdens of power, money, hierarchy, responsibility, and exclusion that plague actual political engagements. Sympotic experiences do not really resemble actual political experiences. This allows the symposium to be a safe space to train the faculties required by political engagement on one hand and, on the other, to enjoy the self-revealing pleasures of acting and speaking with one's equals that are promised by the moral ideal of free and equal citizenship but are in practice denied to most citizens (cf. Epicureanism in Green 2016). Indeed, this extrapolitical enjoyment of the promise of democratic politics is more accessible and more complete in the small, friendly stage of the symposium than its equivalent in the large-scale, high-pressure, and high-stakes conditions of political life.

The argument is fully detailed in the third section of the article. The first section sets up the dramatic narrative and the prelude to the Stranger's argument for

²The agonist project has borne fruit in the last decade. On the one hand, politics has become more agonistic—more impassioned, confrontational, and unpredictable—and arguably also more democratic as citizens have found new ways to participate in political life. On the other hand, devotion to leaders, suspicion of the media and other institutions, street-level and anti-elitist mobilization, and antipluralist and illiberal acts indicate that something deeper is at stake than merely checking the juristocratic tendencies of liberal democracy. Citizens and officeholders, after all, may engage more or less well in the art of politics.

³The article uses Pangle's (1980) translation.

⁴There may be grounds to be suspicious of the earnestness of the Athenian Stranger. He apologizes for spending so much time on it (642a), Socrates claimed to be friendless and thus potentially indifferent to sympotic relationships (*Lysis* 211d–212b; 215a; but cf. *Lysis* 223b, *Phaedo* 58c, and *Symposium*), and Plato's stern sobriety seems to make him ill-disposed toward diluting the power of reason. But there are good reasons that allay these suspicions. First, the Stranger is not recommending the symposium for philoso-

phers but for citizens. Second, he underlines that he is pursuing a philosophical argument when he says that he is inquiring into “the activity itself” (640e) and “the correct method for [...] inquiry into all such things” (638e; see also Meyer 2012). Third, Plato's denunciations of the hedonistic wine culture of the Greeks elsewhere (*Republic* 389e, 439c–d, 573a–c) may be viewed in light of his larger quarrel with the practical conduct of the art of politics.

drinking with friends in book one of the *Laws*. The second then lays out his psychological argument from book two, which the third section fits with the contemporary demands of our diarchic regime.

The Prelude: Plato's Dialectic of Politics and Rule

The *Laws* is a dialogue between three elder statesmen: the Athenian Stranger, Kleinias from Crete, and Megillus from Sparta. In light of Kleinias's intention to found a colony (702c–d), the men are discussing political regimes and laws (625b). Kleinias and Megillus recount that Crete and Sparta have organized common practices “with a view to war” because political life consists of “an endless war [...] by nature” where “all are enemies of all in public, and in private each is an enemy of himself” (625e, 626a, d).

The Stranger counters that the arts ought to be organized with a view to their ends and that friendship represents the end of politics (628a). Politics ought thus to move away from the “civil war” (628b) that Kleinias takes to be a natural fact of life. The reason for Kleinias's assertion, the Stranger points out, is a lack of “due measure” (757c) in what and how citizens desire. Most people “when in want, they want without measure, and when it's possible for them to gain measured amounts, they choose to gain insatiably” (918d). This absence makes struggle and conflict appear natural; but in politics, it seems, not all is as it appears.

The politico-pedagogical problem for the Stranger, then, is to educate citizens to desire their “due measure.” This psychic pattern, it turns out, weaves “in due proportion” (757c) a particular with a general measure: the character of the individual citizen and the law. And it does so in a way that synthesizes them in the character of the individual who has achieved “perfect [citizenship]” (641c) and knows how to rule and be ruled with justice (644a). The teaching of the Stranger is that the due measure is different for everyone and yet lawful in all.

To see this lawful unity in heterogeneity, this article follows Zartaloudis's distinction between an external and internal dimension of law (*nomos*) in Plato's dialogues. Kleinias and Megillus use the term to refer to the external, evident, and actual aspect of law as “a sense of habit, use, and opinion through to custom, norm, or ‘law.’” *Nomos*, however, also has an invisible, dynamic, and psychological aspect as an “act of ‘distribution-sharing’ or ‘arrangement’” in arts like pol-

itics, gymnastics, and medicine. In this latter sense the term indicates a potentiality that we aim to achieve in practice: pragmatic *idea* in the sense that it “does not lie outside of its actuality, but rather is immanent in its use(s)” (Zartaloudis 2019, xiii, xiv, xvi). Law in its entirety, then, stands for the movement from the external and evident aspect of law to the internal and invisible *idea* of law. The psychological achievement of due measure over time thus also reveals the truth of *nomos*.

The Athenian Stranger's argument unfolds the psychology of this movement as self-rule—citizens that do the right thing even when angry, fearful, or suffering the twists and turns of fortune (632a) or when they are not under the watchful eyes of the law. For the Stranger, this psychic movement occurs in politics.

Since the passions are at stake in citizenship, early childhood education may be rightly concerned with the correct physiological training of the first “pleasures and pains” (653b). Accordingly, the first two books of the *Laws* are concerned with the education of desire and affect (here referred to as “passions” or “cords”) and expectations about pleasure and pain from the beginning of life to old age. At least as important as learning to endure pain is learning how to control pleasure—something that Spartans and Cretans do directly by prohibiting “bad” pleasures (637a) and habituating the young to enduring pain and feats of courage (628e, 629a–b, 629d–e, 633b–c). But desires, it transpires, must only be indirectly disciplined through free play. In this context, the surprising claim is made that symposia help achieve self-rule in adulthood (632e–643a). Free play, the Stranger reminds us, is not only an equality-fostering art but also a distinction-fostering art; in it we are all each other's equals, yet we assert our distinctness. Puzzlingly, he argues that when artificially intensified through the communal imbibing of wine, this troublesome aspect enables self-rule.

The initial formulation of the problem is this: desiring rightly must be learned through free play, yet the external laws of politics must be strict (632c). If the political art requires that horizontal relations between citizens shape their “pains and pleasures, their desire and the ardors of all their erotic longings” that respond to “blaming and praising” (632a), it also presumes vertical relations between rulers and the ruled (Taminiaux 2000, 176). In other words, the politico-pedagogical problem consists of harmonizing rule and play or hierarchical and isonomic relations.

Accordingly, the Stranger first discusses the virtues of vertical rule relations (631b–632c) and introduces the figure of the “sober and wise ruler” (640d), or symposiarch, who supervises drinking parties (640d–e). The

symposiarch stands in for external law in two ways: he oversees the ritualistic laws of the symposium, such as handwashing, wearing wreaths, and mixing wine with water (Meyer 2015, 146), while also representing the *dogma* and *doxa* of the city in sympotic discussions (cf. Bartels 2020). The former provides a safe space from the storms of public life, while the latter ensures that the sympotic goings-on do not take conspiratorial undertones and contradict the lawful order of the city.

The Stranger then goes on to inquire into practices of free relations between equals. Self-rule results from the weaving together of ruling or vertical relations of hierarchy with free action or horizontal relations of equality. The task of the political art is to assimilate, synthesize, or sublate the rule of the symposiarch and, hence, of external law, into the activity itself so that the resulting performance is at once free and lawful (cf. Alexander 2014).

It is from this perspective that the Stranger criticizes Spartan and Cretan education for focusing on “pains and fears”—for example, experiencing pain through “the use of force” (634a)—rather than “pleasure and play” (635b). The error of Cretan laws, it turns out, is that they take politics to be merely hierarchical rule relations. By not allowing people to taste “the greatest sorts of pleasure and play” (635c)⁵ the lawgiver has sought to give the same form to the diverse psyches of Cretan citizens by way of external law.⁶ Accordingly, citizens are either unself-consciously law-abiding, like Kleinias, or worse, they appear to abide by the laws in public when in actuality they are enemies of the law hankering after unlawful pleasures (Lutz 2015, 41; Meyer 2015, 139); both suffer from “softness of spirit” (635d).⁷ By reducing politics to hierarchical relations, the Cretan lawgiver foregoes the pragmatic dimension of law altogether.

At this point, Megillus agrees with the Athenian Stranger’s general argument but insists on the goodness of Spartan laws that prohibit drunkenness—“that practice which leads humans to fall into the greatest pleasures and the greatest sorts of insolence and total mindlessness” (637a). In this the disciplined Spartans seem evidently superior to the ludic Athenians, and the sight of shameless, drunken youngsters in democratic Tarentum seems to Megillus to be proof of this (637b).

⁵However, the Cretan lawgiver has not neglected fear and pain, and the Spartan lawgiver has gone even further (625c, 633a–633c).

⁶For the Stranger’s summary of Spartan education, see 634a–b.

⁷To wit, the prohibition of homosexuality induced a “lack of self-restraint with regard to pleasure” (636c) or the contrary effect to that intended by the legislators. The result was antagonism between the psyche of the citizens and the laws of the city.

The Stranger responds that the symposium forms a community (639d) based on friendship (640d) that can contribute to citizenship. This is, of course, anything but self-evident (645e), and most symposia proceed incorrectly (640e). The prelude ends with Kleinias’s persevering question: “suppose this custom regarding drinking were to proceed correctly—what good would it then do to us [...] to private individuals or to the city?” (641a–b).

The Argument: Plato’s Dialectic of Passion and Reason

We now come to the main body of the Stranger’s argument (643a–650b) with the myth of the divine puppets (644c–645c) at its heart. Oddly enough, he argues for symposia as a counter to the dangers of factionalism (627e–638d). This contains a hint of the distinctiveness of the Platonic treatment. Counterintuitively, the cure for the “insolence” and “mindlessness” caused by the imbibing of wine turns out to be more symposia over time; symposiasts learn to rule themselves in the long run through uncontrolled, rule-less behavior in the short run. Flipping the Cretan and Spartan script, symposiasts achieve their due measure by “weaving” the general measure of the law into their particular psyche.

The myth presents the morphology of the psyche as a playing field of the three “passions” of boldness, fear, and calculation that “work within us like tendons or cords” (644e). Their interaction yields the resultant psychic motion. The passions are connected, on one side, to the body through pleasure and pain and, on the other, to politics and morality through “opinions about the future” or “expectation” (644c). Pleasure moves the psyche through “boldness,” pain through “fear” (644c–d). Additionally, fear assumes one of two forms: fear of evils that may befall us or fear of disgrace—the shame that holds us back from “the most frequent and greatest pleasures” (646a). “‘Fear’ is” thus “the expectation of pain, and ‘boldness’ the expectation of the opposite” (644d). Accordingly, each cord has not only a physiological and affective character but also a cognitive and evaluative one. The integration of pleasure and pain in the process of opinion formation results in the emotions that we feel in expressing or changing our opinions.

A person may reflect on their pleasures and pains by way of a third cord called “calculation,” and if the person lives in a polis, “calculation” “is called law” (644d). They move in response to the pull of these three cords; self-rule occurs when the three are “in consonance”

under the direction of the law cord (653b). If consonance is “virtue” (653b), vice is psychic conflict between the different cords and war between different factions within the polis. Kleinias’s assertion that war within and between us is what is true by nature indicates that the elderly Cretan statesman does not recognize virtue.

Two more features of the psyche are worth noting. First, children respond to the first two cords straight away, while the third appears later. Second, the “golden” cord is also softer than the other two “hard and iron” cords (645a). Hence, it must adjust to them in a play not of its own making, and it is in continuous need of outside assistance to grow. Action thus results from the evaluative configuration of cords that urge us toward or away from things, events, and people. It is precisely here, says the Stranger, that “the practice of spending time drinking together, which might be considered too trivial to be worth so many words, may well appear not unworthy of such lengthy speech” (645c).

The Stranger begins by clarifying the nature of education as “[the] correct nurture [...] which [...] draws the soul of the child at play toward an erotic attachment to what he must do when he becomes a man who is perfect as regards the virtue of his occupation” (643d). This, we recall, means above all an education in becoming a “perfect citizen who knows how to rule and be ruled with justice” (644a).

The aim of education, then, is that individuals rule themselves (653c, 659d). One’s due measure is the harmony between one’s particular psyche and the generality of the law; the psyche assimilates the measure of the law in order to give law to itself (Caram 2019, 127). Emphasizing this, the Stranger redefines education again a little later as “the drawing and pulling of children toward the argument that is said to be correct by the law and [...] by those who are most decent and oldest” (659d–660e). *Children* are to be educated into the law as habit, custom, and opinion in the Cretan and Spartan manner.

We might recall that Athenian laxity about pleasures and play, however, may bring about virtuous *adults*.⁸ But pleasure can draw us towards unreasonable or forbidden things, and pleasure inflamed by wine doubly so: “[e]veryone [...] becomes filled with license of speech, and fails to listen to his neighbors; each considers himself capable of ruling the others as well as himself” (671b). How can the symposiasts become just citizens if their souls become tyrannical? If consonance is the standard,

why not simply habituate citizens to the right pleasures and pains by pounding in the Dorian manner the square peg of individuality into the round hole of external law? Because, the Stranger says, the cords would slacken, the resulting psychic motions would grow less intense, and more corrupt; all men would come to resemble the old (653c–d). As the Eleatic Stranger put it to Young Socrates in the *Statesman* (311a), their motion would “lack pungency and the drive which makes for efficiency.” Hence, education cannot merely endow its subjects with virtue; they must acquire it via playful and even disreputable practices.

If the aim of civic education is to win the continuous war against ourselves that so concerned Kleinias, then we must not shrink from the battle by smothering the movement but get better at winning. Citizens need all their cords straining at their utmost. They must be at once both bold and fearful, or both shameless and ashamed (646e–647c). Shamelessness brings one out of oneself in speech and deed; it encourages the transgression of one’s boundaries, and thus the assertion of one’s distinctness. But shame or “awe” encourages one to mind one’s reputation among fellow citizens, and thus encourages the assertion of one’s equality with others (647a). The former moves one to overcome limits whether psychic or legal, the latter to restrain oneself by considering others’ opinions. The dynamic of the psyche thus encourages transgressive passions and actions that run afoul of the law as well as restraining ones that encourage the scrupulous observance of the law.

This article argues that the distinction is temporal: transgressive passions are stimulated immediately while symposiasts acquire self-restraint over time. Wine’s spirited effect on the psyche only intensifies this dynamic by raising the stakes: it immediately stimulates the iron cords and undercuts the golden one by encouraging shameless speeches and deeds in disregard of law and convention. Over time, however, friendship and honor as a worthy symposiast stimulate the golden cord and encourage shame of unworthy behavior (cf. Saxonhouse 2006). The experienced symposiast “trusting in himself on account of the fine preparation given by nature and by training” likes “making a display of his capacity to outstrip and overcome the power of the necessary transformation effected by the drink” in fearlessness, yet “[goes] away before taking that last drink” in fear of bringing shame to themselves (648d–e; cf. Socrates’ sympotic skills in *Symposium* 176a–c, 214a–b, 220a). The immediate degradation of the physical and intellectual capacities of symposiasts may bring about a more virtuous citizenry over time. There is nothing mysterious about this, says the Stranger; for example, people go to gymnasia and

⁸Is Megillus’s remark that “Athenians who are good are good in a different way [...] by their own nature without compulsion [...] they are true, and not artificially, good” a partial confirmation of the success of these educational practices (642c–d)?

degrade their physical capacities in the short run for healthier bodies in the longer term (646c).⁹

In light of the differences between the three cords, we can view the symposium as a setting in which citizens' psyches come to momentarily resemble those of children through the intensification of the iron cords and the degradation of the golden cord. This continuous return to the beginning that clears space for its relentless overcoming is the basic pedagogical teaching of the Stranger's political psychology.

But is it true, as the Stranger claims, that the end of all of this is self-rule within and not beyond the law as pragmatic potentiality, that is, as a citizen and not as a tyrant? The Stranger's contention may be schematically rephrased thus: children naturally begin with a two-cord individual psyche that, in a second phase, encounters the general cord of law ("calculation"). Before they can even speak, children knit their psyches together by imitating and remembering those around them. The law as *dogma* and *doxa* is thus already present in the configuration of the iron cords by way of socialization. But this natural imbibing of the law presents two problems. First, it is unselfconscious, and second, those that chance has thrown around the children may be more or less artful role models in the use of "blaming and praising" (632a). The natural encounter may thus act as a cover for artlessness. Crete and Sparta respond to this by stripping down the particular and diverse psyches of the young and building them up again according to a single general measure the way an army does with its soldiers: "your regime," says the Stranger to Kleinias, "is that of an armed camp and not of men settled in cities" (666e).¹⁰

The Stranger threads the needle between Dorian bellicosity and lawless tyranny by identifying a setting proper to the continuous artful recurrence of that original natural encounter. Surrounded by the symposiarch and their friends, the wine drinkers imbibe the measure of the law artfully and self-consciously in three steps. First, they negate their original psychic composition through alcohol-induced shamelessness thus falling into disharmony and lawlessness. Second, they integrate the pregiven nomothetic measure in their psyche using their own wits. Finally, they achieve self-rule by issuing law to themselves, moving beyond the first sense of *nomos* as external law to what is revealed in practice as the idea of law (cf. *Minos* 315a in Zartaloudis 2019, xiv).

⁹Is it a coincidence that the Platonic dialogue on friendship, *Lysis*, takes place in a *palaestra* (*Lysis* 204a)?

¹⁰The Stranger's distinction between Athenian and Spartan education has carried over into modern receptions of the two. For example, Nazi ideologists used an idealized model of Spartan education (De Pourcq 2008, 25).

In this way, the achievement of self-rule does not result in mere conformist enslavement to convention.

Last but not least—and unlike the usual treatment of friendship in the history of political philosophy as a source of harmony (e.g., *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1155a22–26)—the distinctiveness of the Stranger's treatment of friendship through the practice of wine-drinking illuminates its conflictual or adversarial dimension. Drinking wine as such is an art (Scruton 2007). But drinking wine with friends in the ritualistic setting of the symposium takes this art further in two distinct ways. It leads the conversation from the descriptive language of everyday life to the evocative language proper to politics and friendship (Dilworth 2008),¹¹ and it facilitates the transition from the desirous to the spirited part of the soul: from a person who seeks to satisfy desires in whatever order they appear to a symposiast who seeks recognition for themselves and the things and principles that they value. To all this the Stranger adds his own twist: adding wine to the mix helps degrade the self's present capacities as a necessary step to their dialectical overcoming—a purpose that would not be fulfilled by, say, a friendly informal gathering over tea.

Becoming Good Citizens: A Political Psychology for Liberal Democracy

We can now connect the Stranger's plea with the cognitively and performatively onerous burdens of citizenship in liberal democracy. These burdens are likely to vary across offices and classes given the unavoidable democratic distinctions between officeholders and average citizens that take place in a broader context of social distinctions between the wealthy, famous, and influential Few and the ordinary Many that necessarily infect every liberal democracy (Green 2016; Sabl 2002).

The first section articulated the problem of citizenship as learning to discriminate between desires—not, however, in the orderly Cretan and Spartan manner of training legally mandated desires but in playful, somewhat chaotic, and even transgressive practices. There is an apparent fit between this argument and the experience of liberal democratic citizenship. Liberal democracy lacks a substantive vision of citizenship while at the same time requiring its citizens to not be everything that they may wish to be. For example, democratic citizens must

¹¹Rösler (1995, 11) also notes the tendency of sympotic conversation to transit quickly to general questions about gods, men, life, and death.

hanker after equality, not timocratic superiority. Nor should a liberal democracy blindly follow the self-indulgent and transient passions of its public. If citizenship in general requires that citizens discern a gap between the merely pleasurable or advantageous and the reasonable or the good, liberal democratic citizenship requires that citizens discern that gap in temporal form; the merely pleasurable becomes the immediately and transiently pleasurable while the good becomes that which the public can accept upon reflection (Sabl 2002, 55–95). As the regime that tracks popular will over time, liberal democratic citizenship plays out in the gap between the immediate and whimsical and the long-term and considered view of public interest.

The second section then underlined the importance of artificially induced transgressions for self-rule. Under the effect of wine, symposiasts at the very least relax their self-control and act in excessive ways that they otherwise would not. This activates a dialectic of self-rule, the Stranger claims, whereby they overcome their native psyche over time. The self-ruling psyche is the product of enjoyable agonistic engagements that sublimate the golden law cord. As such it potentially reconciles the two principles of the agonistic vision.

If agonistic theorists are right regarding the diarchic nature of liberal democracy, then citizenship requires two different psychologies checking one another: a democratic psychology of citizenship next to the liberal psychology of individual autonomy. The latter, however, is nearly hegemonic today (Hobsbawm 1994, 334; Rosa 2019). Viewed from the Stranger's perspective of linking citizenship with desire, the psychology of autonomy is built on the desire to be omnipotent or free of all restraint so that citizens can pursue their pleasures in whatever way they see fit.

This picture of autonomy resembles Plato's famous psychological profile of the tyrant (*Republic* 562a–576b; Tarnopolsky 2010, 165). The friendless tyrant must tyrannize to be free of any claims made by the world and others (*Republic* 567b). But in keeping with the double nature of liberal democracy, autonomy must be checked, not annihilated. Its pursuit enables citizens not only to function in modern society but also to engage in politics. Centered on money and rights – for example, political demands for minimum wage or pro-choice laws – the political struggles that arise from autonomy correspond to the political idea of equality. They form a vital part of citizen responses to experiences of contingency in the contemporary world. But unchecked autonomy undermines the political art, which is shot through with what autonomy abhors: dependency on others for survival, power, and above all, esteem and recognition. In its motivation

to keep the world and others out, the politics of autonomy tilts against democracy when left uncomplemented by other bonds, practices, and motives.

The counter to the psychology of autonomy is provided by the artful acquisition of one's due measure; what the Stranger calls self-rule and we call maturity. If the autonomous person recognizes their right to freely choose and act, the mature person does what ought to be done. And maturity, of course, is acquired through practice and effort over time. It consists of the ability to not give in to transient desires, pleasures, and whims when they conflict with more long-term considerations.

In the following, the article considers and refutes two objections to the psychology of maturity that can be raised by agonistic theorists, here called the gerontocracy and the aristocracy objections. Then it outlines how political maturity fits the demanding agonistic vision of liberal democratic citizenship and how extrapolitical institutions, such as the symposium, may contribute to its achievement.

The gerontocracy objection states that political maturity is incompatible with the youthful energy of liberal democracy; a liberal democracy of mature citizens would be too slow, too timid, and therefore too conservative. After all, going back at least to John Dewey, democratic theory has rightly underlined the open, experimental nature of democratic citizenship. The objection seems to be confirmed by the old age of symposia participants (666a–c). The reason for which the Athenian Stranger stresses the participation of old men in the symposium, however, is not a capacity that they possess but one that they lack; old men ought to drink because their psychic motions have become slack and corrupt (653c–d). They feel too much shame and far too little delight to come out of themselves (665e). Wine drinking at communal meals is “a drug that heals the austerity of old age” (666b); it turns the soul “from harder to softer, so that it becomes more malleable, like iron when it is plunged into fire” (666c).¹²

The mature person resembles more “a man [that] approaches forty” (666b) who threads the needle between youthful transgression of conventional boundaries and their elderly policing (see also Tarnopolsky 2010). Only “children until the age of eighteen” who may have “the madness that is habitual in youth” may not drink at all; everyone else “may taste wine with due measure” (666a). Everyone that we would consider today to have reached the legal age of maturity ought to imbibe: the young to become more like the old, the old to become

¹²Other measures for reinvigorating the motion of the soul are holidays, choral performances, and enjoying the playful and festive performances of the young (653d–654a, 657d).

more like the young, and everyone to become other than what they are.

Hence, a regime that cultivates mature citizenship does not contradict the passionate engagements and fearless commitments that are part of agonistic democratic practice. The symposium even artificially intensifies them and makes them more pleasurable as passions are heightened, awareness of the law is clouded, and conventional norms are transgressed by communal imbibing. Political maturity is therefore fully compatible with the critique, reform, and even overturning of external law required by the democratic principle of liberal democracy.

The aristocracy objection, on the other hand, worries that the emphasis on self-overcoming is incompatible with the egalitarian principles of liberal democracy; a liberal democracy of mature citizens would be aristocratic, hierarchical, and therefore inequalitarian. After all, the Athenian Stranger speaks not only of self-rule but also of ruling and being ruled as if hierarchical relations naturally belong to politics. If this objection is correct, it would go against the very spirit of liberal democracy.

However, mature citizens, as portrayed here, are decidedly not aristocrats. What is at stake in self-rule is not a split between a higher and a lower self (Berlin 1997) or desires that are a priori right or wrong. If it were, the Cretan and Spartan attempts to impose a single model of the good citizen on all would be correct. In the Stranger's account, experienced symposiasts are not after perfection and they most certainly are not after a transvaluation of their common values (cf. Sabl 2002, 63–90). If they were, they would not be friends. No one, after all, wants to drink repeatedly with a cunning Machiavellian, a rambunctious Alcibiades, or a charismatic prophet; no matter how immediately appealing, they all end up shutting down the symposium.¹³

Instead, symposiasts are after the simpler, more ordinary pleasures of enjoying each other's friendship. This implies cultivating the steady attachments and habits that are part of that friendship, accepting the faults of others and becoming aware of one's own. The experienced symposiast who can "go away before taking that last drink" (648e) will also respect what Tully (2002, 218) calls "the first and perhaps only universalizable principle of democratic deliberation": "always listen to the other side."

Aristocracy is rightly distasteful to democratic citizens. But the rejection of aristocracy should not obscure from us the fact that the practices of liberal democratic citizenship are necessarily shot through with inequalities. And among many of these, one may be the most salient

politically: in modern liberal democracies some rule and many more are ruled; some do politics live on the public stage and many more watch it, often prepackaged, on screen. The distinction may be partially grounded on reasons, such as ability, but never completely so; age, habitus, income, legal status, place of birth, and a variety of other accidents play an unavoidable role. Whatever the reasons, the fact is that many are not, nor do they expect to be, cashing in on the promise of free and equal citizenship (Green 2016).¹⁴

If democracy demands at least a distinction between the Few and the Many, the question is not *whether* but *how* we should educate for democracy the Few and the Many with their very different experiences of citizenship. The Few who may exercise public opportunities for judgment and self-expression must gain the maturity to do the political art well. But far more vexing is the case of the Many who suffer the structural gap between the promise and the reality of liberal democratic citizenship. What does political maturity mean for them? And what kind of institution may respond to both experiences democratically, that is, without anticipating who may belong to which class of citizenship?

The remainder of this article uses the argument of the Stranger to show that self-rule fits the bill for the psychology of citizenship presupposed by the agonistic vision of liberal democracy. Then it turns to the institution of the symposium to sketch how extrapolitical social practices can serve both sides of the democratic equation: the luminous, free, and meritocratic agonal political culture of democracy and what Jeffrey Edward Green (2016) calls its "dark shadow" of frustration, resistance, acquiescence, and envy.

I argue that the psychology of self-rule speaks to the challenge facing democratic citizens: their ability to recognize the difference between the free and equal ideal of liberal democratic citizenship and the inequalities that blight political life and their capacity to act accordingly. The performative aspect is as central as the cognitive; recognition alone followed by untimely, thoughtless, and poorly executed action may do more harm than good.

The sense of shame that is central to the Stranger's account is crucial to the cognitive aspect. As we have seen, the symposium sharpens the sense of shame by degrading the cognitive element while overstimulating affective reactions. But this, in the long run, is to the

¹³Recall the chaotic end of the symposium after Alcibiades's drunken entry in the *Symposium*.

¹⁴This has implications beyond questions of justice and fairness. The exclusion of the ordinary Many from political participation may not only deprive them of their democratic dignity but may also make them less good at articulating their political claims over time. The Few/Many divide thus risks undermining the very kind of politics on which liberal democracy rests.

benefit of the cognitive golden cord, which is trained by its continuous contest with the artificially engorged iron cords (recall the analogy with training the body in gymnastics, 646c–d). As Tarnopolsky (2010, 163–164) points out, it is the cognitive element that distinguishes shame from related emotions, such as embarrassment. And that cognitive element consists of the recognition of a gap between the actual and the ideal, i.e., between how one is treated and how one should be treated by others.

But, in addition, the sense of shame also requires the capacity to act well in response to that gap in order to not deteriorate into rage or humiliation. This calls for the ability to strategize, compromise, mobilize, or force a decision according to circumstances (cf. *Statesman* 295a). Psychologically, this is manifest in the capacity to restrain, limit, and channel political action by aligning one's vision and will to political reality—in other words, the capacity to rule oneself by rejecting hasty actions or whimsical behavior if it impedes long-term considerations.

Linking this invisible psychic capacity with visible political action, this article argues, is the faculty of judgment. Inwardly, recall that the Stranger has tied physiological pleasures and pains to beliefs or opinions. Accordingly, judgment changes what one finds pleasurable and painful as one revises one's views over time (cf. Garsten 2006, 136). Outwardly, judgment is the faculty that enables political rule, which the Stranger has described as the weaving of the warp of hierarchy with the woof of equality that occurs in free and playful practices. Built on the psychic sublimation of the law cord, judgment enables conformity with the spirit if not always the letter of the law (cf. *Statesman* 249b–c; *Laws* 636a). If the political art were done right, Plato points out elsewhere, questions of legal compliance would not even arise (*Republic* 425d–e); on the other hand, precisely because political practice must fall short (*Republic* 472a–474b), politics requires the rule of law (*Statesman* 294a–299e).¹⁵

In the small, friendly, repeatedly staged symposium, the maturation of judgment tracks the considered opinion of one's fellow drinkers. The ideal, in light of which the actual is judged, is not some beatific vision or Platonic form. Instead, it comes closer to what Aristotle calls the practical “concord” (*homonoia*) about how to be together (2004, 1167a22–1167b16). Like Socrates's use of *nomos*, this concord is pragmatic; at the same time actual and potential, its potentiality comes into view in practice.

In the Stranger's account, the golden cord of reason is firmly embodied as it ebbs and flows in its contest with the iron cords. Thus, if Socrates in the *Republic* (596b–e) famously attributes the idea of the bed in the human mind to God, the Athenian Stranger would presumably attribute its appearance in the mind to sleepiness. Its training over time enables the psyche to be ashamed of indulging its immediate passions under the effect of intoxication in order to continue to enjoy the company, esteem, and recognition of others.

Unlike law, judgment refers not to general rules but to a shared understanding (Arendt 2003, 145; see also Garsten, 2007); it seeks to persuade not by treating others uniformly but differently according to the democratic art of recognizing distinctness and tending to particular opinions, needs, or fears. It does not eschew personal rule in favor of neutrality but exercises a political form of rule (Garsten 2006, 7). If the Stranger is right, the dialectic that leads to political maturity interweaves the general, dispassionate, and invariable character of law in one's judgment, which *qua* judgment remains individual, perspectival, situated, and embodied. Rule-following in the Cretan and Spartan manner, we now see, blocks the path to political maturity by preempting the exercise of one's judgment.

Finally, the institutional innovation of the symposium consists in the fact that its civic effects are incidental to the practice. The symposium stimulates the capacity to venture forth in speech and deed, vigorously contesting others, suffering their critique, and courageously holding each other accountable that recalls political action. And this similitude is heightened by the threat of lawlessness through overindulgence.

Yet, sympotic experiences are wholly unlike actual political experiences—even at the point of potentially greatest resemblance, alcohol-lubricated discussions do not even approximate political deliberation (Sabl 2002, 4). Political action, of course, can be very pleasurable. But ordinarily, it is also mired in mundane concerns of power, money, status and self-interest, and daunted by the very scale of the public stage where it unfolds and the weight of responsibility that it carries. The symposium, on the other hand, exists only for its own sake; the moment it ceases to be pleasurable, it ceases to be.

The artificially induced loss of autonomy that takes place in the symposium is made pleasurable, appealing, and easy by the delights of friendly, intimate company and wine in ways that actual politics cannot hope to approximate. The handwashing, the wearing of wreaths, and the watering of the wine are all part of the rituals that mark its boundaries (Rösler 1995, 109–110; Allhoff 2008, 1–2; cf. the theatre analogy in Dilworth 2008, 81–94) and

¹⁵ Accordingly, the Athenian Stranger first puts in place the psychology necessary to the political art and then proceeds with a remarkably detailed promulgation of laws.

mark it as a practice that enables the small-scale, face-to-face exchanges promised by our egalitarian model of citizenship (Green 2016, 17). Free of the great responsibilities of political life, sympotic experiences simulate political experiences without resembling them in the least.

This difference makes the simulation of politics effective by controlling its physical and psychological effects in ways that politics cannot. In comparison to the political agon, the symposium is a smaller, bounded, sharply delineated space, with fewer actors. Sympotic performances are not unnerved by the scale of the sympotic stage, suppressed by power and money, or subverted by invisible relationships of habitus and status. Psychologically, the encounter between friends is far more intimate and equal than political encounters in which power, resources, recognition, and representation create far more complex and opaque relationships of rule. To see the other as a friend is to see them as more than debating adversaries or power contenders. Together with its rituals and setting, friendship transforms moments of inebriated antagonism into agonism proper because the admiration and respect for the other necessary to agonism (cf. Honig 1993, 15) come naturally to friends.

The symposiasts are thus, on the one hand, free of the very real psychological burdens of politics—burdens of hierarchy, roleplaying, and exclusion as well as responsibility, decision making, and justice. On the other hand, their engagement occurs in a context of preexisting friendship that allows differences of opinion to be treated as a condition for the enjoyment of the practice. The symposium thus creates a safe space for the intense dialectical movements of the psyche that simulate what ought to occur to a citizen in a democracy over time.

In this way, the symposium speaks to the great divide of democratic citizenship between the Few and the Many because it is not a political institution.¹⁶ The practice trains the spirited virtuosity of the potential Few that may engage in politics for democracy. By sublimating the democratic *nomos* in their judgment, they become psychologically prepared to assert the ideas of equality and liberty; to feel ashamed in the face of intolerance, racism, and xenophobia; and to reject aristocratic impulses of excellence that shut down the sympotic *agon*.

¹⁶Although the Stranger introduces the law in the proceedings through the figure of the symposiarch, the symposium remains located in the nonpolitical sphere of personal intimacy. Symposiarches fail their office if they politicize the institution; were they to do so, the result would hardly be more salutary than the introduction of communal wine-drinking would be in Crete and Sparta.

In it the spiritedness, judgment, and sense of shame relevant to political life are complemented by the democratic dignity-affirming art of responding to the claims, fears, and opinions of others.

However, the symposium also speaks to the shadow of unfairness under which most democratic citizens end up living. The practice redeploys the liberal democratic egalitarian promise that all partake of the pleasures of public self-revelation and performance thus enabling its enjoyment in a more complete and inclusive form than in political life (cf. Green 2016, 130–164)¹⁷: its threshold is lower than entry in active political life, its dynamic is less burdensome and opaque than political life, and its end—in a hangover rather than political failure or headache rather than beheading—is less unpleasant. By reconfiguring in a more intimate and egalitarian manner the “hierarchical speech situation” (Green 2016, 42) typical of liberal democratic regimes, the institution provides an opportunity to enjoy what the realities of inequality deny the ordinary Many.

Although the redeployment of democratic practices away from politics speaks to the Few/Many divide, it does so in a way that is distinctively democratic. After all, these are not two different sorts of educational practices; the ordinary Many can perfectly acquire and display the skills that the Few make use of in politics. The civic practice of the symposium makes the democratic archetype of citizenship accessible to all while taking into account the inequalities that taint liberal democratic citizenship.

Conclusion

None of this is an argument for enlisting binge drinking in citizenship education.¹⁸ Instead, the argument reveals the psychological stakes of balancing the two principles of liberal democracy and its potential implications for institutional theories of democracy. As an informal social practice, the symposium is different not only from the formal institutions but also the informal deliberative assemblies, consultative bodies, and interest groups of liberal democracy. Indeed, it is even different from institutions such as the university campus or the internet which are not *prima facie* political but where people may nevertheless gather to discuss politics. Whether partici-

¹⁷Differently from Green’s Epicureanism, however, the symposium does not encourage political withdrawal.

¹⁸The consumption of alcohol in taverns, banquets, and beer halls, however, has played a considerable role in radical politics whose definitive histories remain to be written (e.g., Baughman 1959; Thompson 1999).

pants discuss politics or not in the symposium is entirely immaterial because its civic usefulness is psychological.

This suggests a path forward for democratic theory that is in keeping with the dialectical nature of the Stranger's argument. Unlike efforts by agonistic and deliberative democrats to design new democratic institutions and the opposite efforts by pragmatists to free up social practices from politics altogether (e.g., Talisse 2019), the Athenian Stranger's ancient argument may be interpreted as a call to think about civic practices that can safely train the spiritedness, judgment, and sense of shame relevant to democratic politics free of the heavy price of political engagement. If democracy is a practical art, the skill of engaging in it must be acquired somewhere. Given the high stakes of political engagement, it should not be left to on-the-job training alone.

The position sketched here comes closest perhaps to theories of agonistic democracy in its integration of the passions, emotions, and affects in civic practice. But, even if they draw different conclusions, contemporary agonists are closer to Kleinias's and Megillus's view that struggle and conflict constitute the nature of the political. This conflictual view may fall victim to its own escalatory tendencies; and since legality at times remains external to political practice in the agonistic approach, it cannot halt its decay into lawlessness or what the Stranger calls "civil war." (628b) By sketching a psychology built on the sublimation of law, the Athenian Stranger opens the door to a properly liberal democratic political psychology.

References

- Alexander, James. 2014. "Notes Towards a Definition of Politics." *Philosophy* 89: 273–300.
- Allhoff, Fritz, ed. 2008. "Wine and Philosophy: A Symposium on Thinking and Drinking." Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Arendt, Hannah. 1998. *The Human Condition*, 2nd edition, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Arendt, Hannah. 2003. "Some Questions of Moral Philosophy." In *Responsibility and Judgment*, ed. Jerome Kohn, 49–146. New York: Schocken Books.
- Aristotle. 2004. *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans., and ed. Roger Crisp, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bartels, L. Myrthe. 2020. "Plato's Seasick Steersman: On (Not) Being Overwhelmed by Fear in Plato's *Laws*." In *Emotions in Plato*, eds. Laura Candiotti and Olivier Renaut, 147–68. Leiden: Brill.
- Baughman, J. John. 1959. "The French Banquet Campaign of 1847–48." *The Journal of Modern History* XXXI(1): 1–15.
- Berlin, Isaiah. 1997. "Two Concepts of Liberty." In *The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays*, eds. Henry Hardy and Roger Hausheer, 191–242. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Brown, Wendy. 2006. *Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Caram, P. Juliano. 2019. "Nomos: Logismós ton Epithymion. Plato's *Laws* and the (De)formation of Desires." In *Psychology and Ontology in Plato*, eds. Luca Pitteloud and Evan Keeling, 125–37. Cham: Springer.
- Connolly, William. 2003. *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- De Pourcq, Marteen. 2008. "'The Paideia of the Greeks': On the Methodology of Roland Barthes's *Comment vivre ensemble*." *Paragraph* 31(1): 23–37.
- Dilworth, John. 2008. "Mmmm ... not Aha! Imaginative vs. Analytical Experiences of Wines." *Wine and Philosophy: A Symposium on Thinking and Drinking*, ed. Fritz Allhoff, 81–94. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Garsten, Bryan. 2006. *Saving Persuasion: A Defense of Rhetoric and Judgment*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Garsten, Bryan. 2007. "The Elusiveness of Arendtian Judgment." *Social Research* 74(4): 1071–108.
- Green, Jeffrey Edward. 2016. *The Shadow of Unfairness: A Plebeian Theory of Liberal Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hirschl, Ron. 2004. *Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Hobsbawm, Eric. 1994. *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914–1991*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Honig, Bonnie. 1993. *Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Honig, Bonnie. 2009. *Emergency Politics: Paradox, Law, Democracy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Kalyvas, Andreas. 2008. *Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary: Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and Hannah Arendt*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lutz, J. Mark. 2015. *Divine Law and Political Philosophy in Plato's Laws*. DeKalb: NIU Press.
- Meyer, S. Susan. 2012. "Pleasure, Pain, and 'Anticipation' in Plato's *Laws*, Book I." In *Presocratics and Plato*, eds. Richard Patterson, Vassilis Karasmanis, and Arnold Hermann, 349–66. Nevada: Parmenides Publishing.
- Meyer, S. Susan. 2015. *Plato: Laws 1 and 2*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- McCormick, P. John. 1997. *Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism: Against Politics as Technology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McCormick, P. John. 2001. "Machiavellian Democracy: Controlling Elites with Ferocious Populism." *American Political Science Review* 95(2): 297–313.
- McCormick, P. John. 2011. *Machiavellian Democracy*. New York/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mouffe, Chantal. 2000. *The Democratic Paradox*. London: Verso.
- Mouffe, Chantal. 2005. *On the Political*. London: Routledge.

- Mouffe, Chantal. 2018. *For a Left Populism*. London: Verso.
- Plato. 1977. *Lysis*, trans. David Bolotin, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Plato. 1977. *Phaedo*, trans. G. M. A Grube, Indiana: Indianapolis.
- Plato. 1980. *The Laws of Plato*, trans. Thomas L. Pangle, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Plato. 1999. *Symposium*, trans. C. Gill, London: Penguin Books.
- Plato. 2007. *The Republic*, 2nd ed. trans. Desmond Lee, London: Penguin Books, 2007.
- Rosa, Hartmut. 2019. *Resonance: A Sociology of Our Relationship to the World*, trans. James C. Wagner. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Rosa, Hartmut. 2020. *The Uncontrollability of the World*, trans., James C. Wagner. Cambridge: Polity.
- Rösler, Wolfgang. 1995. "Wine and Truth in the Greek *Symposium*." In *In Vino Veritas*, eds. Oswyn Murray and Manuela Tecuşan, 106–12. London: The British School of Rome.
- Sabl, Andrew. 2002. *Ruling Passions: Political Offices and Democratic Ethics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Saxonhouse, W. Arlene. 2006. *Free Speech and Democracy in Ancient Athens*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Scruton, Roger. 2007. "The Philosophy of Wine." In *Questions of Taste: The Philosophy of Wine*, ed. Barry C. Smith, 18–38. Oxford: Signal Books.
- Talissee, Robert, P. 2019. *Overdoing Democracy: Why We Must Put Politics in its Place*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Taminiaux, Jacques. 2000. "Athens and Rome." In *The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt*, ed. Dana Villa, 165–77. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tarnopolsky, Christina. 2010. *Prudes, Perverts, and Tyrants: Plato's Gorgias and the Politics of Shame*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Thompson, Peter. 1999. *Rum, Punch, and Revolution: Tavern-going & Public Life in Eighteenth Century Philadelphia*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Tully, James. 2002. "The Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to Their Ideals of Constitutional Democracy." *The Modern Law Review Limited* 65(2): 204–28.
- Tully, James. 2008. "Public Philosophy in a New Key." Volumes 1 & 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tushnet, Mark. 2000. *Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Zartaloudis, Thanos. 2019. *The Birth of Nomos*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Wenman, Mark. 2013. *Agonistic Democracy: Constituent Power in the Era of Globalization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wingenbach, Edward C. 2016. *Institutionalizing Agonistic Democracy: Post-Foundationalism and Political Liberalism*. Abingdon: Routledge.