Abschlussbericht: Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit im erweiterten Europa

Gefördert durch die Deutsche Forschungsgesellschaft DFG
(JA 638/12-1, JA 638/12-2)

Prof. Dr. Detlef Jahn
in Zusammenarbeit mit Jan Helmdag

Universität Greifswald

Abstract

Within the research project *Wohlfahrtsstaatliche Politik im erweiterten Europa* (Welfare policies in the enlarged Europe), funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG), social security programs of ten Central Eastern European (CEE) Countries were investigated. As a result of the research project, the applicant Prof. Dr. Detlef Jahn (University of Greifswald), published the *Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset 2* (CWED2) in collaboration with Prof. Lyle Scruggs (University of Connecticut, USA) and Dr. Kati Kuitto (Finnish Centre for Pensions, Finland). CWED2 is a comprehensive dataset that contains information on replacement rates, important policy parameters, and generosity scores on public social security programs as unemployment, sickness, pension, and minimum pension benefits in 33 OECD countries from 1970–2010. The dataset and its codebook is accessible free-of-charge on the website `www.cwed2.org`. An evaluation of publications published via peer-review process reveals that more than 200 articles, chapters in edited volumes, and books use CWED2 when analyzing replacement rates and generosity scores.

The analysis of replacement rates of CEE countries and established Western welfare states conducted within the project revealed a multitude of developments can be observed: 1) We can still observe welfare regime clusters 2) CEE countries continuously increase the generosity of their social security programs over time and approximate their Western counterparts, 3) empirical analysis reveals that CEE countries do not form a homogenous and disjoint cluster, 4) we can not empirically observe general trends (i.e. race to the top, race to the bottom, universal convergence or divergence) for all welfare regimes, 5) economic growth, partisanship, and economic openness have only minor impacts on replacement rates, 6) most of the countries experience high degrees of path dependencies, 7) diffusion of social policies has an non-uniform influence on policy making processes with varying degree, and 8) socio-economic pressures (i.e. dependency ratios, number of benefit recipients) as well as institutional factors (notably the degree of corporatism) have substantial impact on reforms of replacement rates.

Kurzzusammenfassung

Das von der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) geförderte Projekt *Wohlfahrtsstaatliche Politik im erweiterten Europa* diente der Erforschung wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Sozialversicherungsprogramme in zehn mittelosteuropäischen Ländern. Aus der Zusammenarbeit des Antragsstellers Herrn Prof. Dr. Jahn (Universität Greifswald) mit Prof. Lyle Scruggs (University of Connecticut, USA) und Dr. Kati Kuitto (FInnish Centre for Pensions, Finnland) resultierte dabei der *Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset 2* (CWED2). Dieser Datensatz enthält Informationen zu Lohnersatzraten und Kriterien der Leistungsberechtigung in den zentralen Sozialsicherungsprogrammen (Arbeitslosen-, Kranken- und Rentenversicherung, sowie allgemeiner Grundsicherung) sowie der Generosität der einzelnen Teilprogramme und des gesamten wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Engagaments für insgesamt acht Haushalts- und Einkommenstypen von 33 OECD-Ländern für die Jahre 1970 bis 2010. Dieser Datensatz ist frei verfügbar und kann auf der Webseite `www.cwed2.org` inklusive des Codebuches heruntergeladen werden. Eine Evaluierung der Anzahl der Publikationen, die CWED2-Daten benutzen, zeigt bereits zu dem Zeitpunkt des Projektabschlusses auf, dass der Datensatz frequentiert genutzt wird und innerhalb von über 200 Publikationen, die ein *peer review*-Verfahren durchlaufen haben, genutzt wird.

Die innerhalb des Projektes durchgeführte Analyse der neu gewonnenen Daten über öffentliche Sozialversicherungsprogramme in mittelosteuropäischen Ländern und etablierten Wohlfahrtsstaaten westlicher Länder zeigte auf, dass sowohl in den jüngeren Wohlfahrtsstaaten der mittelosteuropäischen Länder, als auch in den etablierten Wohlfahrtsstaaten der westlichen Länder eine Vielzahl von Entwicklungen zu beobachten sind: 1) Es lassen sich nach wie vor wohlfahrtsstaatliche Regimecluster beobachten, 2) mittelosteuropäische Wohlfahrtstaaten nähern sich bezüglich der Lohnersatzraten an die westlichen Wohlfahrtsstaaten an, 3) empirische Analysen zeigen, dass mittelosteuropäische Wohlfahrtsstaaten kein eigenständiges, homogenes Cluster bilden, 4) allgemeingültigen Trends (*race to the top, race to the bottom,* allgemeine Konvergenz oder Divergenz) bezüglich der Reformierung der öffentlichen Sozialversicherungen beobachten, 5) Wirtschaftswachstum, Parteiendifferenzhypothese und wirtschaftliche Offenheit üben lediglich geringen Einfluss auf die Reformtätigkeit aus, 6) Pfadabhängigkeiten schränken nach wie vor die Reformrichtung massiv ein, 7) Difussionsprozesse finden statt, haben jedoch einen uneinheitlichen Einfluss und 8) sozio-ökonomischer Druck (Anzahl der EmpfängerInnen von Sozialleistungen) und institutionelle Faktoren (insb. der Korporatismusgrad) stellen große Einflüsse auf Lohnersatzraten dar.

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1 Allgemeine Angaben

1.1 DFG-Geschäftszeichen

JA 638/12-1, JA 638/12-2

1.2 Antragsteller

Prof. Dr. Detlef Jahn
Lehrstuhlinhaber
geboren am 05.04.1956, Deutscher

Frühere Anträge:
JA 638/1-5 (Habilitationsstipendium)
JA 638/7-1; JA 638/7-2; JA 638/7-3 JA 638/10-1; JA 638/10-2
E-Mail: djahn@uni-greifswald.de

1.3 Institut/Lehrstuhl

Ernst-Moritz-Arndt-Universität Greifswald
Institut für Politik- und Kommunikationswissenschaft
Lehrstuhl für vergleichende Regierungslehre Baderstr. 6/7
17489 Greifswald

1.4 Thema des Projekts

Wohlfahrtsstaatliche Politik im erweiterten Europa. Eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungstendenzen wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Arrangements in West- und Osteuropa.

1.5 Berichtszeitraum, Förderungszeitraum insgesamt

Das Projekt startete am 01. Februar 2007 und wurde ab dem 01. März 2009 durch die DFG gefördert. Zusätzlich wurde seitens der DFG ein Fortsetzungsantrag zur Förderung des Projektes vom 01. Dezember 2011 bis zum 31. Januar 2014 bewilligt. Dieser Zeitraum wurde anschließend noch durch eine kostenneutrale Verlängerung bis zum 30. September 2015 erweitert.

1.6 Liste der wichtigsten Publikationen aus diesem Projekt

Veröffentlichungen

Ahonen, Kati, Kuitto, Kati and Palomäki, Liisa-Maria (2017). Eläkeikäisten toimeentulo ja pienituloisuus eurooppalaisessa vertailussa [Income and poverty of retirees in European comparison], in: Kuivalainen, Susan/Rantala, Juha/Ahonen, Kati/Kuitto, Kati/Palomäki, Liisa-Maria (eds.) 2017. Eläkkeet ja eläkeläisten toimeentulo 1995–2015 [Pensions and livelihood of retirees 1995-2015]. Helsinki: Finnish Centre for Pensions.

Jahn, D. (2011). Conceptualizing Left and Right in comparative politics: Towards a deductive approach. *Party Politics*, 17(6), 745–765.

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—— (2015). Diffusion. In: *Handbuch Policy-Forschung*, eds. Wenzelburger, G. and Zohlnhöfer, R. Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, pp. 247–276.

—— (2016) Distribution Regimes and Redistribution Effects during Retrenchment and Crisis: A Cui Bono Analysis of Unemployment Replacement Rates of Various Income Categories in 31 Welfare States. *Journal of European Social Policy*, forthcoming.

Jahn, D., and Kuitto, K. (2011). Taking stock of policy performance in Central and Eastern Europe: Policy outcomes between policy reform, transitional pressure and international influence. *European Journal of Political Research*, 50(6), 719–748.

——, and Stephan, S. (2015). The Problem of Interdependence. In: *Comparative Politics: Theoretical and Methodological Challenges*, eds. Dietmar Braun and Martino Maggetti. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 15–54.

Kuitto, Kati (2011). More than just money: Patterns of disaggregated welfare expenditure in the enlarged Europe. *Journal of European Social Policy*, Vol. 21(4), 348–364.

—— (2016). From social security to social investment? Compensating and social investment welfare policies in a life course perspective. *Journal of European Social Policy* 26(5): 442–459.

—— (2016). Measuring welfare entitlement generosity in developing welfare states: the case of post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. *Social Indicators Research*, first online 17 December 2016, doi:10.1007/s11205-016-1520-1.

—— (2016). *Post-Communist Welfare States in European Context: Patterns of Welfare Policies in Central and Eastern Europe*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Andere Veröffentlichungen

Helmdag, J. and Kuitto, K. (2016). Interdependent Learning from Policy Success: Contextual Diffusion of Active Labour Market Policies. *Greifswald Comparative Politics Working*

Paper, 10/2016. http://comparativepolitics.uni-greifswald.de/gcp/GCP-10-2016.pdf.

Jahn, D., Kuitto K. and Düpont, N. (together with Lingner, E., Broeren, M. and Grafe, T.) (2011). Interim report of the research project "Welfare policies in the enlarged Europe". Research report, University of Greifswald.

—, —, —, and Sebastian Stephan (2014). Uneven responsiveness to diffusion effects? Regional patterns of unemployment policy diffusion in Western and Eastern Europe. *CWED Working Paper Series*, WP 02: November 2014. http://cwed2.org/Data/CWED2_WP_02_2014.pdf.

Kuitto, K. (2012). Emerging Patterns of Welfare Policies in Central and Eastern Europe. Post-Communist Welfare States in the European Context. Dissertation, University of Greifswald.

—, and Helmdag, J. (2016). Extending the tail end of working lives: How policies shape labour market participation and retirement of older workers. Working paper, manuscript version September 2016. http://www.etk.fi/wp-content/uploads/Kuitto-Helmdag-sep2016.pdf.

—, Jahn, D. and Düpont, N. (2012). Welfare policy institutions in the enlarged EU - convergence, divergence or persistence? *Greifswald Comparative Politics Working Paper* No. 1/2012. http://comparativepolitics.uni-greifswald.de/gcp/GCP-1-2012.pdf.

Patente

n.z.

2 Arbeits- und Ergebnisbericht

2.1 Ausgangsfragen und Zielsetzung des Projekts

Moderne Wohlfahrtsstaaten sind durch eine Vielzahl von nationalen und internationalen Einflüssen geprägt. Der demographische Wandel in den entwickelten Industrienationen, eine weit verbreitete fiskalische Austeritätspolitik sowie eine zunehmende Internationalisierung durch ökonomische Globalisierung sind die dabei entscheidenden Faktoren. Inwieweit die Mitgliedsstaaten der EU im Allgemeinen sowie die mittelosteuropäischen Staaten im Besonderen auf diese Faktoren reagieren konnte aufgrund der Datenlage bisher nicht in einem umfassenden vergleichenden Rahmen analysiert werden.

Sowohl etablierte westeuropäische Demokratien als auch die neuen Demokratien Mittelosteuropas sehen sich seit Jahren mit vielfältigen Herausforderungen an ihre Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit konfrontiert. Angesichts der wirtschaftlichen Globalisierung und der Offenheit der Märkte stehen europäische Wohlfahrtsstaaten zunehmend unter Wettbewerbsdruck. Gesellschaftliche Umwandlungsprozesse wie eine zunehmend alternde Bevölkerung, der Wandel wirtschaftlicher Produktionsstrukturen, zunehmende Arbeitsmarktbeteiligung von Frauen sowie Immigration bedeuten neue Herausforderungen für Gestaltung und Umfang sozialer Sicherungssysteme. Umfangreiche Verpflichtungen in den Bereichen Arbeitslosen- und Alterssicherung, verbunden mit einer stetig wachsenden Zahl leistungsberechtigter Bürger, haben zur permanenten Austerität der Sozialversicherungssysteme geführt. Zudem eröffnet die sozialpolitische Dimension der EU für die europäischen Wohlfahrtsstaaten neue Perspektiven, bringt aber auch Einschränkungen in der Gestaltungsautonomie mit sich. Diesen Herausforderungen begegnen westliche Wohlfahrtsstaaten seit den späten 1970er Jahren – dem Ende der „goldenen Ära“ des Wohlfahrtsstaates – mit zum Teil umfassenden Reformen. In den postkommunistischen Staaten Mittelosteuropas standen die Wohlfahrtssysteme nach dem Systemumbruch 1989/90 unter den Bedingungen der politischen und wirtschaftlichen Transformation gänzlich zur Revision. Gleichzeitig sind sie zunehmend mit denselben Herausforderungen konfrontiert wie die etablierten Wohlfahrtsstaaten Westeuropas.

Die möglichen Entwicklungsrichtungen und Konvergenztendenzen der europäischen Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit werden angesichts der internationalen und nationalen Herausforderungen sowie der wachsenden Interdependenzen in der vergleichenden Wohlfahrtsstaatsforschung verstärkt seit den 1990er Jahren debattiert. Die Reformwelle in den europäischen Wohlfahrtsstaaten, die sich in den 1990er Jahren intensiviert hat, hat sowohl die öffentliche Wahrnehmung als auch Wissenschaftler dazu veranlasst, vom „Abbau“, von der „Krise“ oder gar vom „Ende“ des Wohlfahrtsstaates zu sprechen. Gerade im Hinblick auf die Neujustierung mittelosteuropäischer Wohlfahrtsstaaten wurde befürchtet, dass der eventuelle neoliberale Kurs zusammen mit dem zunehmenden Wettbewerbsdruck als Folge der Offenheit der Märkte zum sozialen Dumping im gesamten Europa führen würde. Ob die Befürchtungen um die Konvergenz der europäischen Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit

Tabelle 2.1: Hypothesen aus dem Arbeitsprogramm

Nummer	Name	Inhalt
A1	Regimecluster	Europäische Wohlfahrtsstaaten weisen nationale Varianz auf. Sie gruppieren sich in verschiedene Regimetypen (sozialdemokratisch, konservativ, liberal, mediterran).
A2a	Mittelosteuropäische Wohlfahrtsstaaten I	Mittelosteuropäische Wohlfahrtsstaaten weisen deutliche nationale Varianz auf. Einzelne Staaten nähern sich einem der westlichen Regimetypen an.
A2b	Mittelosteuropäische Wohlfahrtsstaaten II	Mittelosteuropäische Wohlfahrtsstaaten bilden im Vergleich zu den restlichen europäischen Staaten einen eigenen Typus von Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit.
B1	Konvergenz	Europäische Staaten nähern sich einander im Zeitverlauf bezüglich ihrer wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Politikmuster an.
B2a	Race to the bottom	Europäische Wohlfahrtsstaaten nähern sich bezüglich ihrer Politikmuster an. Dabei geht der Trend in Richtung niedriger sozialer Standards/in Richtung eines minimalen Wohlfahrtsstaates.
B2b	Race to the top	Europäische Staaten nähern sich bezüglich ihrer wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Politikmuster an. Dabei geht der Trend Richtung hoher sozialer Standards/in Richtung eines umfassenden Wohlfahrtsstaates.
B2c	Neues Modell	Europäische Staaten nähern sich bezüglich ihrer wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Politikmuster und dabei entsteht ein neues Modell der Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit.
B3	Divergenz	Europäische Staaten nähern sich im Zeitverlauf bezüglich ihrer wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Politikmuster nicht an, sondern entfernen sich voneinander.
C1	Parteiendifferenz	Es besteht ein Zusammenhang zwischen der programmatischen Positionierung der Regierungsparteien und der wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Politik. Linke Regierungen tendieren dabei dazu, umfangreichere wohlfahrtsstaatliche Politik zu betreiben.
C2	Pfadabhängigkeit	Der institutionalisierte Typus des Wohlfahrtsstaates determiniert die weitere Entwicklung der Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit.
C3	Transformation	Erfolge der wirtschaftlichen Transformation determinieren die wohlfahrtsstaatliche Politik in den postkommunistischen Staaten.
D1	Wirtschaftliche Offenheit	Wirtschaftliche Offenheit beeinflusst die wohlfahrtsstaatliche Politik im Sinne der Effizienz- oder Kompensationshypothese.
D2	Diffusion	Diffusionsprozesse zwischen den europäischen Staaten beeinflussen im Zeitverlauf die wohlfahrtsstaatliche Politik im Sinne der Konvergenzhypothese.
E1	Kontrollvariablen	Wohlfahrtsstaaten werden nicht nur von nationalstaatlichen und internationalen Faktoren, sondern auch von wirtschaftlichen, strukturellen und demographischen Einflussgrößen beeinflusst.

auf den kleinsten gemeinsamen Nenner (*race to the bottom*) sich als reell erweisen, ob im Gegensatz dazu in Europa ein gemeinsames ëuropäisches Sozialmodell"mit hohen sozialen Standards entsteht oder ob die von Esping-Andersen (1990) identifizierten wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Regime, welche verschiedene Ausprägungen national divergierender wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Arrangements darstellen, weiterhin Bestand haben, blieb bislang offen. Die meisten Analysen konzentrierten

sich bisher auf die westlichen OECD-Länder. Die nach dem Systemumbruch 1989/90 entstandenen wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Arrangements in Mittel- und Osteuropa sind dagegen bis jetzt nur rudimentär systematisch empirisch und vergleichend untersucht worden, so dass unser sozialwissenschaftliches Wissen über den Charakter der sich neu formierenden Wohlfahrtsstaaten sowie über die Determinanten der wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Politik in den neuen Demokratien Mittel- und Osteuropas noch unzureichend ist. Systematische Erkenntnisse über gesamteuropäische Entwicklungen der Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit gerade im Hinblick auf Parallelen im westlichen und östlichen Europa blieben daher eher lückenhaft. Das vorliegende Forschungsprojekt soll zur Schließung dieser Forschungslücke beitragen.

Eines der ursprünglichen Ziele des vorliegenden Forschungsprojektes war es die wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Politikmuster von 27 EU-Mitgliedsstaaten sowie Norwegen und der Schweiz zu identifizieren. Des weiteren sollte die Entwicklung im Hinblick auf die postulierten Konvergenz- bzw. Divergenztendenzen im Zeitraum von 1995 bis 2006 analysiert werden. Weiterhin sollte empirisch getestet werden, welchen Einfluss internationale Faktoren, die unter den Stichworten Globalisierung und Internationalisierung zusammengefasst werden können, unter Berücksichtigung zentraler nationalstaatlicher Faktoren auf die wohlfahrtsstaatliche Politik im erweiterten Europa ausüben. Das ursprüngliche Ziel der Identifizierung der wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Politikmuster hat sich im Verlauf des Projektes auf insgesamt 33 Staaten ausgeweitet. Die Konvergenztendenzen der mittelosteuropäischen Staaten wurden bereits ausführlich im Zwischenbericht ausgewertet. Abschließend galt es die erhobenen Daten im Hinblick auf den Einfluss von nationalen und internationalen Charakteristika zu untersuchen, wie wir in den vorangegangen Abschnitten aufzeigten. Die Veröffentlichung des Datensatzes mit den neuen Haushaltstypen stellt den finalen Schritt des Projektes dar. Damit lässt sich abschließend sagen, dass die Ausgangsfragen des Projektes beantwortet werden konnten und die Zielsetzungen übererfüllt wurden.

2.2 Entwicklung der durchgeführten Arbeiten

Die Durchführung der Arbeiten folgte dem Ziel einen Datensatz mit umfassenden Daten zur Sozialversicherung für die vorgestellte Analyse zu erstellen. Die Erhebung der Daten erwies sich dabei als vielschichtiger und komplexer als ursprünglich angedacht. Bei der Erfassung von Daten für länger in der Vergangenheit zurückliegende Zeitpunkte stießen wir wiederholt das Problem der Datenverfügbarkeit. Dies trifft insbesondere auf die Formierungsphase der Mittelosteuropäischen Wohlfahrtsstaaten Anfang bis Mitte der 1990er Jahre zu, für die wir teilweise nur begrenzt Daten finden konnten, weshalb innerhalb des Datensatzes die Datenpunkte für diese Länder erst einheitlich ab dem Jahr 1995 vorliegen. Oftmals gelang es uns bei einigen Ländern erst nach mehrmaliger Kontaktaufnahme mit den entsprechenden Behörden in den jeweiligen Ländern die von uns angeforderten Daten (oder zumindest entsprechende Äquivalente) zu erhalten.

Ebenfalls als aufwändig und zeitintensiv erwies sich die Einarbeitung von studentischen Hilfskräften in das Forschungsfeld und die ausgesprochen anspruchsvolle Art und Weise der Datenerhebung. Entsprechende Verzögerungen setzten demnach ein, wenn Hilfskräfte die Arbeit im Projekt beendeten (bpsw. durch Studienabschluss oder -ortswechsel) und neue, geeignete Hilfskräfte gefunden und anschließend eingearbeitet werden mussten.

2.3 Ergebnisse

Die Haupterrungenschaften des Projektes *Wohlfahrtsstaatliche Politik im erweiterten Europa* sind zum einen die neu erhobenen Daten, die den Umfang des bisherigen Datensatzes um ein vielfaches übersteigen und zum Anderen die dadurch ermöglichten Analysen und deren Ergebnisse. Die Arbeit im Projekt führte zur Veröffentlichung des neuen *Comparative Welfare Entitlement Dataset 2* (CWED2)-Datensatzes mit Informationen zu Lohnersatzraten und Generositätsindizes von vier zentralen Sozialversicherungsprogrammen (Arbeitslosigkeit, Krankheit, Altersrente und Sozialrente) mit insgesamt acht Haushaltstypen und weiteren parametrischen Indikatoren eben dieser Programme im Zeitraum von 1970 bis 2010 für 33 Länder. Zehn dieser Länder sind mittelosteuropäische Staaten, die in vorangegangenen Versionen des Datensatzes bisher nicht enthalten waren. Der Datensatz ist online auf der Webseite `www.cwed2.org` frei zum Download verfügbar und kann aufgrund der vorhandenen Einstellungsmöglichkeiten nach Belieben modifiziert werden.

Das Hauptziel des CWED2-Datensatzes ist es dem Kollegium von Forschenden einen umfassenden und adäquaten Datensatz mit einer Vielzahl an Inidkatoren und Indizes bereitzustellen. Dabei basiert der Datensatz auf dem anerkannten *social citizenship*-Ansatz für die Analyse von Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit (Danforth and Stephens, 2013; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi and Palme, 1998, 2003; Marshall, 1950; Scruggs, 2007; Scruggs and Allan, 2006, 2008; Titmuss, 1974).[1] Der Hauptfokus dieses Ansatzes liegt auf der Bereitstellung von Daten zu wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Programmen die Lohnersatzleistungen bei Arbeitslosigkeit, Krankheit, oder Altersrente, basierend auf nationaler Gesetzgebung, bereitstellen. Darauf aufbauend, werden Lohnersatzraten, Qualifikationskriterien, Abdeckungsraten, sowie die Generosität der wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Programme analysiert um Wohlfahrtsregime zu identifizieren.

Der erste öffentlich zugängliche Datensatz war der CWED1-Datensatz von Lyle Scruggs (2004).[2] Dieser Datensatz enthielt jährlich erhobene Zeitreihen zu den oben genannten wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Programmen für 18 OECD-Länder (später folgte der sog. *Social Citizenship Indicator Program* (SCIP)-Datensatz mit längeren 5-Jahreszeitreihen für das gleiche Ländersample von Walter Korpi und Joakim Palme (2007)). Der CWED1-Datensatz erlangte eine große Popularität innerhalb der Gemeinschaft der Forschenden große Popularität und ist einer der meist verwendeten und zitierten Datensätze innerhalb der vergleichenden Wohlfahrtsstaatsforschung.

Die Lohnersatzraten innerhalb des CWED1-Datensatzes wurden in Referenz auf den durchschnittlichen Arbeitslohn im sekundären Sektor (sog. *average production worker wage*) für Single- und Partnerhaushalte erhoben. Diese fiktiven, repräsentativen Personen (auch *notional persons* genannt) repräsentierten die Durschnittsempfängerinnen und -empfänger und galten als geeignetes Maß um die Generosität von wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Progammen zu messen. Diese fiktiven Personen und die daraus resultierenden Haushaltstypen verloren jedoch im Laufe der Zeit kontinuierlich an Bedeutung und wurden zunehmend ungeeigneter um zentrale Fragen der vergleichenden Wohlfahrtsstaatsforschung, die sich beispielsweise mit der Generosität für Teilzeitbeschäftigte oder Geringverdiende oder dem Grad der Disparität der Generosität von Sozialleistungen

[1] Für eine neuere Diskussion um die theoretischen Implikationen und methodischen Herausforderungen dieses Ansatzes siehe auch: Danforth and Stephens (2013); Ferrarini et al. (2013); Scruggs (2013).

[2] Aus Gründen der Verständlichkeit sprechen wir vom CWED1-Datensatz um auf die erste Version zu rekurrieren, auch wenn dieser Datensatz CWED hieß und die zusätzliche Versionsnummer nicht enthielt.

für unterschiedliche Einkommensniveaus beschäftigten, zu beantworten. Einige Projekte versuchten diesem Problem durch Mikrosimulationen, die auf Umfragedaten basieren, entgegenzuwirken (bspw. das *tax-benefit micro-simulation model* der Europäischen Union EUROMOD; Sutherland and Figari (2013)), was unter anderem den gesteigerten Bedarf an differenzierteren Daten demonstriert.

Mit dem CWED2-Datensatz wurden die bereits angesprochenen Defizite bisher bestehender Datensätze beseitigt und die Entwicklungstendenzen bezüglich der Form der Beschäftigung sowie der sich verändernden Rolle der Frau und Familie in der post-industriellen Gesellschaft (Bonoli, 2006; Esping-Andersen, 2002; Hemerijck, 2013; Taylor-Gooby, 2004) durch die Implementation neuer Haushaltstypen berücksichtigt. In der neuen Version des Datensatzes sind nun acht Haushaltstypen, zehn Mittelosteuropäische Länder sowie Griechenland, Spanien, Portugal und die beiden asiatischen Staaten Taiwan und Südkorea enthalten. Zusätzlich sind die enthaltenen Zeitreihen um acht Jahre länger und enden im Jahr 2010. Die sechs neuen Haushaltstypen beinhalten nun Beschäftigte mit geringem und hohem Einkommen sowie alleinerziehende Eltern in Teilzeitarbeit. Die Veröffentlichung des CWED2-Datensatzes[3] wurde innerhalb der Gemeinschaft der Forschenden positiv aufgenommen (siehe bspw. Schmidt, 2015; Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer, 2014).

2.4 Indikatoren im CWED2-Datensatz

Innerhalb des CWED2-Datensatzes werden systematisch erhobene Daten zu staatlichen Sozialversicherungsprogrammen in 33 OECD-Ländern für die Jahre 1970 bis 2010 erfasst. Der Datensatz Informationen für vier zentrale staatliche Sozialversicherungsprogramme (Arbeitslosigkeit, Krankheit, Minimal- und Altersrente). Diese vier Programme haben zusammen genommen den bei weitem größten Anteil an aggregierten Sozialausgaben in westlichen Industrienationen (siehe bspw. Kuitto, 2011; Obinger and Wagschal, 2010; Pierson, 2001).

Die Arbeitslosenversicherung deckt öffentlich finanzierte Versicherungsprogramme ab und schließt Programme wie Arbeitslosenhilfe und privat oder betriebliche Programme aus. Die Krankenversicherung beinhaltet Programme zur Lohnabsicherung im Falle von nicht-arbeitsgebundener Krankheit (bspw. Betriebsunfälle). Dazu zählen auch gesetzliche Regelungen, bei denen der Arbeitgeber die Lohnausgleichszahlung leistet. Rentenprogramme sind ausschließlich öffentlich finanzierte Programme der gesetzlichen Altersvorsorge aus der ersten Säule. Erwerbsbasierte oder private Vorsorgeprogramme sind aufgrund ihrer variablen Form der Verzinsung und Auszahlung nicht berücksichtigt. Neben lohngebundenen Rentenprogrammen sind in CWED2 auch Daten zur Mindestrente/Grundsicherung enthalten. Diese Programme erfassen die Sicherung für Personen mit unzureichender Qualifikationsgrundlage (bspw. unzureichende Erwerbshistorie) für die oben genannten Programme.

Die in den einzelnen Sozialversicherungsprogrammen enthaltenen Lohnersatzraten werden nach derselben Methodik errechnet wie in den für CWED2 grundlegenden Publikationen CWED1 (Scruggs, 2004) und dem SCIP (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi and Palme, 2007). Grundlage für die Berechnung sind dabei mehrere standardisierte Haushaltstypen, die unterschiedliche

[3] Der Datensatz kann unter folgender URL heruntergeladen werden: `www.cwed2.org`.

Personen- und Einkommenskonstellationen berücksichtigen. Die Lohnersatzraten sind dabei definiert durch das Verhältnis von Nettosozialleistung zu Nettolohn (siehe Gleichung 2.1). Im Detail ergibt sich die Nettosozialleistung aus der Bruttosozialleistung abzüglich Steuern und Sozialversicherungsbeiträgen (siehe Gleichung 2.2).[4] Der Nettolohn ergibt sich aus dem Bruttolohn abzüglich (Lohn-)Steuern und Sozialversicherungsbeiträgen.

$$\text{Lohnersatzrate (RR)} = \frac{\text{Nettosozialleistung}}{\text{Nettolohn}} \tag{2.1}$$

$$RR = \frac{\text{Bruttosozialleistung} - \text{Steuern} - \text{Sozialversicherungsbeiträge} + \text{Sonstiges}}{\text{Bruttolohn} - \text{Steuern} - \text{Sozialversicherungsbeiträge} + \text{Sonsitges}} \tag{2.2}$$

Die in CWED2 enthaltenen Haushaltstypen können in folgende zwei Subgruppen unterteilt werden: a) Single- und b) Partnerhaushalte. Für diese beiden Gruppen werden Lohnersatzraten für jeweils vier Haushaltstypen (insgesamt acht), die zwar fiktiv, jedoch repräsentativ für die Gesamtpopulation sein sollen, berechnet.[5] Eine tabellarische Auflistung der vorhandenen Haushaltstypen findet sich in Tabelle 2.2. Die Gruppe der Singlehaushalte ist definiert durch alleinstehende Personen, die 50% bis 200% des sog *average production worker*-Lohnniveaus, das von der OECD festgelegt wurde, verdienen.[6] Die zweite Gruppe von Haushaltstypen werden durch verheiratete Paare mit zwei Kindern[7] repräsentiert mit einem zwischen 50% und 150% variierenden Lohnniveau.[8]

Auf Basis der acht Haushaltstypen ist es möglich neue Indizes zu erstellen, die das Einkommensniveau bestimmer Haushaltstypen, die ein ähnliches Einkommensniveau besitzen, zusammenfassen (siehe Tabelle 2.2 untere Hälfte). Durch das Vorhandensein der neuen Indizes ist es nun möglich das Niveau und die Entwicklung von aggregierten Lohnersatzraten verschiedener Einkommensgruppen zu untersuchen. Dadurch ermöglicht der Datensatz die Untersuchung von neuen Fragestellungen, die explizit die Unterschiede in der Reformbereitschaft einzelner Regierungen gegenüber bestimmten Einkommensgruppen in den Fokus rücken.

Zusätzlich zu den Lohnersatzraten und den aggregierten Indizes werden Informationen zu der Berechtigung von Leistungsempfängerinnen und -empfänger (bspw. Bedingungen zur Inanspruchnahme, Länge des Auszahlungszeitraums) angegeben. Diese Indikatoren werden anschließend genutzt um den allgemeinen Umfang eines Sozialversicherungsprogramms mittels des sog. Generositätsindex (*generosity score*) zu beschreiben (Scruggs, 2013, 2014).

[4] Andere (Zusatz-)Leistungen wie bspw. Kindergeld werden unter dem Sammelbegriff "Sonstiges" geführt. Dies gilt ebenfalls für die Berechnung des Nettolohnes.

[5] Die gewählten Haushaltstypen folgen dem Kodierungsschemata des CWED1-Datensatzes und sind im Codebuch dokumentiert. Downloadlink: `http://cwed2.org/Data/Codebook.pdf`.

[6] Falls die Höhe der Lohnersatzraten und die Zeitspanne deren Auszahlung abhängig sein sollten vom Alter der betroffenen Person und deren bisheriger Arbeitsbiographie, so gehen wir aus praktikablen Gründen davon aus, dass diese Person 40 Jahre alt ist und die letzten 20 Jahre Ihres Lebens ununterbrochen gearbeitet hat. Ebenfalls gehen wir davon aus, dass die betroffene Person männlich ist, insofern dies von Relevanz sien sollte. Die Gruppe der Singlehaushalte enthält außerdem eine alleinerziehende Person mit einem Lohnniveau von 50% und mit zwei Kindern im Alter von sieben und zwölf Jahren.

[7] Wie bereits bei der alleinerziehenden Person, sind auch hier die Kinder sieben resp. zwölf Jahre alt.

[8] Für den Fall dass die Generosität der wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Programme vom Familienstatus abhängen, gehen wir davon aus, dass der/die Ehepartner/in abhängig vom Ehepartner ist. Wie bereits bei den Singlehaushalten gehen wir davon aus, dass der Hauptverdiener des betroffenen Haushaltes eine männliche Person ist, falls dies in dem jeweiligen Wohlfahrtssystem eines Landes von Belang ist.

Tabelle 2.2: Haushaltstypen in CWED2

Einkommensniveau	Beschreibung
Singlehaushalt	
50%	Niedriges Einkommen/Teilzeitarbeit
50%	Alleinerziehnd, zwei Kinder; niedriges Einkommen/Teilzeitarbeit
100%	Durchschn. Einkommen, vorhanden in CWED1
200%	Hohes Einkommen
Partnerhaushalt	
50%, 50%	Niedriges Einkommen/Teilzeitarbeit, beide
100%, 0%	Durchschn. Einkommen, finanziell abhängiger Partner; vorhanden in CWED1
100%, 50%	Durchschn. Einkommen, finanziell abhängiger Partner hat niedriges Einkommen/Teilzeitarbeit
150%, 150%	Hohes Einokmmen, beide
Indizes	
Niedriges Einkommen[a]	50% Single, 50%/50% Partner
Mittleres Einkommen	100% Single, 100%/0% Partner, 100%/50% Partner
Hohes Einkommen	200% Single, 150%/150% Partner

[a] Aufgrund unzureichender Datenverfügbarkeit ist der alleinerziehende Single nicht im aggregierten Index enthalten.

2.4.1 Beschreibung Indikatoren und Variablen; Haushaltstypen

Eine weitere Haupterrungenschaft ist die erstmalige Analyse der Entwicklung von Lohnersatzraten für verschiedene Einkommensniveaus in dem gesamten Sample im Allgemeinen und für Mittelosteuropa im Besonderen. Wie wir in der Analyse zeigen, erlaubt die programmatischen, inhaltlichen und geographischen Erweiterungen des neuen Datensatzes aufgrund ihrer Vielfältigkeit und neu ermöglichten Aggregationsmöglichkeiten eine bisher unerreichte analytische Tiefe, die mit anderen Datensätzen nicht möglich ist. Die vorliegenden Ergebnisse zeigen, dass nationale und internationale Faktoren die Wohlfahrtsstaalichkeit in den analysierten Ländern beeinflussen. Je nach Art der Sozialversicherung (Arbeitslosengeld, Krankengeld, Altersrente) und dem Einkommensniveau der Empfängerinnen und Empfänger der jeweiligen Sozialleistung können die Ergebnisse jedoch stark variieren.

Dies weist letztlich auf, wie wichtig der von uns erstellte Datensatz für eine detaillierte und differenzierte Analyse von Wohlfahrtsstaaten und Sozialversicherungsprogrammen ist. Die Ergebnisse weisen eine analytische Tiefe auf, die mit den bisher verfügbaren Daten nicht zu erreichen war. Mögliche weitere Anwendungen für den Datensatz sind Deskriptionen und explorative Datenanalysen, die die soziale Absicherung von Wohlfahrtsstaaten vergleichend beschreiben. Ebenfalls möglich sind vergleichende x- oder y-zentrierte Untersuchungen der Ursachen und Folgen der unterschiedlichen Generosität von Wohlfahrtsstaaten denkbar.

2.5 Verwertbarkeit der Daten

Der CWED2-Datensatz wird innerhalb der Forschungsgebiete der Politikwissenschaft und Sozialwissenschaften im Allgemeinen und der vergleichenden *Policy*-Forschung im Besonderen frequentiert genutzt. Eine Auflistung von Artikeln in Fachzeitschriften, Monographien und Herausgeberschatfen zeigt, dass bereits über 200 quantitativ-empirische Studien erschienen sind, die den

Tabelle 2.3: Evaluation der Hypothesen aus dem Arbeitsprogramm

#	Name	Kurzbeschreibung	Evaluation
A1	Regimecluster	Gruppierung in verschiedene Regimetypen	Angenommen
A2a	MOE I	Annäherung an westlichen Regimetypen	Angenommen[a]
A2b	MOE II	Bildung eines eigenen Typus	Verworfen
B1	Konvergenz	Annäherung der Wohlfahrtsstaaten	Verworfen
B2a	Race to the bottom	Annäherung durch Rückbau	Verworfen
B2b	Race to the top	Annäherung durch Ausbau	Verworfen
B2c	Neues Modell	Annäherung und Bildung eines neuen Typus	Verworfen
B3	Divergenz	Auseinanderstreben der Wohlfahrtsstaaten	Verworfen
C1	Parteiendifferenz	Regierung beeinflusst Reformen	Verworfen[b]
C2	Pfadabhängigkeit	Eingeschränkte Entwicklung	Angenommen
C3	Transformation	Wirtschaftswachstum begünstigt Ausbau	Verworfen
D1	Wirtsch. Offenheit	Wirtschaftliche Offenheit bewirkt Reformen	Verworfen
D2	Diffusion	Diffusionsprozesse begünstigen Konvergenz	Angenommen[c]
E1	Kontrollvariablen	Institutionelle/Demographische Faktoren	Angenommen[d]

[a] Konvergenz in einzelnen Sozialversicherungsprogrammen und Finanzierungsformen beobachtet, jedoch nicht bei (aggregierten) Sozialausgaben.
[b] Je nach Einkommensniveau und Sozialversicherungsprogramm; keine Evidenz für aggregierte Lohnersatzraten.
[c] Für die Mehrheit der untersuchten Sozialversicherungsprogramme zu unterschiedlichen Graden.
[d] Dies gilt insbesondere für den Korporatismusgrad eines Landes.

Qualitätsmerkmalen der genannten Publikationsformen entsprechen und CWED oder CWED2-Daten verwenden.[9] Die Statistiken zum Webseitenaufruf der Homepage `www.cwed2.org` zeigen, dass seit Weblaunch etwa 28.000 Besucher die Webseite besuchten um den Datensatz herunterzuladen.[10] Aufgrund der oben genannten Anzahl der Veröffentlichungen sowie der Nutzerstatistiken, gehen wir davon aus, dass der Datensatz sich auch in Zukunft großer Beliebtheit erfreuen wird. Zusätzlich werden die neu erhobenen Haushaltstypen, Länder, Zeiträume und aggregierten Indikatoren dazu beitragen, dass Forscherinnen und Forscher in Zukunft eine noch größere Vielfalt an Forschungsfragen mittels des Datensatzes bearbeiten können. Die genannten Punkte zur Verfügbarkeit und Häufigkeit der Verwendung der Daten zeigen, dass Verwertbarkeit der Daten in einem hohen Maße gegeben ist.

2.6 Kooperationspartner, Projektmitarbeiter

Prof Lyle A. Scruggs, Ph.D.
UConn Department of Political Science
University of Connecticut
Storrs, CT, USA

[9] Eine ausführliche Auflistung der Publikationen befindet sich im Appendix A.1.
[10] Detaillierte Nutzungsstatistiken sowie Diagramme zur Verlaufsstatistik im Appendix A.2.

Dr. Kati Kuitto
Senior Researcher
Finnish Centre for Pensions
Helsinki, Finnland

2.7 Qualifikationsarbeiten

Im folgenden werden Dissertationen, Magister- und Masterarbeiten sowie Bachelorarbeiten gelistet, die Daten aus CWED2 benutzen.

Doktorarbeiten

Kuitto, Kati (2012). Emerging Patterns of Welfare Policies in Central and Eastern Europe. Post-Communist Welfare States in the European Context. Dissertation, Universität Greifswald.

Magister- und Masterarbeiten

Düpont, Nils (2009) Linke Regierung – rechte Sozialpolitik? Zum Zusammenhang von Parteipositionen und Wohlfahrtsstaatstätigkeit.

Helmdag, Jan (2015) Same Shift – Different Dynamics? The Conditionality of Diffusion of Successful Labor Market Policies in the OECD.

Horn, Alexander (2010) Autonomieverlust der Politik? Zum Zusammenhang zwischen Parteipositionen und wohlfahrtsstaatlichem Rückbau in OECD-Ländern.

Masch, Lena (2013) Welfare Regimes and Obesity. A multilevel cross-sectional analysis of national welfare regime characteristics and individual obesity risks.

Radloff, Julien (2015) Bildung als Menschenrecht: Eine globale Analyse von Einflussfaktoren zur Erreichbarkeit eines erfolgreichen Bildungssystems.

Stark, Martin (2015) Einfluss familienpolitischer Maßnahmen auf die Fertilität. Ein Vergleich europäischer Staaten

Szelinski, Björn (2016). Lassen sich Wohlfahrtsstaaten wie in Esping-Andersens "The three Worlds of Welface Capitalism"typologisieren? Ein Replikationsversuch seiner Ergebnisse mit den Daten des CWED-Projektes.

Todua, Maia (2010) Zivilgesellschaft und Wohlfahrt im Zuge von Transformation in Georgien.

Bachelorarbeiten

Awe, Katrin (2012). Ökonomische Effekte von Sozialsystemen.

Brandt, Torben (2015). Globalisierung und wohlfahrtsstaatliche Politik.

Baltz, Erik (2017). Der Einfluss von Vetospielern auf die Höhe Lohnersatzraten für Renten.

Brockmann, Henrik (2013). Bestrafung statt Sozialpolitik? Zum Zusammenhang von Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit und Kriminalpolitik.

Diebitsch, Tim (2015). Statistische Analyse: Einfluss von Parteien auf die Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit in Lateinamerika.

Gutglück, Eric (2015). Der Einfluss der Parteiendifferenz auf den Wohlfahrtsstaat.

Heide, Luisa (2015). Politische Ökonomie und aktive Arbeitsmarktpolitik. Passen sich die Ausgaben für aktive Arbeitsmarktpolitik and die wirtschaftlichen Veränderungen ein?

Lingner, Eric (2008). Bestimmungsgrößen der Staatstätigkeit in OECD-Ländern. Eine Paneldatenanalyse für die Jahre 1980-2006.

Lipovac, Nada (2014). Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit in Kroatien und Serbien – Qualitative Analyse der Arbeitslosenersatzleistungen.

Schmidt, Ludwig (2015). Allokationspolitik auf dem Arbeitsmarkt – Determinanten der strukturellen Arbeitslosigkeit im internationalen Vergleich.

3 Zusammenfassung (max. 1 A4-Seite)

Die Arbeiten im Projekt Wohlfahrtsstaatliche Politik im erweiterten Europa sind abgeschlossen und haben große internationale Aufmerksamkeit gefunden. Die arbeitsteilige Forschungskooperation mit Professor Lyle Scruggs (University of Connecticut) hat zu der Finalisierung des Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset 2 (CWED2) geführt, der auf der Webseite `www.cwed2.org` frei heruntergeladen werden und für Forschungsvorhaben genutzt werden kann. Der neu entstandene Datensatz CWED2 enthält Informationen zu den Lohnersatzraten und Kriterien der Leistungsberechtigung in den zentralen Sozialsicherungsprogrammen für insgesamt acht Haushalts- und Einkommenstypen für 33 Länder.[1] Zehn dieser Länder sind mittel- und osteuropäische Länder, die neu in den Datensatz integriert worden sind.[2] Daten zu den Sozialversicherungsprogrammen dieser Länder sind für die Jahre 1995 bis 2010 im CWED2 enthalten. Damit stellt der CWED2 die derzeit umfassendste Datenquelle für europäische Sozialversicherungssysteme dar, mit der quantitativ-empirische Vergleichsstudien durchgeführt werden können. Eine Evaluierung der Anzahl der Publikationen, die CWED2-Daten benutzen, zeigt bereits zu diesem Zeitpunkt auf, dass der Datensatz frequentiert genutzt wird.[3] Vorrangig ist die Nutzung dabei im internationalen Kontext zu verzeichnen, was sich wiederum in einer hohen Sichtbarkeit des Datensatzes in renommierten Journals niederschlägt. Das erklärte Ziel, die Bereitstellung eines frei zugänglichen Datensatzes, der es Forscherinnen und Forschern vergleichenden Wohlfahrtsstaatsforschung ermöglichen soll, differenziertere Aussagen über den redistributiven Charakter und die Generosität zentraler sozialpolitischer Institutionen zu treffen, wird damit als erfüllt angesehen.

Unsere Analyse hat gezeigt, dass sowohl in den jüngeren Wohlfahrtsstaaten der Mittelosteuropäischen Länder, als auch in den etablierten Wohlfahrtsstaaten der westlichen Länder mithilfe der Daten des CWED2-Datensatzes nach wie vor Reformen zu beobachten sind. Darüber hinaus ist es mithilfe neu erhobenen Haushaltstypen nun erstmals möglich Entwicklungen der Sozialversicherungen in verschiedenen Einkommensschichten der Gesellschaften zu analysieren. Die geographische und analytische Erweiterung des Datensatzes wird auch in Zukunft dafür sorgen, dass der CWED2-Datensatz sich innerhalb der Gemeinder der Forschenden einer hohen Beliebtheit erfreuen wird und frequentiert für makro-ökonomische Analysen genutzt wird.

Aufgrund der in diesem Abschlussbericht inhaltlich aufgeführten Ergebnisse, der Veröffentlichung des Datensatzes und der Erfüllung der formellen Anforderungen an den Antragssteller kann das Projekt *Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit im erweiterten Europa* somit als erfolgreich abgeschlossen angesehen werden.

[1] Zum Vergleich: Der CWED(1)-Datensatz enthielt Informationen zu zwei Haushaltstypen in 18 Ländern.

[2] Folgende Mittelosteuropäische Länder wurden neu in den Datensatz integriert: Bulgarien, Estland, Lettland, Litauen, Ungarn, Polen, Rumänien, Tschechische Republik, Slowakei und Slowenien.

[3] Eine ausführliche Auflistung von ca. 200 Publikationen, die ein peer review-Verfahren durchlaufen haben und Daten aus CWED2 in der empirischen Analyse benutzen, befindet sich im Appendix A.1.

4 Empirical Analysis[1]

Modern European welfare states are challenged by a mutlitude of (socio-)economical and institutional pressures. Increasing competition as a consequence of economic globalisation, demographic ageing, and fiscal austerity are the most prominent of those factors. Due to the absence of reliable data, the levels of welfare provision and its trends in the Central Eastern European (CEE) could not be put in perspective in a comprehensive and comparable manner. The first aim of the project was to identify whether there are trends in convergence or divergence of welfare policies of CEE countries and their matured counterparts in Western Europe. The second aim of the project is to identify the key factors that drive welfare state reform in Eastern and Western Europe. In providing comparative data and identifying trends in welfare state reform and their causal dependencies, this project marks a substantial contribution to the understanding of recent welfare state reforms in OECD countries in general and CEE countries in particular.

In the following sections we will discuss the main achievements and characteristics of the CWED2-dataset 4.1 and we will discuss the variables and indices used 4.2. In section 4.3 we birefly present the previous results on the formation as well as the convergence and divergence of welfare states, which we already extensively discussed in the interim report of the project (Jahn et al., 2011). Subsequently, in section 4.4 we will discuss the developments of the social security programs within the CEE countries and how the empirical forms of these countries align with the ideal types of welfare regimes. Following this, we will perform an even refined analysis of aggregated replacement rates for different income levels in section 4.5 and try to answer the question who benefits most from social security programs and their reforms in CEE and non-CEE countries. Thereafter, in section 4.6 we analyze the replacement rates for unemployment, sickness, and standard pension replacement rates for different income levels and show how this new approach brings new insights in the distinction of different welfare regimes.[2] Finally, we analyze the effects of different exogenous factors in section 4.7, before we come to a final conclusion in the conclusing section 4.8.

4.1 The Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset II

The main accomplishment of the project *Wohlfahrtsstaatliche Politik im erweiterten Europa* is the introduction of the CEE countries, a generally longer period of observation, and six additional household types with the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset 2 (CWED2). Comprising

[1] Die Ausführungen innerhalb dieses Abschnittes des Arbeits- und Ergebnisberichts sind in englischer Sprache verfasst, um eine größtmögliche Reichweite der Leserschaft zu erzielen und um die Verwendung von irreführenden deutschen Bezeichnungen für innerhalb des Forschungsfeldes etablierte Fachtermini zu vermeiden.

[2] This is an additional and refined testing of the hypotheses on regime clusters, additionally to the ones we already performed in the interim report of the project at hand (Jahn et al., 2011).

data on 18 countries for two household types spanning from 1970 to 2002, previous versions[3] of the CWED2 lacked both the broadness of the sample as well as the substantial depth of indicators. Since the project is finished, the new dataset is complete and available to the public.

The purpose of the CWED2 dataset is to provide the scientific community with an encompassing, methodologically sound and conceptually rich macro-comparative dataset of social policy indicators. CWED2 contributes to a well-established research tradition and subsequent social science data generation stemming primarily from the influential 'social rights of citizenship' approach for analyzing welfare states (Danforth and Stephens, 2013; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi and Palme, 1998, 2003; Marshall, 1950; Scruggs, 2007; Scruggs and Allan, 2006, 2008; Titmuss, 1974).[4] The focus of that approach is on welfare provision as it is anchored in national legislation and provided by welfare entitlements in social protection programs such as unemployment, sickness, and pension schemes at various stages of citizens' lives. Thus, replacement rates, eligibility criteria, coverage, and, ultimately, the benefit generosity of such schemes unfold decommodifying and stratifying effects for the individual and society and also determine differing types of welfare regimes. Furthermore, social rights have far-reaching consequences for equality and poverty reduction in industrial democracies (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1999; Korpi, 1989). Consequently, empirical indicators were developed to measure these dimensions of welfare policies. However, the first dataset to include longer time series and numerous countries publicly available to the scientific community, the CWED was first published in 2004 by Lyle Scruggs (2004) and later followed by the Social Citizenship Indicator Program (SCIP) by Walter Korpi and Joakim Palme (2007). The CWED dataset gained huge popularity in the scientific community and, nearly thirteen years after its initial release, is one of the most cited social science datasets worldwide. Meanwhile, the OECD has published advanced data on some social security programs (OECD Tax and benefits indicators database; Pensions at a glance; Family database).

Common to all datasets was that the amount and the conditions of the benefits were calculated with reference to a typical industrial worker with permanent full-time employment, being either single or having a non-earning spouse and two children (the so called Average Production Worker (APW) type case approach). This notional person was seen to best represent an average beneficiary and therefore the average targeted generosity of the welfare benefits. As the representativeness of this type case is increasingly becoming obsolete and the average generosity of benefits is ill-suited to analyze several core issues of comparative welfare politics (e.g. on the distributive effects of welfare benefits across income classes or class-related effects of welfare reforms) the OECD started offering data across various income classes. Additionally, some micro-simulation data projects seek to calculate benefit levels for any given individual, extracted from survey data with the concomitant restrictions (e.g. the Tax-benefit micro-simulation model for the European Union EUROMOD; Sutherland and Figari (2013). These developments attest to the growing need for data measuring a broad range of parameters of welfare policy programs.

With the *Comparative Welfare Entitlement Dataset 2* (CWED2), jointly generated by Lyle Scruggs, the applicant and Kati Kuitto, foundations were laid for a dataset which better responds

[3] For reasons of simplicity, we refer to previous versions of CWED2 as Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset (CWED).

[4] For a more recent discussion on the theoretical and methodological issues on that topic, see for example: Danforth and Stephens (2013); Ferrarini et al. (2013); Scruggs (2013).

to the analytical demands rising from the changing needs structure of welfare policies especially with regard to post-industrialization (Bonoli, 2006; Esping-Andersen, 2002; Hemerijck, 2013; Taylor-Gooby, 2004). CWED2 amended the original CWED dataset by eight more years, data for the Central Eastern European (CEE) states as well as data for Greece, Spain, Portugal, Taiwan and Korea. In addition to the existing two household types, data for six additional household types including lone-parenting and two-earner couples at different income levels. The publication of CWED2[5] three years ago was widely and explicitly welcomed by the international research community (see for example Schmidt, 2015; Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer, 2014) and has already reached visibility in top international journals.

4.2 Indicators in CWED2

The CWED2 data set provides systematic data on institutional features of social insurance programs in 33 OECD countries from 1970 to 2010. The dataset contains information for three social insurance programs: i) unemployment insurance, ii) sick pay insurance, and iii) public pensions. These programs by far make up the biggest share of total social expenditure in matured welfare states (see for example: Kuitto, 2011; Obinger and Wagschal, 2010; Pierson, 2001).

Unemployment insurance covers national insurance provisions earned without income testing and excludes unemployment assistance as well as any provisions for unemployment under collective bargaining contract. Sickpay insurance is captured by benefits paid in the event of short-term non-occupational illness or injury. This includes provisions for mandatory private (employer-paid) benefits in addition to public insurance. Public pensions considered here include only mandatory public programs and excludes occupational pensions. Mandatory private savings schemes are not included due to variable returns in benefits. Besides earnings-related mandatory public pensions, data is also provided for replacement rates of minimum pensions (i.e., for persons with working histories non-sufficient for eligibility).

Following the conventions established by the CWED dataset (Scruggs, 2004), the OECD for calculating net unemployment benefits and the Social Citizenship Indicator Program (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi and Palme, 2007) the replacement rates are calculated as the ratio of net social insurance benefit in the corresponding social security scheme (sickness, unemployment, and pensions) to the net wage before the loss of income. We follow a type-case-approach in which replacement rates for each of those programs are reported for certain standardized household types which are comparable across time and countries. The calculation of a replacement rate is straightforward: First, we have to calculate the net wage for a given person by substracting income taxes and social security contributions (SSC) from the gross wage. Then, we add additional cash benefits (e.g. family benefits) if they are applicable. Finally, we divide the net benefit by the gross wage:

$$\text{Replacement rate (RR)} = \frac{\text{Net benefit}}{\text{Net wage}} = \frac{\text{Gross benefit} - \text{Taxes} - \text{SSC} + \text{Other}}{\text{Gross wage} - \text{Taxes} - \text{SSC} + \text{Other}} \tag{4.1}$$

Replacement rates are calculated for eight household types, which are ficticious (yet represene-

[5]The dataset can be accessed via the following URL: `www.cwed2.org`.

Table 4.1: Description of eight household types included in CWED2.

Income level	Description
Single households	
50%	Low income/part-time work
50%	Lone parent with two dep. children; low income/part-time work
100%	Average income, originally included in CWED
200%	High income
Couple households	
50%, 50%	Low income/part-time work, both
100%, 0%	Average income, fully dependent spouse; orig. included in CWED
100%, 50%	Average income, spouse has low income/part-time job
150%, 150%	High income, both
Aggregates	
Low Income[a]	50% single, 50%/50% couple
Mid Income	100% single, 100%/0% couple, 100%/50% couple
High Income	200% single, 150%/150% couple

[a] Due to unsufficient data availability, we excluded the lone parent from the aggregate index.

tative) cases of beneficiaries. The chosen case types follow the coding in the CWED I dataset based on the assumptions for the notional person (see codebook). The household types can be distinguished into two groups: single households and couple households.

The first group of household types is defined by single persons, earning 50%–200% of the Average Production Worker Wage level. Whenever benefits or the duration of benefits are dependent on age or contributions, we are assuming the worker is 40 years of age with a fulltime working history of 20 years. In case of relevance, the single person is assumed to be male. Additionally, we coded one lone parent with a 50% income and two dependent children (aged seven and twelve).

The second group of household types refers to married couple with two children[6], where earnings of spouses vary between 50% and 150% of the APW level.[7] Besides being married and having two dependent children, the assumptions for the couple households do not differ from those for single households made above.

On basis of these household types it is now possible to create new aggregate income level variables. In the very first paper analysing replacement rates from CWED, Allan and Scruggs (2004) used the average of the only two available household types and called it *average replacement rate*. In the following years the majority of researchers used that indicator to analyze welfare reforms. Having six additional household types for different family and income types in CWED2 allows for a multitude of new aggregates. For example, it is now possible to analyze social security programs in regard to previous income levels of beneficiaries (low, mid, and level benefits) or their family status (presence of children, having a spouse, and income of spouse).

Additionally to replacement rates and their aggregates, information on eligibility criteria (i.e. qualifying conditions, duration of payment and waiting days) for each program is also provided. We first include the period of qualification required for being eligible to draw benefits (in weeks). This is in most cases defined as a certain minimum period of employment and/or contributions

[6] Again, both children are aged seven and twelve.

[7] In case of benefits supplements or preferential tax treatment for spouses or family members with no income of their own, we assume the second spouse to be dependent. Again, in case it matters, the working spouse is assumed to be male.

to social security schemes. Second, we include the duration of payment (i.e. the period for which the benefit is paid, in weeks). Third, we report the waiting days a beneficiary must wait before the benefit is paid (in days). These variables indicate the generosity of the benefit eligibility.[8]

4.3 Social protection programs and welfare regimes

International and domestic developments, such as increasing economic competition and intensified interaction across states and international actors, along with similar demographic pressures, hypothetically suggest a convergence of welfare policies in the enlarged Europe (Pierson, 1994, 2001). As we have shown in previous analyses of replacement rates, social expenditure, and organizational principles of funding, empirically there can be observed no general trends of convergence from the mid-1990s until recently (Jahn et al., 2011). This is in particular true for the ubiquituously hypothesized 'race to the bottom'. Empirically, if there is a race in any direction at all, we can observe a slight trend towards the middle among the established Western European welfare states, whereas the transitional welfare states in CEE can be found at the lower end of the scale or even show decreasing levels of replacement rates. Given the transitional character of the post-socialist countries and their particularly narrow economic leeway, their welfare policies are most volatile compared with the rest of the European countries. Reversely, this indicates that path dependency seems to play an important role in the mature welfare states, forcing policy makers to opt for incremental reform only. Together with the significant differences within the CEE country group, this seems to suggest a diversification of welfare policy arrangements rather than the emergence of a single Eastern European welfare model, not to mention a single 'European model'.

Classifying welfare states has a long history in the social sciences. Starting out from identifying various strategies of supporting the poor (Myrdal and Myrdal, 1935; Titmuss, 1938), the basic dichotomy of a Beveridgean and Bismarkian social benefits and transfers systems has inspired researchers to classify types or regimes of welfare states. The Bismarckian model of the welfare state is income maintenance for employees in the case that they are not actively working; either for a certain period or, as in the case of pension, for the rest of their lives. The principle is that employees get benefits which replace parts of their income more or less regardless the previous income has been. In contrast, the Beveridge principle is the prevention of poverty and is characterized by universal provisions of flat-rate benefits on the basis of need or residency. Typical examples of the Beveridge model can be found in in the United Kingdom and other Anglo-Saxon states as well as in the Nordic states. Richard Titmuss (1974) extends the distinction in that he focuses on the distribution effect of social benefits. He distinguishes between an 'achievement-performance model' which resembles the Bismarkian principle, on the one hand, and the universalistic models in the Beveridge tradition, on the other. However, he subdivided the latter model into two separate types in the Beveridgian tradition: a 'residual model of social policy' and an 'institutional-redistributive model of social policy'. With this framework he laid the groundwork for the political distinction of the distribution effect of the welfare state which Esping-Andersen elaborated most forcefully in his distinction of the three worlds of welfare

[8] Since there exists neither comprehensible nor reliable data on coverage of social security schemes for CEE countries, we exclusively gathered data on replacement rates for these countries.

capitalism.

Esping-Andersen turned the debate into an ideological power discourse by referring to theories of social rights and justice. In the way that he labels his types of welfare regimes into political categories of liberal, conservative corporatist and socialist, he focuses explicitly on the distribution effect of welfare policies. In his own words, the liberal welfare state is characterized by "modest social insurance plans [...]. Benefits cater mainly to a clientele of low-income" (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 26). This type of welfare state applies mainly to countries of the Anglo-Saxon family of nations (Castles, 1993; Castles and Mitchell, 1993). The aim of liberal welfare states is to prevent extreme poverty. If employees with higher incomes are becoming inactive they get relatively little support as long as they do not fall into the category of poor. Since this system of social benefits is aimed to prevent extreme poverty, its benefits are small and just enable the individual to survive. There is neither the intention nor the effect of any redistribution in this model. The conservative corporatist welfare state prevents status differentials. Based on Catholicism and the principle of subsidiarity, the system is built on the principle that employees are able to maintain their status in society. This means that the social benefits are in principle higher in the conservative corporatist systems than in liberal welfare states but that there are no redistribution effects. Esping-Andersen locates conservative corporatist states in Austria, France, Germany, Italy and other continental countries.

The social-democratic welfare state provides social benefits which reach beyond just surviving and makes a social living beyond the labor market possible and, in addition, has redistributional effects. The former aspects are related to the political claim that employees have universal social rights and that the state is responsible for ensuring that individuals are able to make a living even in situations when they become inactive on the labor market. Esping-Andersen grasps this point by the degree of decommodification, which he defines as the degree of decoupling of an individual from the labor market in the case of income of loss. A distinctive redistribution effect leads to low income groups being favored in relation to employees which are better off. In other words, social-democratic welfare states aim to change the social stratification of society in favor of lower income groups or if one prefers to express it in political terms: in favor of the working class.

During the debate of types of welfare states new categories have been suggested which add to the three classical regimes (Abrahamson, 2000; Arts and Gelissen, 2002; Bambra, 2007; Castles and Obinger, 2008, for a recent overview see Kuitto, 2016, Chapter 3). Castles 1998 suggests that Australia and New Zealand are distinct from the liberal welfare states in that they are more inclusive than pure liberal welfare states. Another group of scholars suggests a Southern or Mediterranean Model of welfare states which is characterized by favoring those participating in the core of the labor market. This would mean that employees with higher income are favored and that the lower income groups are marginalized and left with very little in terms of social benefits (Bislev and Hansen, 1990; Ferrera, 1996; Leibfried, 1992; Rhodes et al., 1997). These kinds of welfare states which are supposed to be present in Spain, Portugal and Greece, have been labelled "particularist-clientelistic welfare states" (Ferrera, 1996, p. 25).

4.4 The Central Eastern European countries

Until the release of CWED2, comparing levels and changes of social security programs of CEE countries was difficult (and to some degree nearly impossible) due to the lack of reliable as well as comparable data. Hence, gathering data on social security programs for the CEE countries now enables researchers to analyze the degree of social security in these countries. Furthermore, we can now assess the varieties, idiosyncracies, and commonalities of those countries that are part of the latest Eastern enlargements of the European Union. Since these countries vary remarkably in their characteristics of social security provision, it is our goal to identify whether there are trends in convergence or divergence of welfare policies of CEE countries and their matured counterparts in Western Europe. In our initial application we had deductively derived fourteen hypotheses from five different perspectives on the welfare state. Those hypotheses are listed in table 4.2. We present our evidence and the results of our hypotheses tests in the following sections.

Research on welfare states in CEE has triggered the question of whether these states resemble a particular pattern of existing welfare states or whether they form a new class of their own. As a third option it was hypothesized that they form a hybrid type of welfare state or a mixture of several types. In view of the first assumption early prognoses said that CEE countries would resemble the liberal welfare state because of the pressure of globalization and the following race to the bottom (Esping-Andersen, 1996; Ferge and Kolberg, 1992; Kornai, 1992). International pressure and the communist legacy have been used to suggest that all CEE states joint the same model type. Others thought that the welfare states in CEE display the same types of welfare states as in the established OECD world: a liberal-capitalist system in Hungary, a post-communist conservative corporatist system in Poland and a social-democratic type in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Deacon, 1992). Referring to diffusion research some predict that the welfare states in CEE resemble the one with which a country has the highest interaction. That would mean that the Baltic States come close to the Scandinavian model, and the Visegrád countries meet the principle of the conservative corporatist model. Finally, Inglot (2008) and Caramani (2008) predict a certain mixture of universalist and conservative corporatist welfare states. The idea that CEE welfare states are hybrids of established welfare states is most forcefully expressed in the most elaborated and extensive study of clustering welfare states in CEE to date (Kuitto, 2016). Aside from the fact that all CEE countries are hypothesized to have lower benefits than their Western counterparts, they are distinct from each other. Hungary and Slovenia "align rather with the Southern and conservative corporatist model of welfare states than with the CEE type. The configuration of all CEE welfare states gives a strong indication of an axiomatically Bismarckian type of welfare model, combined with universalist elements." (Kuitto, 2016, p. 165). In this sense, we could affirm the established notion that welfare states cluster into regimes (Hypotheses A1), but could not find evidence on an emerging regime that has an isomorphous character, which only corresponds to CEE countries (Hypotheses A2a and A2b).

In the interim report of the project at hand (Jahn et al., 2011) we already tested the hypotheses of groups A (regime cluster) and B (convergence/divergence) articulated in table 4.2. We found that rather a dual split along the 'old' member states and the new CEE countries emerges, whereas the CEE countries lag behind in many respects (Hypothesis B1). While there is some

Table 4.2: Initial hypotheses on welfare regimes and their developments

#	Name	Description
A1	Regime cluster	Welfare states exhibit country-specific variance and can be clustered into regime types (i.e. social-democratic, conservative, liberal, and Mediterranean).
A2a	CEE welfare states I	Welfare states in CEE countries converge to the characteristics of Western types.
A2b	CEE welfare states II	Welfare states in CEE countries form a distict Eastern welfare regime.
B1	Convergence	European welfare states converge over time.
B2a	Race to the bottom	European welfare states exhibit a downward convergence.
B2b	Race to the top	European welfare states exhibit an upward convergence.
B2c	New model	European welfare states convergence and form a new model of welfare regime (i.e. a distinct European welfare regime).
B3	Divergence	European welfare states diverge over time.
C1	Partisan influence	Parties do matter in reforming welfare states. Leftist parties correlate with higher replacement rates, while righist parties correlate with lower replacement rates.
C2	Path dependency	The type of welfare state determines the range of future developments within itself.
C3	Transformation	Economic growth within the transformation phase of CEE countries determines the development of the welfare state.
D1	Economic openness	Economic openness has an effect on the development of the welfare state.
D2	Diffusion	Policy diffusion has an effect on the convergence of European welfare states.
E1	Controls	Welfare state reform is influenced by institutional, economic, corporatist, and (socio)demographic factors.

convergence in some social security programs (e.g. minimum income protection and unemployment benefits), social spending differs to an increasing degree. We have shown, that the common concern that an enlargement of the EU would result in a race to the bottom (Hypothesis B2a) or a race to the top (Hypothesis B2b) of the generosity of social security programs and social expenditure is empirically unsubstantiated. Our findings have shown that we can neither observe the emergence of a common 'European model' (Hypothesis B2c) nor a substantiated divergence of the welfare states within Europe (Hypothesis B3).

Our results are in line with the findings of previous studies, which suggest modest convergence in the years after World War II for social expenditure, but slight divergence later on and no signs of a race to the bottom (see for example Alber and Standing, 2000; Attia and Bérenger, 2007; Bouget, 2003; Castles, 2004; O'Connor, 1988; Sosvilla-Rivero et al., 2003; Tomka, 2003). Also in line with previous studies is the evidence that social rights are more subject to retrenchment by either tightening eligibility criteria or cutting replacement rates (Kangas, 2004; Montanari, 1995, 2001; Montanari et al., 2007). In contrast to earlier studies, however, we do not witness a general downward trend in unemployment generosity, but rather stability or even raising standards in former laggard countries. The former dualism in funding principles – tax-based systems vs. social

contribution-based types – shows a strong convergent trend to a balanced funding, which is also in line with former evidence (Attia and Bérenger, 2009; Greve, 1996) and that especially funding principles are path-dependent (Bonoli et al., 1996; Palme et al., 2009). If this is to continue, at least with respect to funding, a more universal model of organizing the funding of welfare policies with a balanced share of social contributions and taxes as sources of financing seems to emerge.

4.5 Cui bono? Identifying welfare regimes based on (dis)favoring income levels via social policies

With some noticeable exceptions (Bonoli, 1997; Castles, 1998; Kuitto, 2016) current research on welfare regimes so far builds their analysis on (averaged) replacement rates (RRs) of the average production worker (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi and Palme, 1998; Scruggs and Allan, 2006). The downside of such an approach is that it cannot distinguish whether certain income groups are favored or disfavored. However, the distribution effect is highly relevant in the field of welfare state research because it addresses the question of whether welfare states do not just prevent social hardship but also promote social equality. We are therefore interested which groups in society are favored by social benefits. In so far we ask which income group benefits when receiving social benefits in relation to other income groups and which basic principle is underlying the distribution of social benefits. Taking such a perspective we call our approach the cui bono approach.

As a heuristic advice we refer to the concept of various types of capitalism and welfare state regimes (Beramendi et al., 2015; Esping-Andersen, 1990).[9] In this tradition, favoring low income groups may have two different motivations. On the one hand, it may support groups most in need with marginal benefits. This approach would have little redistributive effects and comes close to how the liberal welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 26) or competitiveness-oriented capitalism has been described.[10] Countries which fit into this category are mainly found in the Anglo-Saxon world. When benefits are high and low income groups are favored, we may conclude that a redistribution takes place. This pattern, reinforcing social equality, may be most likely to be expected in social democratic welfare states or in equality-oriented capitalism which has its home in the Nordic countries. Another pattern of welfare distribution is that benefits maintain the status differences in society. That means that no redistribution occurs. This distribution pattern can be expected in continental status-oriented capitalism. A less researched and considered redistribution effect of welfare states are those which favor the high-income groups. Beramendi et al. (2015) identify this as capture-oriented capitalism which has a legacy of privileging well-organized manufacturing workers and small businesses. This distribution pattern is based on

[9] As a classification of different forms of capitalism we prefer the newly developed concepts of Beramendi et al. (2015) because it is more encompassing than the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach which basically distinguishes only two types of capitalism and also systematically includes the Mediterranean and other countries which are ignored in the welfare state typology of Esping-Andersen. Furthermore, it is less static since it takes into account various circumstances which lead to changes in the regime type (Beramendi et al., 2015, p. 57–62).

[10] We disagree with the conclusion of (Beramendi et al., 2015, p. 43) that competitiveness-oriented capitalism contains "highly redistributive programs targeted to the very poorest", because the benefits are simply too low to be redistributive. This is made very clear by (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 64–65) when he states that the liberal social-insurance scheme of the liberal welfare state regime which comes close to the competitiveness-oriented capitalism "reproduces the profile of the stratification of the market", i.e. has no redistribution effect.

Table 4.3: Distribution regimes and types of capitalism

	Favoring low income groups	Equal (status-oriented) benefits	Favoring high income groups
Marginal contributions	(I) Competitiveness-oriented capitalism	(III) Status-oriented capitalism	(IV) Capture-oriented capitalism
Universal contributions	(II) Equality-oriented capitalism		

the relatively late industrialization and democratization of countries practicing this distribution regime (Rueda et al., 2015). Furthermore, this type of capitalism is characterized by ignoring the needs of the poor: "There is little to no redistributive solidarity toward the poor" (Beramendi et al., 2015, p. 49). In the same vein, Ferrera (1996) suggests that welfare distribution may be "particularist-clientelistic welfare states." (ibid. p. 25). This kind of welfare state may correspond with the Mediterranean welfare state regime. These considerations about the *cui bono* aspect can be cross-tabulated with the amount of benefits and the resulting distribution regimes in various kinds of capitalism as is done in table 4.3.

4.6 The (re)distribtution regimes of welfare states in 33 countries

The income come levels defined in the previous section can be used to identify clusters of welfare states in the area of unemployment and sickness benefits as well as standard pension. Referring to the different income types enables us to use more sophisticated categories and to analyze which income type is systematically favored by a redistribution regime. We use the replacement rates for low, middle and high income groups only. This means of course that we do not measure the generosity in general. We have to do this because we have too many missing data for the duration, waiting days and coverage of the programs which would be necessary to calculate generosity. Nevertheless, our analysis illuminates new and important aspects of different welfare states.

We use two dimensions in order to place welfare states into the four distribution regimes described above. The first dimension asks which cui bono principle dominates: favoring low income groups, favoring high income groups or distributing welfare benefits according to former incomes regardless of the income level. The first aspect we operationalize by using the ratio between favoring the low income group in relation to the average of the mid and high income groups. The same procedure is used in order to find out whether the high income groups are favored. Here we measure the relation between the RRs of the high income group to the average of the mid and low income groups. The last category identifies the variance between the three income groups by using the standard deviation. The lower the variance the more the distribution regime follows the principle of the status-oriented capitalism. In order to find out which principle dominates we use the z-scores of each aspect. According to the highest z-score of each country in one of the three categories we group the countries as favoring the low or the high income group or whether the RRs are relatively equal. In order to distinguish the competitive and the equality-oriented capitalism which both favor the low income groups we use a second dimension.

Table 4.4: Distribution regimes for unemployment replacement rates in 33 countries

	Equality-oriented capitalism	Competitiveness-oriented capitalism	Status-oriented capitalism	Capture-oriented capitalism
Non-CEE	Belgium Denmark Japan Sweden	Ireland New Zealand South Korea United Kingdom	Australia Austria Canada Finland Germany Italy Netherlands Norway Spain Switzerland Taiwan United States	Greece France Portugal
CEE	Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Romania	Lithuania Poland	Slovakia Slovenia	Estonia Latvia

Note: Data refers to country-specific averages from 2000–2010.

The second dimension is simply the average RRs for the low income group of a country. This dimension is important because some countries may favor low income groups but the social benefits are so low that one can hardly speak of social benefits which make it possible that the recipient is able to live from it (competitiveness-oriented capitalism). On the other hand, welfare states may favor the low income group with substantial welfare state benefits. In this case we speak of a redistributive welfare state which we find in equality-oriented capitalism. In empirical terms, we use the mean of the social benefits for the low income group in order to distinguish between these two types of welfare states. This principle and operationalization rules of clustering welfare states we use in the following for unemployment, sickness and standard pension benefits, as well as for an index using the aggregate of these three areas of social benefits.

4.6.1 Cluster of Unemployment Replacement Rates

Unemployment RRs vary substantially between the 33 welfare states under investigation. When taking the average over all three income types they range from 39% in South Korea to 97% in Portugal with an average of 65%. The mean between the OECD countries (excluding the CEE countries, South Korea and Taiwan) is 67% and for the CEE it 65%. This shows that both regions do not differ so much. Over all countries the low income group has the highest RR (mean 77%), followed by the mid income group (65%) and the high income group (58%). In the CEE countries the low income group has a higher RR than in the OECD countries and the RR for the high income group is lower. Single cases which fit best the four regimes are Denmark for the equality-oriented capitalism, Austria and Germany for the status-oriented capitalism, New Zealand and Poland for the competitiveness-oriented capitalism, and Greece, Lithuania and Estonia for the capture-oriented capitalism. Table 2 shows the results for aggregated data from 2000–2010.

Of course some countries fit very well the regime type and other are more border cases. Above

we mentioned already the most distinguished countries for each regime type. It might be a bit surprising that the United States, Canada and Australia are in the status-oriented group. However, these countries are a bit special and can be distinguished from the rest of the OECD countries in this group. Australia has clearly a status-oriented distribution system but the RR is very well below the mean (36%). In so far one can actually doubt whether the Australia is unemployment benefits are sufficient for any income type. The United States scores below the mean of all z-scores and is only negatively (the highest value below the mean) classified as status-oriented. Furthermore, the welfare configuration of the United States clearly support higher incomes due to tax breaks and private insurance incentives (Hacker, 2008; Howard, 1997). Only Canada fits relatively well in the status-oriented benefit group since it has relatively high RRs and clearly qualifies as such a country in terms of unemployment RRs. For Taiwan the same applies as for the US. Additionally Taiwan has a very low RR (44%). In these terms it is different from the other countries in this group and seems to constitute a subgroup together with Australia and the United States. For South Korea it is also so that it scores below the mean of all z-scores but the closest value to the mean brings it into the competitiveness-oriented capitalism. This is also legitimized by the very low RRs for the low income group (45%). The last ambiguous case is the Czech Republic. Also here are all scores below the mean and the difference between the score for the status- and equality-oriented capitalism is very small so that the country could fit into both categories. All other countries could be very easily groups into one or the other regime.

All in all the countries fit into the categories as one may expect from the literature on welfare state regimes. Mediterranean countries are either status- or capture-oriented. Continental European counties are mainly placed into the status-oriented regime and the anglo-saxon countries into the competitiveness-oriented regime with the noticeable exceptions of Australia, Canada, and the United States. However, the Nordic countries do not fit as well into one regime as suggested in the literature. Denmark and Sweden are doubtlessly equality-oriented but Finland and Norway fall into the status-oriented regime. However, already in Esping-Andersen's study it has been suggested that unemployment RRs are different from other policies as the low correlation with the decommodification index in may suggest.[11] So far there are no hints that our data are misleading. Instead they illuminate in further detail the distribution patterns of RRs.

4.6.2 Cluster of Sickness Replacement Rates

There are some similarities but also very important differences how countries cluster concerning the sickness RRs. Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden are again equality-oriented countries. Ireland, New Zealand, Lithuania, and the United Kingdom are again competitiveness-oriented countries, and six of the the eight OECD countries are again status-oriented countries. Greece and Portugal are again captured-oriented countries. The Anglo-Saxon countries all cluster this time in competitiveness-oriented countries (for Canada and South Korea there are no data and

[11] In the original study by Esping-Andersen (1990), unemployment RRs correlate only with 0.54 with the decommodification index in contrast to sickness (0.93) and pension (0.87). Leading countries here are the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Belgium, and Ireland which do not fit the social-democratic regime type of Nordic countries. This weak correlation actually shed some doubts whether the three programs are suitable for constructing a unidimensional index of a welfare state regimes. However, this issue is not of specific concern in this study and should be treated separately.

Table 4.5: Distribution regimes for sickness replacement rates in 31 countries

	Equality-oriented capitalism	Competitiveness-oriented capitalism	Status-oriented capitalism	Capture-oriented capitalism
Non-CEE	Belgium Denmark Netherlands Sweden	Australia Ireland New Zealand Taiwan United Kingdom	Finland France Spain Austria Germany Italy Norway Switzerland	Greece Japan Portugal
CEE	Czech Republic Slovakia	Lithuania	Estonia Latvia Poland Romania Slovenia	Bulgaria Hungary

Note: Data refers to country-specific averages from 2000–2010. Canada, South Korea and United States are missing because they have either no data or no public sickness benefit program.

the United States has no sickness benefit program). The association between both social benefit programs is relatively high (Cramer's V = 0.56). On average the RR for sickness benefits is 76%. Again the highest RRs are for the low income group, followed by the mid income and high income group. However, this time there are substantial differences between the established OECD countries and the countries of CEE. The RRs are around twenty percentage points higher in the CEE countries than in the OECD countries. The differences are highest among the high income groups where the CEE countries have a twenty-five percentagte points higher replacement rate than the OECD countries. The most typical countries for each regime are Denmark for the equality-oriented regime, The United Kingdom and New Zealand for the competitiveness-oriented, Norway and Austria for the status-oriented, and Portugal and above all Greece for the captured-oriented regime. A borderline case for equality-oriented regime is the Netherlands which score below the mean in all z-scores. The same is true for Lithuania for competitiveness-oriented countries and Germany for the status-oriented ones. However, these countries could still be unambiguously classified into one of the regime types.

4.6.3 Cluster of Standard Pension Replacement Rates

The cluster for standard pension replacement rates deviate most from the other patterns. The association between the standard pension RRs and unemployment RRs is low (Cramer's V = 0.33) and for sickness RRs relatively high ($V = 0.54$). Standard pension RRs are the lowest RRs for the three policy areas. On average and for all countries except Taiwan and South Korea the RR is 62%. Korea and Taiwan have extremely low RRs (Taiwan 38% and South Korea 21%). The average RR in CEE is four percentage points higher than in the OECD countries (again Taiwan and South Korea are excluded). Low income groups have the highest and high income groups have the lowest RR. While the lowest income group receives a two percentage points higher RR in the CEE countries than in the OECD countries the difference between both groups disappears almost completely for the mid income group. However, the high income group

Table 4.6: Distribution regimes for standard pension replacement rates in 31 countries

	Equality-oriented capitalism	Competitiveness-oriented capitalism	Status-oriented capitalism	Capture-oriented capitalism
Non-CEE	Canada Denmark Netherlands	Australia Ireland Japan New Zealand	Austria Belgium Finland France Italy Norway Sweden Spain Switzerland South Korea Taiwan United Kingdom United States	Germany
CEE	Czech Republic Estonia Latvia Slovakia		Lithuania	Hungary Romania Slovenia Bulgaria Poland

Note: Data refers to country-specific averages from 2000–2010. No data on standard pensions for Greece and Portugal.

Table 4.7: Esping-Andersen's de-commodification index for pensions

Low	Middle	High
Australia	Austria	Belgium
Canada	Italy	Denmark
Ireland	Japan	France
Germany	Netherlands	Finland
United Kingdom	New Zealand	Norway
United States	Switzerland	Sweden

Note: See Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 50, Table 2.1). Values of the column for pensions are re-arranged into three categories, i.e. low, mid, and high de-commodification.

receives more than 11 percentage points more in the CEE countries than in the OECD. This indicates that the CEE countries may fall into the category of captured-oriented welfare states for standard pension RRs. This first impression is forcefully confirmed in table 4.6 where we present the regime cluster of the 31 countries in this study with available data.[12]

In contrast to the RRs for unemployment and sickness, the RRs for standard pension deviates the most from the results in the literature. This shows a table of the degree of de-commodificaton for old-age pension from Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 50) which refer to data for the year 1980.

The data simply puts the countries with the six lowest degree of de-commodification into the first column, the six next in the second and the six highest in the last column. Of course it is not clear if pension RRs changed most dramatically from 1980 to 2010 or if our way of calculating the regimes makes the difference. It is of course remarkable that Canada falls into the group of equality-oriented capitalism in our analysis. However, as we will see later it is a border case. The Nordic countries mainly fall into the status-oriented regime leaving only Denmark in the

[12]Greece and Portugal are excluded because of missing information.



Figure 4.1: Trends in standard pension replacement rates in Sweden, United Kingdom and United States, 1970–2010

category of equality-oriented countries. That Sweden moved from the equality-oriented to the status-oriented regime may be a result of the cuts in replacement rates over the time of welfare state retrenchment and the impact of globalization in this country. In contrast the United Kingdom and the United States are status-oriented countries. Figure 4.1 impressively shows the different trends of these three countries.

The figure shows impressively the rise and decline of standard pension RRs in Sweden. The equal cuts of all three income types makes Sweden a status-oriented regime. Why this is so for the United Kingdom and the United States has different reasons. In the United Kingdom there is clear trend of convergence of the three income types. Since the conservative government under Margret Thatcher, the standard pension RRs of the mid and high income types increased substantially. This trend has been reinforced my Tony Blair's Labour government. In this period and the following conservative governments the gap between the three income types closed considerably (this latter period is on which our regime classification is based). For the United States there has not been much change since the late 1980s and also that means that the RRs regime is status-oriented.

In terms of individual countries the Netherlands, Denmark and Estonia are the most pronounced equality-oriented countries. Australia and New Zealand are clear competitiveness-oriented countries. The status-oriented countries are most clearly Spain, Italy and Austria and the captured-oriented countries are Hungary and Romania. There are also some border cases:

Table 4.8: Distribution regimes in 33 Countries

	Equality-oriented capitalism	Competitiveness-oriented capitalism	Status-oriented capitalism	Capture-oriented capitalism
Non-CEE	Belgium Denmark Netherlands Sweden	Australia Canada Ireland Japan New Zealand United Kingdom	Austria Finland France Germany Italy Norway Spain South Korea Switzerland Taiwan United States	Greece Portugal
CEE	Czech Republic Poland	Estonia Lithuania		Bulgaria Hungary Latvia Romania Slovakia Slovenia

Note: Data refers to country-specific averages of aggregated unemployment, sickness, and standard pension replacement rates from 2000–2010.

Canada qualifies as equality-oriented country only because its RRs for low income groups is just above the mean. Belgium, Japan, and Switzerland have z-scores which are below the mean for all three income types. Nevertheless they can be clearly grouped into the regime types. Germany also scores high for the status-oriented regime although the score for captured-oriented regime is clearly higher.

4.6.4 Overall Distribution Regimes in 33 Countries

In order to give an overall picture of the distribution regimes in 33 countries we took the average RRs for low, middle and high income groups as well as the average of the RRs of low income groups over all the three policy areas. As in Esping-Andersen's study the overall regime types are most closely associated with sickness RRs (Cramer's V = 0.69) and least closely with unemployment RRs (0.50), leaving the association with standard pension RR in the middle (0.61). Taking this perspective reaches a very familiar result of regime clustering except for the Nordic countries. Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden are mainly equality-oriented countries. All these countries have the highest degree of de-commodification in Esping-Andersen's study (1990, p. 52). From the CEE countries the Czech Republic and Poland joins this camp. It seems to be at odd that Poland qualifies for this regime because it never fell into this category in the individual policy areas.

There is no surprise at all for the competitiveness-oriented regime. All are Anglo-Saxon and Japan joint this group. Perhaps it is a bit of a surprise that only Estonia and Lithuania as a CEE country falls into this category as well. The status-oriented countries are also close to Esping-Anderson's middle group of de-commodification with some exceptions. One is the United States which is not in the competitiveness-oriented group and Norway which is no equality-oriented country according to our data. No CEE country is in this category. When looking at Taiwan

and South Korea one has to note that these countries fall most likely into the status-oriented group but that they are very distinguished because of their extremely low RRs. The last group is most illuminating. It is certainly no surprise that Greece and Portugal fall into this group which was not considered in analytical terms by Esping-Andersen. This finding confirms studies which speak of a Mediterranean kind of welfare state regimes.[13] However, this kind of welfare state regime is more common than assumed since almost all CEE countries have captured-oriented distribution regimes. This result makes clear how important it is to use this type of welfare states in the research on welfare state regimes.

Closing this part of the report with a methodological note: there are only very few border cases. Japan and Sweden score below the mean in all three areas, however, they are clearly to classify. The only ambiguous country is Estonia. Here the score of competitiveness- and capture-oriented regime is very narrow. Again, this shows that the CEE welfare states align strongly to the captured-oriented type of capitalism. This leads us to the conclusion that the newly emerging welfare states of CEE form a common type of welfare state which has not been in the focus of established studies of the core OECD countries.

This last remark underlines that a regime placement of the 33 countries according to a *cui bono* approach which considers the RRs of various income groups reaches to reliable results. It does not only locate the established OECD countries into the category of equality-, competitiveness-, status-, and captures-oriented distribution regimes but also the newly emerging welfare states in CEE and the Pacific region. With that approach we clearly break new grounds in the study of welfare states and the regimes they are forming. In the next part of the report we turn to causal analysis and ask which political factors are mainly responsible for favoring the various income types.

4.7 Causal Analysis: Explaining changes in replacement rates

The causal analyis is testing the hypotheses outlined in the application. As dependent variable we use a standard model for the original RRs for an average worker, including the household types of a single average worker and a married couple with two children where one person is working full-time and the other is not working. Furthermore, we use the categories for low, mid and high income groups which we defined in section 4.2. Basically, we include representative variables for various approaches in welfare state research. We present the results in turn for unemployment RRs, sickness RRs, and standard pension RRs. Finally, the results are shown for all 31 countries included in this study from 1996 to 2010 and broken down for 21 OECD countries and ten CEE countries.[14] This way of analyzing the data allows us to identify program specific as well as area specific causalities.

The regression model applied is a time-series–cross-section analysis with panel corrected standard errors. Such a model estimates the regression as OLS or Prais-Winsten regression and when calculating the standard errors assumes that the disturbances are, by default, heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across panels. Furthermore the model specifies that, within

[13] Actually Italy only moved recently from the captured-oriented group into the status-oriented group.

[14] Because of the lack of data for most of the independent variables we exclude Taiwan and South Korea from the causal analysis in this chapter.

panels, there is first-order autocorrelation AR(1) and that the coefficient of the AR(1) process is common to all the panels. This standard model has been suggested by Beck and Katz (1995). However, we do not include a lagged dependent variable because of methodological concerns (Achen, 2001). We neither included fixed effects nor period effects. The former we exclude because we are interest in country variance. Including fixed effects wipes out any country effect (Plümper et al., 2005). Period effects are not necessary to include for statistical reasons. All models were checked though with fixed and period effects and came substantially to very similar results. We also applied all common test statistics. In some cases, there has been multicollinearity or variables interacted in a particular way. In these cases we tested various models and report here the results of the most robust models. All party families and diffusion variables are related to each other so that we include only one variable for these two areas in the particular models. However, all other party families and diffusion mechanisms have been tested and the results are shown when they are significant.

The variables used in these models are either taken from the data sets of other scholars or are collected and operationalized within the project. The party matter hypothesis (C1) we test in two ways. First we use the party family approach by using the share of each party family in government. We do not use here the commonly used index of left, center and right party families (Armingeon et al., 2015; Swank, 2002) but Manfred Schmidt's disaggregated data set (Schmidt, 2011).[15] This data make it possible to analyze the effect of the orginal party families as suggested by Klaus von Beyme (1985). This leads to clearer results than conflating for example communist, social democratic and green parties in a single category of left party strength. We test in the following the party families which have a long tradition of being in government. The party families tested are: social democrats, Christian democrats, liberals, and conservatives.

The other measure for the impact of parties in governments moves away from a static time-invariant classification of parties and uses the party positions on a left-right scale. We use the left-right (LR) index developed by the applicant (Jahn, 2011, 2014). We use the varying institutional settings of countries which can be classified as cabinet, prime minister, and minister model (Jahn, 2016b). For the former model which is normally used for all the countries, we use the LR score weighted by the seats a party has in parliament when in government. The prime minister model (Poguntke and Webb, 2005) uses the position of the party of the prime minister and the minister model (Laver and Shepsle, 1996) uses the position of the labor minister for unemployment and pension and the position of the health minister in the case of sickness RRs.[16]

To test hypothesis C1' we use our own veto player index which builds on Tsebelis (2002, Chapter 8; Tsebelis and Chang 2004) macro-comparative veto player index which includes the ideological range of government coalition parties, second chambers and presidents.[17]

[15] We are particular grateful that Manfred G. Schmidt shared his data set with us.

[16] Since the United States and Switzerland are particular and deviate from the other parliamentary systems we coded them in a particular manner (for details see Jahn 2016b).

[17] We extended Tsebelis' sample by using data for Switzerland (Tsebelis used the data from Finland for Switzerland; (Tsebelis, 2002, p. 170), the United States and Greece which have not been included in Tsebelis data set. In addition we newly coded all the CEE countries according to Tsebelis' rules for the established OECD countries. Furthermore, we do not rely on expert judgements in order to identify the party positions because they do not vary much over time. Instead we use the LR index which applies Party Manifesto Data and is therefore time and period specific. Tsebelis (2010, p. 11–12) acknowledges this improvement: "There are two important contributions that Jahn introduces in his analysis, both of them depend on the time dimension. Preferences of actors change over time. This change was not included in my original work, so Jahn clearly

According to hypothesis C2 we test whether the degree of corporatism has an impact of explaining RRs. However, the concept of corporatism seems to have overcome its heyday. Taking a closer look at the literature it is not clear whether the decline of the use of corporatism is based on the weakening of the explanatory power of this concept or if it is a result that there is no time variant corporatism index available for time-series–cross-sectional analysis. This has been expressed in a nutshell by Huber and Stephens (2001, p. 63) who point out, by using Lehmbruch's index of corporatism "the corporatist measure suffers from greater measurement error [...] because the degree of corporatist bargaining varies somewhat through time within countries but the measure does not". As a consequence, the authors eliminated corporatism from their empirical analysis. The complaint that no time-variant indices on corporatism exist is often expressed in current research (see for instance: Ward et al. 2011, p. 539; Jensen 2011, p. 173–174). Therefore, we developed a time-variant corporatism index for 42 countries from 1960 to 2010 within the framework of this project (Jahn, 2016a).

Hypothesis D1 about the impact of the economic openness has been tested by using data from PennTrade (see also Armingeon et al. 2015) and is an index of the sum of imports and exports divided by the Gross National Income (GDI).

International diffusion (hypothesis D2) is analyzed by means of spatial analysis (Jahn and Stephan, 2015). In this context we checked on the one hand diffusion effects from neighboring countries and on the other for model states for a particular welfare regime. Theses model states are taken from Esping-Andersen's study (1990, Chapter 8) and are composed of Sweden for the social democratic welfare state, Germany for the corporatist welfare state, and the United States for the liberal welfare state. However, we alo included model states for the four different regime types identified above. These are Sweden for the equality–oriented welfare state, the UK for the competitiveness-oriented, Germany for the status-oriented, and France for the captured-oriented welfare state.

As control variables we use the unemployment rate for unemployment RRs, the life expectation after the age of 65 and the share of elderly (people above 65 years of age) for the sickness RRs, and the share of elderly again for the analysis of standard pension RRs. In the case of sickness RRs we assume that life expectation after the age of 65 and the share of elderly are convenient proxies for the health situation of a country. The higher the life expectation after 65 the healthier is the population. In contrast the higher the share of elderly the higher may be the pressure for the health insurances and the lower the RRs. For standard pension RRs the share of elderly is also an indicator for the pressure on the pension system in a country. Finally we control for the growth of the GNI. A high GNI may lead to a larger room to maneuver for governments and in turn may lead to higher RRs. The opposite may be true if GDI declines or is low. In this case, governments may be constrained or even forced to reduce RRs. After having introduced the variables included into the model and the way how the empirical analysis is conducted we turn now to the causal analysis of the three policy areas of our study.

Table 4.9: Determinants of unemployment replacement rates (original index)

	Original					
	Overall		OECD			CEE
LR	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.01	0.01	-0.20
Veto player	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.25
Christian Democrats	-0.03+	-0.03+		0.00	0.00	-0.05+
Conservatives			-0.02*			
Corpartism	9.23***	10.24***	6.34***	8.15***	6.16***	13.87***
Unemployment	-0.21	-0.19	0.05	0.14	0.08	-0.38
GDP growth	-0.03	-0.02	-0.12+	-0.09	-0.09	-0.01
Openness	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	0.01
Spatial lags						
United Kingdom	43.48**		64.56***		51.72***	
France		-14.31***		-11.22***		-30.35
Constant	50.54***	72.01***	44.52***	68.96***	47.75***	83.43*
N	439	439	299	299	299	140
R2	0.59	0.59	0.85	0.83	0.84	0.37
Adj. R2	0.58	0.59	0.84	0.83	0.83	0.34

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4.10: Determinants of unemployment replacement rates (low income)

	Low income						
	Overall			OECD		CEE	
LR	0.12	0.13+	0.12	0.09	0.14*	0.09	0.07
Veto player	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.05	0.04	-0.18	-0.19
Christian Democrats	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.03*		-0.05+	-0.04
Conservatives					-0.02*		
Corporatism	7.85***	6.51***	7.55***	7.25***	3.50***	11.15**	10.21**
Unemployment	0.02	-0.03	0.02	0.02	-0.07	-0.24	-0.13
GDP growth	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01	-0.11+	-0.14*	0.03	0.05
Openness	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.05**	0.06**	-0.02	-0.04
Spatial lags							
United States	-7.80*			-11.26***		274.00*	
United Kingdom		26.78***			35.60***		
France			-5.17+				-20.01*
Constant	79.79***	60.61***	78.48***	80.38***	54.74***	-116.08	103.15***
N	439	439	439	299	299	140	140
R2	0.74	0.75	0.74	0.86	0.87	0.62	0.62
Adj. R2	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.86	0.86	0.60	0.60

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4.11: Determinants of unemployment replacement rates (mid income)

	Mid income					
	Overall		OECD			CEE
LR	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	-0.20
Veto player	0.06	0.07	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.27
Christian Democrats	-0.03	-0.03+	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.04
Corporatism	8.27***	10.04***	6.33***	7.92***	6.33***	11.56***
Unemployment	-0.21	-0.16	0.04	0.09	0.04	-0.38
GDP growth	-0.05	-0.05	-0.12*	-0.11+	-0.12*	-0.05
Openness	0.00	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.02
Spatial lags						
United Kingdom	34.96***		41.86***		41.86***	
United States		-20.26***		-12.99**		
Neighbors						2.64
Constant	53.14***	77.62***	50.03***	72.89***	50.03***	65.06***
N	439	439	299	299	299	140
R2	0.68	0.67	0.88	0.86	0.88	0.48
Ad. R2	0.67	0.67	0.87	0.86	0.87	0.44

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4.12: Determinants of unemployment replacement rates (high income)

	High income			
	Overall	OECD		CEE
LR	-0.02	0.01	0.00	-0.26
Veto player	0.05	0.01	0.03	0.73**
Christian Democrats	-0.03	0.00	0.00	-0.05
Corporatism	5.76***	5.84***	8.01***	4.09*
Unemployment	-0.18	-0.06	-0.04	-0.16
GDP growth	-0.04	-0.13*	-0.11+	-0.04
Openness	-0.01	-0.03+	-0.04*	0.00
Spatial lags				
United Kingdom	54.27***	53.26***		
Germany			-3.26*	
United States				-291.00**
Constant	42.21***	42.62***	62.25***	209.22***
N	439	299	299	140
R2	0.68	0.81	0.80	0.45
Adj. R2	0.67	0.81	0.80	0.42

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

4.7.1 Unemployment

For the analyses of the unemployment RRs we include the unemployment rate as a control variable.[18] It can be assumed that high unemployment rates create pressure for the social benefits and in turn may lead to lower RRs. However, as we will see in the analyses the percentage of unemployed in relation to the total labor force has no significant impact in any statistical model of unemployment RRs.

The analysis of the original RRs for unemployment benefits shows a strong effect of corporatism in favor of higher RRs. This is true for both, OECD countries as well as CEE countries. There are also weakly significant effects of Christian democratic and conservative governments. However, the former is only true when analyzing all countries but fades when we split the analysis for OECD and CEE countries, respectively. For conservative government we find only a negative effect on RRs in the OECD countries and for Christian democratic only for the CEE countries. There is no diffusion by neighborship but some states serve as models. Above all the UK is a model for OECD countries. France is a model for the opposite. When France increases RRs the other states do the opposite. However, the breakdown in the three income groups clarifies these results.

First of all the partisan effects are becoming clearer. Left party positions correlate with lower unemployment RRs. However, this is only true for OECD countries. This result shows that left parties are more inclined to cut social benefits in the established welfare states than governments with a more centrist position. A bit of a surprise is that governments with a high participation of Christian democratic parties are associated with lower RRs. This result is particularly true for OECD countries but also for the CEE countries. In the OECD countries governments with a strong government participation of conservative parties are responsible for lower RRs for lower income groups.

There are only significant effects of veto players in the model for the high income group in the CEE countries. However this effect is clearly significant ($p < 0.01$) and shows that RRs for people with high income are protected by veto players. This result explains why some CEE countries fall into the captured-oriented distribution regime.

When considering the low income group we find a significant effect of diffusion by neighborship. This effect was disguised in the analysis of the average wage earner above. Both the OECD as well as the CEE countries orient themselves at the RRs of the US. However, this orientation is significantly positive in the CEE but negative for the OECD world. Furthermore, the UK is a model for the OECD countries and France is a negative case for the CEE countries. This result sheds some doubts that the newly emerging welfares states in CEE took a European welfare state as a model. But it also shows that the OECD countries are not following the lead of the US in respect to unemployment RRs of low incomers. Finally it needs to be mentioned that a very robust result for all countries, OECD as well as CEE, is the highly significant and positive effect of corporatism.

The strong impact of corporatism can also be seen in the models for the mid and high income groups. Only in the latter group in the CEE countries corporatism is only significant at the

precedes one step further. [...] the other significant change that Jahn introduces is change of institutions."

[18] The data is taken from Armingeon et al. 2015.

$p < 0.5$ level. However, partisan effects fade. Only governments with strong conservative parties are associated with lower RRs for mid income groups in the OECD countries. In contrast to this the highly significant negative diffusion effect concerning the US model role remains also for the mid income groups in the OECD countries while the positive effect for the CEE countries disappears. Without any doubt, the UK is also in this income group the big model for the OECD countries, Significant diffusion mechanisms differ in the high income group from the low and mid income groups. While Germany is a negative example for the OECD countries the US takes the same role for the CEE countries. That means that the impact of taking the US as a model for the development of unemployment replacement rates in the CEE countries has different effects for the various income groups. The US serves as a positive model for low incomers, it is neutral for mid incomers and it is a negative example for the high incomers. Similarly, economic openness has different effects but just for the OECD countries. The effects are positively significant for the low income type, insignificant for the mid incomers and negatively significant for the high income group. The UK is again the clear model state.

All in all the highly significant impact of corporatism for all income groups and countries is impressive. This shows that the concept of corporatism travels very well to the CEE countries and is a significant explanatory variable for both OECD and CEE countries. The finding that veto players have a significant effect on keeping RRs high for the high income group in the CEE countries helps to explain why some of these countries fall into the status-oriented distribution regime. Furthermore, there are also diffusion effects and international factors at work. In particular specific countries standing for a particular welfare state regime serve as a model as well as a contrast model. Partisan effects, in contrast, do not contribute overwhelmingly much to explain unemployment RRs. However, they have significant results in some models.

4.7.2 Sickness

Table 4.13: Determinants of sickness replacement rates (original index)

	Original			
	Overall		OECD	CEE
LR	-0.11	-0.12	-0.03	-0.37
Veto player	0.07	0.07	0.07+	0.00
Social Democrats	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01
Corporatism	8.36***	10.32***	19.76***	2.28
Life expectancy	-3.40***	-3.84***		-0.36
Elderly	3.29***	2.74***	3.28***	-0.34
GDP growth	-0.16+	-0.12	-0.06	0.00
Openness	0.11***	0.10***	0.03	-0.01
Spatial lags				
United Kingdom	93.91***		68.43***	
Germany		-8.50*		-32.15+
Constant	48.88***	95.03***	-7.07	125.64***
N	425	425	285	140
R2	0.74	0.73	0.88	0.71
Adj. R2	0.74	0.73	0.88	0.69

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

For sickness RRs we introduce two variables which are often significant when explaining social

Table 4.14: Determinants of sickness replacement rates (low income)

	Low income		
	Overall	OECD	
LR	-0.10	-0.09	-0.07
Veto player	0.05	0.07	0.07
Social Democrats	0.00	0.00	0.00
Corporatism	9.72***	17.26***	16.41***
Life expectancy	-2.15***		
Elderly		2.66***	2.71***
GDP growth	-0.11+	0.00	-0.01
Openness	0.11***	0.09***	0.09***
Spatial lags			
United Kingdom	6.65+	-9.26*	
France			-4.06+
_cons	102.34***	27.98***	24.16**
N	425	285	285
R2	0.80	0.86	0.86
Adj. R2	0.79	0.86	0.86

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Regressions with CEE sample yielded no significant results for diffusion variables.

Table 4.15: Determinants of sickness replacement rates (mid income)

	Mid income				
	Overall		OECD		CEE
LR	-0.09	-0.11	-0.07	-0.08	-0.33
Veto player	0.04	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.01
Social Democrats	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01
Corporatism	6.56***	8.46***	19.34***	20.98***	1.16
Life expectancy	-3.25***	-3.63***			-0.29
Elderly	2.92***	2.68***	3.32***	3.23***	-0.60
GDP growth	-0.13	-0.12	0.00	0.03	-0.01
Openness	0.10***	0.10***	0.02	0.01	0.00
Spatial lags					
United Kingdom	58.26***		23.51***		
Germany		-7.17+			-28.76+
France				-6.60**	
Constant	56.17***	93.33***	2.53	16.62*	126.25***
N	425	425	285	285	140
R2	0.76	0.76	0.87	0.87	0.76
Adj. R2	0.75	0.75	0.87	0.87	0.74

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4.16: Determinants of sickness replacement rates (high income)

	High income				
	Overall	OECD			CEE
LR	-0.15	-0.18	-0.20	-0.15	-0.50+
Veto player	0.02	0.08	0.07	0.06	0.03
Social Democrats	0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.01
Corporatism	4.02**	17.53***	16.14***	17.24***	1.59
Life expectancy	-3.84***				
Elderly	3.95***	4.09***	4.19***	3.78***	1.88*
GDP growth	-0.01	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.07
Openness		-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03
Spatial lags					
United Kingdom	74.04***		25.35***		
Germany		7.56*			
France				-6.84*	
Neighbors					0.91
Constant	50.57***	-7.63	-12.23	6.91	58.83***
N	425	285	285	285	140
R2	0.73	0.79	0.78	0.80	0.70
Adj. R2	0.72	0.79	0.77	0.79	0.68

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

health policy. Both variables should capture the "pressure" on the health system although both factors are just very rough proxies.[19]. Elderly is the percentage part of people over 65 years of age. One may assume that an aging population implies higher health problems because elderly have more frequently serious health problems than younger people. The other variable, life expectations after 65, covers a similar effect. However, causality is less clear here. A higher life expectation may not only create pressure but also relief. If people live longer they may be healthier and may relief governments from high health expenditure. The hypothetical effect on RRs is, therefore, ambiguous.

In the analysis it turned out that both variables interact with each other so that we often had to exclude one variable from the analysis. This is so although the direct bi-variate correlation is modest (< 0.4) and the variance inflation factor does not detect the collinearity of the regressors with the constant. Substantially, the result actually is so that elderly is associated with higher RRs and life expectations with lower ones. This relationship is true mainly in the OECD countries where the effect of elderly is highly significant ($p < 0.001$) for all income groups. In contrast for CEE countries this is only true for the high income group. This may show that elderly have a strong lobby in established welfare states which keeps high RRs up. This effect may only be valid for high incomers in the CEE countries and is also a strong explanatory variable why so many CEE countries fall into the captured- and status-oriented distribution regimes.

The models with the original RRs show that besides the two discussed variables, corporatism is significant and economic openness when we consider all countries. The UK is also for sickness RRs the model for the OECD countries and Germany seems to serve as a negative model in the CEE countries. Are we able to refine this picture when looking at various income groups?

For the low income group we find no significant results for the RRs of the low income group for the CEE countries. For the OECD countries economic openness has appositive effect on RRs.

[19]The data are taken from Armingeon et al. 2015

This indicates a race to the top. As above, for the CEE countries we do not come to a conclusive result for the low income group. Actually, none of the variables included into the model reaches a significant result.

This changes only slightly for the mid income group. Again, the UK has a strong impact on the RRs of the OECD countries. The negative impact of Germany as a model is significant at the 0.1 level for both the OECD and the CEE countries. For the latter France has a negative impact. For the OECD countries economic openness has no effect anymore leaving corporatism and the share of elderly as the only – but highly significant – variables.

This pattern hold for high income groups for the OECD countries. For CEE countries the position of the government has a significant effect. The more a government stands to the left, the higher the RRs. This may explain why more than two thirds of the CEE countries have status- or captured-oriented patterns of distributions regimes for sickness RRs. Furthermore, the pressure of elderly is in the high income group not only significant for the OECD countries but also for the CEE countries. While the effect of elderly in the high income groups is significant on the $p < 0.05$ level for the CEE countries, the diffusion effect disappears. However, this is different for the OECD countries. Here, Germany and above all the UK are positive examples, while France is a negative one.

All in all the results show the highly significant impact of corporatism again. However, for sickness RRs only for the OECD countries. For these countries the pressure created by a high amount of elderly people is also highly significant. Very impressive is the model role of the UK for the OECD countries. All three findings are highly significant for all three income groups in the OECD countries. For CEE countries we could not find very conclusive results in the area of sickness RRs. However, we obtained again some significant results (impact of left government position and share of elderly for the high income group) why so many CEE countries have capture-oriented or status-oriented distribution regimes.

4.7.3 Standard pensions

For the RRs of standard pension we find again that corporatism has a significant impact among the OECD countries. In sharp contrast, this time corporatism has no effect in the CEE countries. The models with the original RRs show that the share of people of 65 lead to higher standard pension RRs. This is true for the OECD as well as CEE countries and also when analyzing OECD and CEE countries simultaneously in one single model. In addition, economic openness has a negative effect in the OECD countries showing that there is a race to the bottom in the area of standard pension policy. The United States serves as a negative model for pension policy in both OECD and CEE countries. In contrast to these findings France seems to be a reference model for OECD countries. There is also a weak partisan effect: when liberal parties are strong in governments in OECD countries this leads to lower standard pension RRs.

When looking at the low income group many of the above mentioned findings cannot be confirmed. Only corporatism prevails for the OECD countries. Government positions are important in both OECD and CEE countries. When governments move to the left, RRs for the low income group decrease significantly. The UK has again a model role in the OECD countries. This is also true for Germany. However, Germany has a positive model role in the OECD countries but

Table 4.17: Determinants of standard pension replacement rates (original index)

	Original			
	Overall	OECD		CEE
LR	0.05	0.06	0.07	-0.06
Veto player	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.03
Social Democrats	0.01			0.03
Liberals		-0.03	-0.05*	
Corporatism	3.29*	3.71**	5.63***	-0.83
Elderly	1.80***	1.36***	1.71***	2.87*
GDP growth	-0.03	0.00	0.00	-0.05
Openness	-0.06+	-0.04+	-0.04*	-0.09
Spatial lags				
United States	-20.80***		-17.51***	-65.73*
France		6.43+		
Constant	53.74***	41.90***	51.96***	73.03**
N	411	271	271	140
R2	0.59	0.84	0.85	0.34
Adj. R2	0.58	0.84	0.85	0.30

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4.18: Determinants of standard pension replacement rates (low income)

	Low income					
	Overall		OECD		CEE	
LR	0.13	0.19+	0.06	0.13+	0.80*	0.87**
Veto player	0.00	-0.03	-0.05	-0.10*	0.38	0.40
Social Democrats	0.02	0.02	-0.01	0.00	0.05	0.05
Corporatism	2.26	1.93	6.44***	5.53***	-5.65	-5.05
Elderly	-0.02	-0.37	0.14	-0.24	-2.73**	-2.52*
GDP growth	-0.16+	-0.14	-0.01	0.03	-0.22	-0.17
Openness	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.05
Spatial lags						
Germany	16.53*		25.00***		-83.05+	
United Kingdom		20.89***		14.51***		
France						-58.80**
Constant	61.23***	63.73***	56.99***	68.65***	151.56***	137.09***
N	411	411	271	271	140	140
R2	0.64	0.66	0.83	0.82	0.45	0.47
Adj. R2	0.63	0.66	0.83	0.81	0.42	0.44

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4.19: Determinants of standard pension replacement rates (mid income)

	Mid income				
	Overall	OECD			CEE
LR	0.06	0.08	0.07	0.08	-0.05
Veto player	0.00	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	0.03
Social Democrats	0.02				0.03
Liberals		-0.05*	-0.04+	-0.05*	
Corporatism	3.25*	5.06***	4.79***	6.59***	-2.15
Elderly	1.55***	1.43***	1.31***	1.57***	2.25+
GDP growth	-0.04	0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.07
Openness	-0.05+	-0.05**	-0.04*	-0.05**	-0.08
Spatial lags					
United States	-18.56**			-16.60***	-60.36*
United Kingdom		8.99*			
France			6.74*		
Constant	54.11***	40.12***	41.76***	52.35***	74.16**
N	411	271	271	271	140
R2	0.61	0.86	0.85	0.86	0.37
Adj. R2	0.60	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.33

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4.20: Determinants of standard pension replacement rates (high income)

	High income				
	Overall		OECD	CEE	
LR	0.04	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.03
Veto player	-0.11+	-0.11+	-0.05	-0.37	-0.35
Social Democrats	0.01	0.00		0.00	0.01
Liberals			-0.08**		
Corporatism	7.18***	8.25***	10.64***	4.53	5.68
Elderly	1.75***	2.02***	2.25***	-0.26	-0.32
GDP growth	0.05	0.05	0.08	0.09	0.09
Openness	-0.06+	-0.06+	-0.08***	-0.08	-0.07
Spatial lags					
United Kingdom	15.17+				143.96**
United States		-15.35*			
Sweden			13.20**	-54.93+	
Constant	22.91**	32.32***	14.90*	95.51**	2.74
N	411	411	271	140	140
R2	0.46	0.47	0.76	0.19	0.21
Adj. R2	0.44	0.46	0.75	0.14	0.16

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

a negative in the CEE countries. The latter is also true for France. For the CEE countries there is a significant effect for elderly but the sign is in the non-expected direction.

The situation changes for the models analyzing the mid income group. For the CEE countries elderly has now a significantly weak but positive impact and the US is a negative model. In the OECD counbtries the UK and France are model states showing that various models of welfare state developments have an impact in the OECD countries. Furthermore, the impact of economic openness is negatively significant ($p < 0.05$) for the mid income group. For the OECD model we also find that strong liberal parties in government have a negative effect on standard pension RRs for the mid income group.

Even on a higher level of significance most of these findings are confirmed for the high income group. It is a bit surprising that a high amount of liberals in government target the high income group for cuts in RRs in the OECD countries. An astonishing result is the diffusion impact of Sweden as a model. For OECD countries Sweden serves a model and countries follow the Swedish way. In CEE countries it is just the opposite. Sweden serves as a negative example. While this result is clearly significant for the OECD countries ($p < 0.01$) it is less clear for the CEE countries ($p < 0.1$), in particular because the latter model is not well specified. However, this time the UK is a model state for the CEE countries.

The models for standard pension RRs show again that corporatism and the model role of the UK are important variables, at least in the OECD welfare states. A high amount of elderly is a robust indicator for explaining high standard pension RRs in the OECD countries. Diffusion and international factors are relevant although in different and specific ways as described above. There are also some weak partisan effects in this area.

4.7.4 Total replacement rates

Analyzing the impact of variables on an aggregated index may be disputed. As we have seen from the analysis of the three policy areas many and diverse variables have specific impacts of the RRs in unemployment, sickness and pension RRs. However, analyzing the aggregate may show which trends dominate when looking at a broader picture.

In the OECD countries, corporatism is the major game in town. Corporatist countries have high RRs. In the CEE countries this is only true for the high income group. Only this group is protected by organized interest groups which may be an explanation why status and captured oriented capitalism is at work in the CEE countries. Actually the same is also true for elderly. People of an age of 65 and above exercise a high pressure for the OECD countries. In the CEE countries this is only true for the high income group.

Economic openness has a U-shaped effect in the OECD countries. For the low income group the relationship between economic openness and RRs is positive and significant. That means that an open economy supports higher RRs. This changes for the mid-income group where this relationship is small and insignificant. Turning to the high income group leads again to significant results but this time the direction of the association has changed: the more open an economy the lower the RRs.

In the aggregated analysis the high impact of the UK on the RRs of the other countries prevails. For the OECD countries the UK is a model for all income groups. For the CEE countries, the

Table 4.21: Determinants of total replacement rates (low income)

	Low income					
	Overall		OECD		CEE	
LR	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.12	0.13
Veto player	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.09	0.07
Social Democrats	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02
Corporatism	3.51***	4.95***	6.40***	8.37***	2.81	3.11
Elderly	0.73**	0.74**	1.03***	1.15***	-0.19	0.06
Unemployment	0.20	0.23+	0.17*	0.19*	0.16	0.15
GDP growth	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	0.03
Openness	0.05**	0.05*	0.05**	0.04*	-0.02	-0.01
Spatial lags						
United Kingdom	24.52***		16.81***		-168.10*	
Germany		9.27**		9.94***		
France						-37.97**
Constant	45.07***	51.68***	43.37***	43.61***	179.75***	105.67***
N	383	383	243	243	140	140
R2	0.87	0.86	0.94	0.94	0.79	0.79
Adj. R2	0.86	0.86	0.94	0.94	0.77	0.78

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4.22: Determinants of total replacement rates (mid income)

	Mid income				
	Overall	OECD		CEE	
LR	-0.04	0.06	0.04	-0.19	-0.18
Veto player	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.05
Social Democrats	0.00			0.00	0.00
Conservatives		-0.01*	-0.01		
Corporatism	5.13***	8.33***	10.24***	3.27	2.96
Elderly	1.31***	1.44***	1.52***	0.86	0.59
Unemployment	0.08	0.21*	0.22**	-0.06	-0.11
GDP growth	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01
Openness	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0.00	-0.01
Spatial lags					
United Kingdom	24.87**	24.73***		-110.53**	
United States			-28.77*		
France					-45.85+
Constant	34.62***	30.73***	51.64***	105.60***	93.02***
N	383	243	243	140	140
R2	0.82	0.93	0.92	0.75	0.76
Adj. R2	0.81	0.92	0.92	0.74	0.74

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4.23: Determinants of total replacement rates (high income)

	High income					
	Overall			OECD		CEE
LR	-0.14	-0.16+	-0.15	-0.11	-0.06	-0.29
Veto player	-0.02	0.00	-0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.04
Social Democrats	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.00
Corporatism	4.01***	5.17***	5.28***	10.95***	10.60***	4.59+
Elderly	1.63***	1.67***	1.85***	2.13***	2.16***	1.50*
Unemployment	0.10	0.09	0.10	0.21*	0.15	-0.21
GDP growth	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.01
Openness	0.00	0.01	0.01	-0.05**	-0.03*	-0.04
Spatial lags						
United Kingdom	38.05***			11.17+		
United States		-71.24+				-184.87+
Sweden			13.38***		12.34***	
Constant	20.19**	56.72***	22.26**	20.37***	15.71*	110.41***
N	383	383	383	243	243	140
R2	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.86	0.87	0.71
Adj. R2	0.77	0.76	0.76	0.86	0.87	0.69

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

UK is a negative example for low and mid income groups and insignificant for the high income group. Actually, for the CEE countries there are no positive diffusion effects in the aggregated analysis. France has a negative effect in the low and mid income group and the US for the high income group. For the OECD countries the US is a negative example for the mid income group and Sweden is a positive example for the high income group.

There are no partisan effects which survive in an aggregated analysis. The trends are too contradictuous and vary too much from one policy to the other that there are clear party effects identifiable. These results are in line with the literature analyzing aggregated social expenditure (Huber and Stephens, 2001).

4.8 Conclusion

Taking the three areas of social policy together the results show that corporatism is the major political variable explaining differences in RRs. This is undoubtedly true for the OECD countries but also in the CEE countries this variable has a predominantly significant effect. In sharp contrast to this substantial finding, partisan effects are all in all weak. This might be the case because during the period of welfare state retrenchment there are probably no clear partisan effects since parties react country specific. For instance, in some countries such as the UK or Germany social democrats were the leader of reforming the welfare state even if that meant to cut RRs severely. In other countries such as France, Greece and Spain social democrats are more strongly aligned with traditional left politics which also means to keep RRs at a high level. Taken this contradictous behavior of party families into account may explain why the effects of party families are wiped out. Additionally, a variable that has only minor explanatory power in our analysis is the veto player. The variable has only been significant in the models for the high income group for unemployment RRs in the CEE countries. Concerning the function

Table 4.24: Evaluation of hypotheses on welfare regimes and their developments

#	Name	Description	Evaluation
A1	Regime cluster	Welfare states exhibit country-specific variance and can be clustered into regime types (i.e. social-democratic, conservative, liberal, and Mediterranean).	Accepted
A2a	CEE welfare states I	Welfare states in CEE countries converge to the characteristics of Western types.	Accepted[a]
A2b	CEE welfare states II	Welfare states in CEE countries form a distict Eastern welfare regime.	Rejected
B1	Convergence	European welfare states converge over time.	Rejected
B2a	Race to the bottom	European welfare states exhibit a downward convergence.	Rejected
B2b	Race to the top	European welfare states exhibit an upward convergence.	Rejected
B2c	New model	European welfare states convergence and form a new model of welfare regime (i.e. a distinct European welfare regime).	Rejected
B3	Divergence	European welfare states diverge over time.	Rejected
C1	Partisan influence	Parties do matter in reforming welfare states. Leftist parties correlate with higher replacement rates, while righist parties correlate with lower replacement rates.	Rejected[b]
C2	Path dependency	The type of welfare state determines the range of future developments within itself.	Accpeted
C3	Transformation	Economic growth within the transformation phase of CEE countries determines the development of the welfare state.	Rejected
D1	Economic openness	Economic openness has an effect on the development of the welfare state.	Rejected
D2	Diffusion	Policy diffusion has an effect on the convergence of European welfare states.	Accepted[c]
E1	Controls	Welfare state reform is influenced by institutional, economic, corporatist, and (socio)demographic factors.	Accepted[d]

[a] Convergence observed in social security programs and funding, but not in social expenditures.
[b] Depending on income level and social security program, but not for aggregated replacement rates.
[c] For most programs, but to a varying degree.
[d] This is especially true for the degree of corporatism in country.

of a role model for the OECD countries, the United Kingdom is a decisive factor to explain variation in the development of RRs. Reforms initiated by the prime ministers Thatcher, Major and Blair serve as policy reform examples for the other OECD countries. The British model can be characterized as disfavoring the low income group and increasing the RRs of the mid and above all high income groups. However, the results show that international factors are not solely determining replacement rates. They are by far not dominating domestic politics, but they are often significant in various forms. However, the impact is ambiguous and different from one policy field to the other. This makes an easy interpretation difficult. It is fair to say the United States more often than not serves as a negative model for both the OECD and the CEE countries. The role of the UK has been discussed above.

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A User statistics/Nutzerstatistik

A.1 Scientific works and publications using CWED data

This list exclusively contains peer-reviewed journal articles, monographies, and compilations (handbooks, edited volumes, etc.) written in English language using CWED or CWED2 data. Because of reasons of space, the vast numbers of dissertations, master's theses, and working papers are excluded.[1] The studies listed below all utilize measures from either CWED or CWED2 in the empirical analysis. Typically, indicators and variables of the dataset are used in large-N studies, although in some cases the data are used in other types of empirical analyses.

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A.2 User statistics of the CWED2 website

Below, we present the user statistics of the website for CWED2 (`www.cwed2.org`) from its launch until end of December 2016. Since the website went online in August 2013, the website had attracted numerous visitors downloading the data set and codebook. To date, the website had an overall count of over 35,000 visitors (with about 23,000 unique visitors).

Monthly history



Month	Unique visitors	Number of visits	Pages	Hits	Bandwidth
Jan 2013	0	0	0	0	0
Feb 2013	0	0	0	0	0
Mar 2013	0	0	0	0	0
Apr 2013	0	0	0	0	0
May 2013	0	0	0	0	0
Jun 2013	0	0	0	0	0
Jul 2013	0	0	0	0	0
Aug 2013	66	99	318	619	22.55 MB
Sep 2013	1,013	1,320	4,087	11,002	256.21 MB
Oct 2013	422	635	1,772	4,309	123.71 MB
Nov 2013	439	592	1,584	3,976	105.92 MB
Dec 2013	353	551	1,737	4,000	108.63 MB
Total	2,293	3,197	9,498	23,906	617.01 MB

Monthly history



Month	Unique visitors	Number of visits	Pages	Hits	Bandwidth
Jan 2014	404	593	1,794	3,933	93.15 MB
Feb 2014	300	421	1,605	3,881	88.31 MB
Mar 2014	666	1,043	3,986	9,070	202.24 MB
Apr 2014	528	881	2,545	4,964	137.19 MB
May 2014	513	904	2,722	4,849	114.75 MB
Jun 2014	528	851	2,777	5,102	111.99 MB
Jul 2014	433	629	1,672	3,593	133.82 MB
Aug 2014	366	513	1,453	3,457	96.46 MB
Sep 2014	443	599	1,448	3,832	99.28 MB
Oct 2014	571	793	2,271	5,380	132.24 MB
Nov 2014	582	773	2,370	6,055	163.67 MB
Dec 2014	555	708	2,302	5,471	147.07 MB
Total	5,889	8,708	26,945	59,587	1.48 GB

Monthly history



Month	Unique visitors	Number of visits	Pages	Hits	Bandwidth
Jan 2015	583	1,126	3,414	6,745	194.73 MB
Feb 2015	451	682	1,912	4,328	182.22 MB
Mar 2015	583	758	2,117	5,239	220.31 MB
Apr 2015	578	768	2,586	5,811	249.09 MB
May 2015	556	734	2,110	5,458	196.02 MB
Jun 2015	517	711	1,993	4,950	163.98 MB
Jul 2015	510	670	1,955	4,906	144.62 MB
Aug 2015	543	693	2,067	4,790	127.74 MB
Sep 2015	466	659	1,895	4,012	95.65 MB
Oct 2015	575	824	2,243	4,741	110.92 MB
Nov 2015	536	826	2,193	4,870	125.26 MB
Dec 2015	532	856	2,518	4,901	133.07 MB
Total	6,430	9,307	27,003	60,751	1.90 GB

Monthly history



Month	Unique visitors	Number of visits	Pages	Hits	Bandwidth
Jan 2016	560	900	2,780	5,425	123.71 MB
Feb 2016	631	992	2,908	5,932	159.50 MB
Mar 2016	693	1,061	2,988	6,370	154.77 MB
Apr 2016	587	903	2,863	5,993	157.46 MB
May 2016	797	1,258	3,766	8,253	194.23 MB
Jun 2016	608	931	2,825	5,737	153.18 MB
Jul 2016	547	911	2,687	5,340	152.82 MB
Aug 2016	681	1,141	2,991	5,611	132.07 MB
Sep 2016	598	1,102	2,847	5,258	124.02 MB
Oct 2016	860	1,635	3,460	5,935	123.26 MB
Nov 2016	1,044	1,887	4,186	7,527	178.31 MB
Dec 2016	993	1,958	4,236	6,952	150.30 MB
Total	8,599	14,679	38,537	74,333	1.76 GB

B Graphs/Graphiken

B.1 Replacement rates for single households

B.1.1 Unemployment

Western countries














Finland
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Unemployment RR single 50
Unemployment RR single 100
Unemployment RR single 200
Unemployment RR lone parent 50


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
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
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Unemployment RR lone parent 50


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Unemployment RR lone parent 50


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
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
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
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
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Unemployment RR single 200
Unemployment RR lone parent 50


Norway
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR single 50
Unemployment RR single 100
Unemployment RR single 200
Unemployment RR lone parent 50


Portugal
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR single 50
Unemployment RR single 100
Unemployment RR single 200
Unemployment RR lone parent 50


Spain
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR single 50
Unemployment RR single 100
Unemployment RR single 200
Unemployment RR lone parent 50


Sweden
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR single 50
Unemployment RR single 100
Unemployment RR single 200
Unemployment RR lone parent 50


Switzerland
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR single 50
Unemployment RR single 100
Unemployment RR single 200
Unemployment RR lone parent 50


United Kingdom
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR single 50
Unemployment RR single 100
Unemployment RR single 200
Unemployment RR lone parent 50



Eastern countries














Poland
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR single 50
Unemployment RR single 100
Unemployment RR single 200
Unemployment RR lone parent 50


Romania
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR single 50
Unemployment RR single 100
Unemployment RR single 200
Unemployment RR lone parent 50


Slovakia
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR single 50
Unemployment RR single 100
Unemployment RR single 200
Unemployment RR lone parent 50


Slovenia
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR single 50
Unemployment RR single 100
Unemployment RR single 200
Unemployment RR lone parent 50

B.1.2 Sickness

Western countries


















Germany
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR single 50
Sickness RR single 100
Sickness RR single 200
Sickness RR lone parent 50


Greece
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR single 50
Sickness RR single 100
Sickness RR single 200
Sickness RR lone parent 50


Ireland
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR single 50
Sickness RR single 100
Sickness RR single 200
Sickness RR lone parent 50


Italy
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR single 50
Sickness RR single 100
Sickness RR single 200
Sickness RR lone parent 50


Japan
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR single 50
Sickness RR single 100
Sickness RR single 200
Sickness RR lone parent 50


Korea, Republic of
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR single 50
Sickness RR single 100
Sickness RR single 200
Sickness RR lone parent 50


Netherlands
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR single 50
Sickness RR single 100
Sickness RR single 200
Sickness RR lone parent 50


New Zealand
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR single 50
Sickness RR single 100
Sickness RR single 200
Sickness RR lone parent 50


Norway
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR single 50
Sickness RR single 100
Sickness RR single 200
Sickness RR lone parent 50


Portugal
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR single 50
Sickness RR single 100
Sickness RR single 200
Sickness RR lone parent 50


Spain
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR single 50
Sickness RR single 100
Sickness RR single 200
Sickness RR lone parent 50


Sweden
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR single 50
Sickness RR single 100
Sickness RR single 200
Sickness RR lone parent 50


Switzerland
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR single 50
Sickness RR single 100
Sickness RR single 200
Sickness RR lone parent 50


United Kingdom
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR single 50
Sickness RR single 100
Sickness RR single 200
Sickness RR lone parent 50


United States of America
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR single 50
Sickness RR single 100
Sickness RR single 200
Sickness RR lone parent 50

Eastern countries





















B.1.3 Standard pensions

Western countries










Taiwan, Province of China
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR single 50
Standard pension RR single 100
Standard pension RR single 200
Standard pension RR lone parent 50


Denmark
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR single 50
Standard pension RR single 100
Standard pension RR single 200
Standard pension RR lone parent 50


Finland
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR single 50
Standard pension RR single 100
Standard pension RR single 200
Standard pension RR lone parent 50


France
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR single 50
Standard pension RR single 100
Standard pension RR single 200
Standard pension RR lone parent 50


Germany
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR single 50
Standard pension RR single 100
Standard pension RR single 200
Standard pension RR lone parent 50


Greece
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR single 50
Standard pension RR single 100
Standard pension RR single 200
Standard pension RR lone parent 50


Ireland
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR single 50
Standard pension RR single 100
Standard pension RR single 200
Standard pension RR lone parent 50


Italy
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR single 50
Standard pension RR single 100
Standard pension RR single 200
Standard pension RR lone parent 50


Japan
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR single 50
Standard pension RR single 100
Standard pension RR single 200
Standard pension RR lone parent 50


Korea, Republic of
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR single 50
Standard pension RR single 100
Standard pension RR single 200
Standard pension RR lone parent 50


Netherlands
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR single 50
Standard pension RR single 100
Standard pension RR single 200
Standard pension RR lone parent 50


New Zealand
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR single 50
Standard pension RR single 100
Standard pension RR single 200
Standard pension RR lone parent 50


Norway
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR single 50
Standard pension RR single 100
Standard pension RR single 200
Standard pension RR lone parent 50


Portugal
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR single 50
Standard pension RR single 100
Standard pension RR single 200
Standard pension RR lone parent 50


Spain
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR single 50
Standard pension RR single 100
Standard pension RR single 200
Standard pension RR lone parent 50


Sweden
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR single 50
Standard pension RR single 100
Standard pension RR single 200
Standard pension RR lone parent 50







Eastern countries










Latvia
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR single 50
Standard pension RR single 100
Standard pension RR single 200
Standard pension RR lone parent 50


Lithuania
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR single 50
Standard pension RR single 100
Standard pension RR single 200
Standard pension RR lone parent 50


Poland
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR single 50
Standard pension RR single 100
Standard pension RR single 200
Standard pension RR lone parent 50


Romania
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR single 50
Standard pension RR single 100
Standard pension RR single 200
Standard pension RR lone parent 50


Slovakia
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR single 50
Standard pension RR single 100
Standard pension RR single 200
Standard pension RR lone parent 50


Slovenia
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR single 50
Standard pension RR single 100
Standard pension RR single 200
Standard pension RR lone parent 50

B.1.4 Minimum pensions

Western countries


















Germany
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum pension RR single 50
Minimum pension RR single 100
Minimum pension RR single 200
Minimum pension RR lone parent 50


Greece
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum pension RR single 50
Minimum pension RR single 100
Minimum pension RR single 200
Minimum pension RR lone parent 50


Ireland
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum pension RR single 50
Minimum pension RR single 100
Minimum pension RR single 200
Minimum pension RR lone parent 50


Italy
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum pension RR single 50
Minimum pension RR single 100
Minimum pension RR single 200
Minimum pension RR lone parent 50


Japan
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum pension RR single 50
Minimum pension RR single 100
Minimum pension RR single 200
Minimum pension RR lone parent 50


Korea, Republic of
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum pension RR single 50
Minimum pension RR single 100
Minimum pension RR single 200
Minimum pension RR lone parent 50


Netherlands
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum pension RR single 50
Minimum pension RR single 100
Minimum pension RR single 200
Minimum pension RR lone parent 50


New Zealand
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum pension RR single 50
Minimum pension RR single 100
Minimum pension RR single 200
Minimum pension RR lone parent 50


Norway
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum pension RR single 50
Minimum pension RR single 100
Minimum pension RR single 200
Minimum pension RR lone parent 50


Portugal
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum pension RR single 50
Minimum pension RR single 100
Minimum pension RR single 200
Minimum pension RR lone parent 50


Spain
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum pension RR single 50
Minimum pension RR single 100
Minimum pension RR single 200
Minimum pension RR lone parent 50


Sweden
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum pension RR single 50
Minimum pension RR single 100
Minimum pension RR single 200
Minimum pension RR lone parent 50


Switzerland
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum pension RR single 50
Minimum pension RR single 100
Minimum pension RR single 200
Minimum pension RR lone parent 50


United Kingdom
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum pension RR single 50
Minimum pension RR single 100
Minimum pension RR single 200
Minimum pension RR lone parent 50


United States of America
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum pension RR single 50
Minimum pension RR single 100
Minimum pension RR single 200
Minimum pension RR lone parent 50

Eastern countries





















B.2 Replacement rates for couple households

B.2.1 Unemployment

Western countries










Taiwan, Province of China
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR couple 50/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/0
Unemployment RR couple 100/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/150


Denmark
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR couple 50/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/0
Unemployment RR couple 100/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/150


Finland
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR couple 50/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/0
Unemployment RR couple 100/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/150


France
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR couple 50/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/0
Unemployment RR couple 100/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/150


Germany
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR couple 50/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/0
Unemployment RR couple 100/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/150


Greece
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR couple 50/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/0
Unemployment RR couple 100/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/150


Ireland
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR couple 50/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/0
Unemployment RR couple 100/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/150


Italy
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR couple 50/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/0
Unemployment RR couple 100/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/150


Japan
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR couple 50/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/0
Unemployment RR couple 100/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/150


Korea, Republic of
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR couple 50/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/0
Unemployment RR couple 100/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/150


Netherlands
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR couple 50/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/0
Unemployment RR couple 100/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/150


New Zealand
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR couple 50/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/0
Unemployment RR couple 100/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/150


Norway
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR couple 50/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/0
Unemployment RR couple 100/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/150


Portugal
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR couple 50/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/0
Unemployment RR couple 100/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/150


Spain
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR couple 50/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/0
Unemployment RR couple 100/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/150


Sweden
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR couple 50/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/0
Unemployment RR couple 100/50
Unemployment RR couple 100/150







Eastern countries










Latvia
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR single 50
Unemployment RR single 100
Unemployment RR single 200
Unemployment RR lone parent 50


Lithuania
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR single 50
Unemployment RR single 100
Unemployment RR single 200
Unemployment RR lone parent 50


Poland
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR single 50
Unemployment RR single 100
Unemployment RR single 200
Unemployment RR lone parent 50


Romania
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR single 50
Unemployment RR single 100
Unemployment RR single 200
Unemployment RR lone parent 50


Slovakia
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR single 50
Unemployment RR single 100
Unemployment RR single 200
Unemployment RR lone parent 50


Slovenia
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR single 50
Unemployment RR single 100
Unemployment RR single 200
Unemployment RR lone parent 50

B.2.2 Sickness

Western countries


















Germany
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR couple 50/50
Sickness RR couple 100/0
Sickness RR couple 100/50
Sickness RR couple 150/150


Greece
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR couple 50/50
Sickness RR couple 100/0
Sickness RR couple 100/50
Sickness RR couple 150/150


Ireland
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR couple 50/50
Sickness RR couple 100/0
Sickness RR couple 100/50
Sickness RR couple 150/150


Italy
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR couple 50/50
Sickness RR couple 100/0
Sickness RR couple 100/50
Sickness RR couple 150/150


Japan
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR couple 50/50
Sickness RR couple 100/0
Sickness RR couple 100/50
Sickness RR couple 150/150


Korea, Republic of
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR couple 50/50
Sickness RR couple 100/0
Sickness RR couple 100/50
Sickness RR couple 150/150


Netherlands
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR couple 50/50
Sickness RR couple 100/0
Sickness RR couple 100/50
Sickness RR couple 150/150


New Zealand
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR couple 50/50
Sickness RR couple 100/0
Sickness RR couple 100/50
Sickness RR couple 150/150


Norway
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR couple 50/50
Sickness RR couple 100/0
Sickness RR couple 100/50
Sickness RR couple 150/150


Portugal
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR couple 50/50
Sickness RR couple 100/0
Sickness RR couple 100/50
Sickness RR couple 150/150


Spain
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR couple 50/50
Sickness RR couple 100/0
Sickness RR couple 100/50
Sickness RR couple 150/150


Sweden
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR couple 50/50
Sickness RR couple 100/0
Sickness RR couple 100/50
Sickness RR couple 150/150


Switzerland
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR couple 50/50
Sickness RR couple 100/0
Sickness RR couple 100/50
Sickness RR couple 150/150


United Kingdom
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR couple 50/50
Sickness RR couple 100/0
Sickness RR couple 100/50
Sickness RR couple 150/150


United States of America
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR couple 50/50
Sickness RR couple 100/0
Sickness RR couple 100/50
Sickness RR couple 150/150

Eastern countries





















B.2.3 Standard pensions

Western countries










Taiwan, Province of China
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR couple 50/50
Standard pension RR couple 100/0
Standard pension RR couple 100/50
Standard pension RR couple 150/150


Denmark
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR couple 50/50
Standard pension RR couple 100/0
Standard pension RR couple 100/50
Standard pension RR couple 150/150


Finland
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR couple 50/50
Standard pension RR couple 100/0
Standard pension RR couple 100/50
Standard pension RR couple 150/150


France
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR couple 50/50
Standard pension RR couple 100/0
Standard pension RR couple 100/50
Standard pension RR couple 150/150


Germany
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR couple 50/50
Standard pension RR couple 100/0
Standard pension RR couple 100/50
Standard pension RR couple 150/150


Greece
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR couple 50/50
Standard pension RR couple 100/0
Standard pension RR couple 100/50
Standard pension RR couple 150/150


Ireland
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR couple 50/50
Standard pension RR couple 100/0
Standard pension RR couple 100/50
Standard pension RR couple 150/150


Italy
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR couple 50/50
Standard pension RR couple 100/0
Standard pension RR couple 100/50
Standard pension RR couple 150/150


Japan
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR couple 50/50
Standard pension RR couple 100/0
Standard pension RR couple 100/50
Standard pension RR couple 150/150


Korea, Republic of
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR couple 50/50
Standard pension RR couple 100/0
Standard pension RR couple 100/50
Standard pension RR couple 150/150


Netherlands
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR couple 50/50
Standard pension RR couple 100/0
Standard pension RR couple 100/50
Standard pension RR couple 150/150


New Zealand
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR couple 50/50
Standard pension RR couple 100/0
Standard pension RR couple 100/50
Standard pension RR couple 150/150


Norway
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR couple 50/50
Standard pension RR couple 100/0
Standard pension RR couple 100/50
Standard pension RR couple 150/150


Portugal
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR couple 50/50
Standard pension RR couple 100/0
Standard pension RR couple 100/50
Standard pension RR couple 150/150


Spain
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR couple 50/50
Standard pension RR couple 100/0
Standard pension RR couple 100/50
Standard pension RR couple 150/150


Sweden
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR couple 50/50
Standard pension RR couple 100/0
Standard pension RR couple 100/50
Standard pension RR couple 150/150







Eastern countries










Latvia
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR single 50
Standard pension RR single 100
Standard pension RR single 200
Standard pension RR lone parent 50


Lithuania
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR single 50
Standard pension RR single 100
Standard pension RR single 200
Standard pension RR lone parent 50


Poland
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR single 50
Standard pension RR single 100
Standard pension RR single 200
Standard pension RR lone parent 50


Romania
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR single 50
Standard pension RR single 100
Standard pension RR single 200
Standard pension RR lone parent 50


Slovakia
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR single 50
Standard pension RR single 100
Standard pension RR single 200
Standard pension RR lone parent 50


Slovenia
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard pension RR single 50
Standard pension RR single 100
Standard pension RR single 200
Standard pension RR lone parent 50

B.2.4 Minimum pensions

Western countries


















Germany
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum pension RR couple 50/50
Minimum pension RR couple 100/0
Minimum pension RR couple 100/50
Minimum pension RR couple 150/150


Greece
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum pension RR couple 50/50
Minimum pension RR couple 100/0
Minimum pension RR couple 100/50
Minimum pension RR couple 150/150


Ireland
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum pension RR couple 50/50
Minimum pension RR couple 100/0
Minimum pension RR couple 100/50
Minimum pension RR couple 150/150


Italy
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum pension RR couple 50/50
Minimum pension RR couple 100/0
Minimum pension RR couple 100/50
Minimum pension RR couple 150/150


Japan
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum pension RR couple 50/50
Minimum pension RR couple 100/0
Minimum pension RR couple 100/50
Minimum pension RR couple 150/150


Korea, Republic of
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum pension RR couple 50/50
Minimum pension RR couple 100/0
Minimum pension RR couple 100/50
Minimum pension RR couple 150/150


Netherlands
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum pension RR couple 50/50
Minimum pension RR couple 100/0
Minimum pension RR couple 100/50
Minimum pension RR couple 150/150


New Zealand
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum pension RR couple 50/50
Minimum pension RR couple 100/0
Minimum pension RR couple 100/50
Minimum pension RR couple 150/150


Norway
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum pension RR couple 50/50
Minimum pension RR couple 100/0
Minimum pension RR couple 100/50
Minimum pension RR couple 150/150


Portugal
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum pension RR couple 50/50
Minimum pension RR couple 100/0
Minimum pension RR couple 100/50
Minimum pension RR couple 150/150


Spain
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum pension RR couple 50/50
Minimum pension RR couple 100/0
Minimum pension RR couple 100/50
Minimum pension RR couple 150/150


Sweden
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum pension RR couple 50/50
Minimum pension RR couple 100/0
Minimum pension RR couple 100/50
Minimum pension RR couple 150/150


Switzerland
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum pension RR couple 50/50
Minimum pension RR couple 100/0
Minimum pension RR couple 100/50
Minimum pension RR couple 150/150


United Kingdom
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum pension RR couple 50/50
Minimum pension RR couple 100/0
Minimum pension RR couple 100/50
Minimum pension RR couple 150/150


United States of America
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum pension RR couple 50/50
Minimum pension RR couple 100/0
Minimum pension RR couple 100/50
Minimum pension RR couple 150/150

Eastern countries





















B.3 Replacement rates for income types

B.3.1 Unemployment

Western countries










Taiwan, Province of China
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR average
Unemployment RR low level
Unemployment RR mid level
Unemployment RR high level


Denmark
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR average
Unemployment RR low level
Unemployment RR mid level
Unemployment RR high level


Finland
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR average
Unemployment RR low level
Unemployment RR mid level
Unemployment RR high level


France
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR average
Unemployment RR low level
Unemployment RR mid level
Unemployment RR high level


Germany
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR average
Unemployment RR low level
Unemployment RR mid level
Unemployment RR high level


Greece
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR average
Unemployment RR low level
Unemployment RR mid level
Unemployment RR high level


Ireland
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR average
Unemployment RR low level
Unemployment RR mid level
Unemployment RR high level


Italy
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR average
Unemployment RR low level
Unemployment RR mid level
Unemployment RR high level


Japan
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR average
Unemployment RR low level
Unemployment RR mid level
Unemployment RR high level


Korea, Republic of
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR average
Unemployment RR low level
Unemployment RR mid level
Unemployment RR high level


Netherlands
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR average
Unemployment RR low level
Unemployment RR mid level
Unemployment RR high level


New Zealand
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR average
Unemployment RR low level
Unemployment RR mid level
Unemployment RR high level


Norway
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR average
Unemployment RR low level
Unemployment RR mid level
Unemployment RR high level


Portugal
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR average
Unemployment RR low level
Unemployment RR mid level
Unemployment RR high level


Spain
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR average
Unemployment RR low level
Unemployment RR mid level
Unemployment RR high level


Sweden
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR average
Unemployment RR low level
Unemployment RR mid level
Unemployment RR high level







Eastern countries










Latvia
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR average
Unemployment RR low level
Unemployment RR mid level
Unemployment RR high level


Lithuania
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR average
Unemployment RR low level
Unemployment RR mid level
Unemployment RR high level


Poland
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR average
Unemployment RR low level
Unemployment RR mid level
Unemployment RR high level


Romania
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR average
Unemployment RR low level
Unemployment RR mid level
Unemployment RR high level


Slovakia
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR average
Unemployment RR low level
Unemployment RR mid level
Unemployment RR high level


Slovenia
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Unemployment RR average
Unemployment RR low level
Unemployment RR mid level
Unemployment RR high level

B.3.2 Sickness

Western countries


















Germany
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR average
Sickness RR low level
Sickness RR mid level
Sickness RR high level


Greece
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR average
Sickness RR low level
Sickness RR mid level
Sickness RR high level


Ireland
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR average
Sickness RR low level
Sickness RR mid level
Sickness RR high level


Italy
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR average
Sickness RR low level
Sickness RR mid level
Sickness RR high level


Japan
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR average
Sickness RR low level
Sickness RR mid level
Sickness RR high level


Korea, Republic of
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR average
Sickness RR low level
Sickness RR mid level
Sickness RR high level


Netherlands
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR average
Sickness RR low level
Sickness RR mid level
Sickness RR high level


New Zealand
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR average
Sickness RR low level
Sickness RR mid level
Sickness RR high level


Norway
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR average
Sickness RR low level
Sickness RR mid level
Sickness RR high level


Portugal
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR average
Sickness RR low level
Sickness RR mid level
Sickness RR high level


Spain
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR average
Sickness RR low level
Sickness RR mid level
Sickness RR high level


Sweden
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR average
Sickness RR low level
Sickness RR mid level
Sickness RR high level


Switzerland
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR average
Sickness RR low level
Sickness RR mid level
Sickness RR high level


United Kingdom
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR average
Sickness RR low level
Sickness RR mid level
Sickness RR high level


United States of America
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sickness RR average
Sickness RR low level
Sickness RR mid level
Sickness RR high level

Eastern countries





















B.3.3 Standard pension

Western countries










Taiwan, Province of China
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard Pension RR average
Standard Pension RR low level
Standard Pension RR mid level
Standard Pension RR high level


Denmark
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard Pension RR average
Standard Pension RR low level
Standard Pension RR mid level
Standard Pension RR high level


Finland
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard Pension RR average
Standard Pension RR low level
Standard Pension RR mid level
Standard Pension RR high level


France
100
90
80
70
60
50
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10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard Pension RR average
Standard Pension RR low level
Standard Pension RR mid level
Standard Pension RR high level


Germany
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard Pension RR average
Standard Pension RR low level
Standard Pension RR mid level
Standard Pension RR high level


Greece
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard Pension RR average
Standard Pension RR low level
Standard Pension RR mid level
Standard Pension RR high level


Ireland
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
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10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard Pension RR average
Standard Pension RR low level
Standard Pension RR mid level
Standard Pension RR high level


Italy
100
90
80
70
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50
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10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard Pension RR average
Standard Pension RR low level
Standard Pension RR mid level
Standard Pension RR high level


Japan
100
90
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70
60
50
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10
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1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard Pension RR average
Standard Pension RR low level
Standard Pension RR mid level
Standard Pension RR high level


Korea, Republic of
100
90
80
70
60
50
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30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard Pension RR average
Standard Pension RR low level
Standard Pension RR mid level
Standard Pension RR high level


Netherlands
100
90
80
70
60
50
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30
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10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard Pension RR average
Standard Pension RR low level
Standard Pension RR mid level
Standard Pension RR high level


New Zealand
100
90
80
70
60
50
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30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard Pension RR average
Standard Pension RR low level
Standard Pension RR mid level
Standard Pension RR high level


Norway
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard Pension RR average
Standard Pension RR low level
Standard Pension RR mid level
Standard Pension RR high level


Portugal
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard Pension RR average
Standard Pension RR low level
Standard Pension RR mid level
Standard Pension RR high level


Spain
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard Pension RR average
Standard Pension RR low level
Standard Pension RR mid level
Standard Pension RR high level


Sweden
100
90
80
70
60
50
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30
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10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard Pension RR average
Standard Pension RR low level
Standard Pension RR mid level
Standard Pension RR high level







Eastern countries










Latvia
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard Pension RR average
Standard Pension RR low level
Standard Pension RR mid level
Standard Pension RR high level


Lithuania
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard Pension RR average
Standard Pension RR low level
Standard Pension RR mid level
Standard Pension RR high level


Poland
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard Pension RR average
Standard Pension RR low level
Standard Pension RR mid level
Standard Pension RR high level


Romania
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard Pension RR average
Standard Pension RR low level
Standard Pension RR mid level
Standard Pension RR high level


Slovakia
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard Pension RR average
Standard Pension RR low level
Standard Pension RR mid level
Standard Pension RR high level


Slovenia
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Standard Pension RR average
Standard Pension RR low level
Standard Pension RR mid level
Standard Pension RR high level

B.3.4 Minimum pension

Western countries


















Germany
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum Pension RR average
Minimum Pension RR low level
Minimum Pension RR mid level
Minimum Pension RR high level


Greece
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum Pension RR average
Minimum Pension RR low level
Minimum Pension RR mid level
Minimum Pension RR high level


Ireland
100
90
80
70
60
50
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30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum Pension RR average
Minimum Pension RR low level
Minimum Pension RR mid level
Minimum Pension RR high level


Italy
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum Pension RR average
Minimum Pension RR low level
Minimum Pension RR mid level
Minimum Pension RR high level


Japan
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum Pension RR average
Minimum Pension RR low level
Minimum Pension RR mid level
Minimum Pension RR high level


Korea, Republic of
100
90
80
70
60
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40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum Pension RR average
Minimum Pension RR low level
Minimum Pension RR mid level
Minimum Pension RR high level


Netherlands
100
90
80
70
60
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1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum Pension RR average
Minimum Pension RR low level
Minimum Pension RR mid level
Minimum Pension RR high level


New Zealand
100
90
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70
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30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum Pension RR average
Minimum Pension RR low level
Minimum Pension RR mid level
Minimum Pension RR high level


Norway
100
90
80
70
60
50
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30
20
10
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1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum Pension RR average
Minimum Pension RR low level
Minimum Pension RR mid level
Minimum Pension RR high level


Portugal
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70
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1995
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2005
2010
Minimum Pension RR average
Minimum Pension RR low level
Minimum Pension RR mid level
Minimum Pension RR high level


Spain
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90
80
70
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50
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1995
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2010
Minimum Pension RR average
Minimum Pension RR low level
Minimum Pension RR mid level
Minimum Pension RR high level


Sweden
100
90
80
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60
50
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30
20
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1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum Pension RR average
Minimum Pension RR low level
Minimum Pension RR mid level
Minimum Pension RR high level


Switzerland
100
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80
70
60
50
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30
20
10
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1995
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2005
2010
Minimum Pension RR average
Minimum Pension RR low level
Minimum Pension RR mid level
Minimum Pension RR high level


United Kingdom
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
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1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum Pension RR average
Minimum Pension RR low level
Minimum Pension RR mid level
Minimum Pension RR high level


United States of America
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum Pension RR average
Minimum Pension RR low level
Minimum Pension RR mid level
Minimum Pension RR high level

Eastern countries


















Slovakia
100
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80
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1995
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2005
2010
Minimum Pension RR average
Minimum Pension RR low level
Minimum Pension RR mid level
Minimum Pension RR high level


Slovenia
100
90
80
70
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40
30
20
10
0
1995
2000
2005
2010
Minimum Pension RR average
Minimum Pension RR low level
Minimum Pension RR mid level
Minimum Pension RR high level

C Tables/Tabellen

Table C.1: Levels of unemployment replacement rates in 33 countries, 1995–2010.

	Singles				Couples			
	50	100	200	LP	5050	1000	10050	150150
AUS	46.04	24.99	15.03	—	43.48	54.46	30.51	50.48
AUT	56.48	54.62	39.23	76.45	84.77	65.51	77.11	77.69
BEL	80.07	62.85	37.01	78.51	100.27	61.76	82.53	84.01
CAN	65.15	61.18	35.84	69.85	81.36	64.72	75.96	73.04
CHE	74.48	69.30	57.44	77.55	88.91	80.43	85.88	88.32
DEU	61.59	62.80	61.59	77.74	86.02	69.80	75.20	72.62
DNK	93.87	69.13	42.71	80.25	97.16	73.27	81.37	76.93
ESP	82.81	82.01	65.76	55.62	94.93	81.56	90.48	89.27
FIN	66.04	53.13	44.40	75.73	99.62	64.02	85.26	81.96
FRA	90.23	70.51	67.28	91.60	65.85	70.27	59.26	61.50
GBR	44.41	28.13	15.14	51.87	78.50	47.68	61.48	61.47
GRC	47.59	45.49	53.90	42.55	78.08	58.00	71.93	80.78
IRL	57.59	38.29	25.11	56.01	88.20	64.05	67.64	69.97
ITA	37.05	25.12	26.98	28.93	71.31	34.88	63.56	66.18
JPN	74.48	62.13	36.11	57.15	87.56	59.18	73.80	73.50
KOR	57.76	53.42	33.06	57.53	28.82	52.69	35.07	21.16
NDL	78.02	80.47	64.58	82.50	90.22	83.45	88.68	85.58
NOR	66.47	64.48	54.36	77.46	93.19	71.52	89.88	89.15
NZL	52.67	30.08	15.56	64.56	79.85	61.63	58.43	60.16
PRT	120.08	90.81	67.53	67.96	112.09	72.58	81.78	87.25
SWE	89.60	77.48	48.41	91.59	95.35	79.65	85.84	78.72
TWN	59.46	60.34	34.76	57.23	29.16	58.29	39.38	22.51
USA	60.00	62.21	32.91	—	87.26	60.33	79.79	78.44
BGR	91.21	57.88	33.91	90.65	95.70	56.57	72.37	69.40
CZE	48.23	48.10	39.85	53.81	124.20	86.06	91.65	80.93
EST	36.95	30.54	27.07	48.11	70.43	36.31	57.31	65.14
HUN	65.70	51.05	30.90	75.68	102.05	71.66	81.92	76.97
LTU	62.62	40.58	23.76	58.42	81.59	40.50	62.06	65.30
LVA	69.03	68.34	67.46	66.34	88.23	65.07	82.38	85.92
POL	55.74	28.97	15.04	76.51	83.51	52.01	63.59	64.80
ROU	74.36	55.78	51.50	76.85	88.23	58.85	73.13	77.25
SVK	61.19	62.06	55.61	56.83	75.49	61.43	74.42	80.03
SVN	63.66	62.77	40.71	71.77	101.02	68.78	80.09	77.30
Non-CEE	70.06	57.80	43.08	69.46	84.84	65.30	74.23	73.97
CEE	62.87	50.61	38.58	67.50	91.05	59.72	73.89	74.30
Total	68.69	56.60	42.22	69.05	86.03	64.36	74.17	74.03

Table C.2: Levels of unemployment replacement rates in 33 countries by aggregates, 1995–2010.

		Income level			No. of children	
	Orig.	Low	Mid	High	Two	None
AUS	40.16	45.26	38.83	32.88	46.12	28.71
AUT	60.00	71.24	66.39	57.97	76.73	50.22
BEL	61.86	88.33	68.42	59.64	80.89	59.21
CAN	62.95	73.25	67.29	54.44	73.77	54.06
CHE	74.87	81.70	78.54	72.88	85.89	67.07
DEU	66.30	73.80	69.09	67.11	76.09	61.59
DNK	71.20	95.51	74.59	59.82	82.18	68.57
ESP	81.78	88.87	84.68	77.52	89.06	76.86
FIN	58.58	82.83	69.02	63.18	83.09	55.58
FRA	68.92	77.04	65.98	63.00	64.07	73.90
GBR	37.90	61.46	45.76	38.31	62.28	29.23
GRC	51.39	62.77	61.08	66.97	73.31	49.83
IRL	51.17	72.89	56.76	47.54	72.55	40.32
ITA	30.00	54.18	48.98	46.55	61.95	33.53
JPN	60.85	81.02	63.43	54.81	72.72	56.76
KOR	53.06	43.29	47.06	27.11	34.43	48.08
NDL	81.96	84.12	84.20	75.08	86.98	74.36
NOR	68.00	80.04	76.13	75.12	87.23	63.27
NZL	45.74	67.34	50.39	38.32	65.70	33.33
PRT	81.69	116.09	81.72	77.39	88.43	92.81
SWE	78.57	92.47	80.99	63.56	84.89	71.83
TWN	59.31	44.31	52.67	28.64	37.33	51.52
USA	61.27	73.72	67.44	55.76	76.46	51.83
BGR	57.22	93.46	62.27	51.65	73.51	61.00
CZE	67.08	86.22	75.27	60.39	95.71	45.39
EST	33.43	53.69	41.39	46.11	57.30	31.52
HUN	61.36	83.87	68.21	53.93	83.15	49.22
LTU	40.54	72.11	47.71	44.53	62.36	42.32
LVA	66.71	78.63	71.93	76.69	80.40	68.28
POL	40.49	69.62	48.19	39.92	65.98	33.25
ROU	57.32	81.30	62.59	64.37	74.36	60.55
SVK	61.75	68.34	65.97	67.82	72.84	59.62
SVN	65.77	82.34	70.55	59.00	81.80	55.71
Non-CEE	61.31	77.24	67.01	58.77	75.03	57.29
CEE	55.17	76.96	61.41	56.44	74.74	50.69
Total	60.32	77.19	66.01	58.35	74.98	56.11

Table C.3: Levels of sickness replacement rates in 33 countries, 1995–2010.

	Singles				Couples			
	50	100	200	LP	5050	1000	10050	150150
AUS	46.04	24.99	15.03	—	43.81	54.46	30.49	50.48
AUT	83.82	83.41	76.21	—	93.36	86.93	90.82	91.50
BEL	88.60	85.42	54.42	86.94	101.89	89.25	68.87	94.03
CAN	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
CHE	81.39	81.98	68.53	85.14	90.93	83.32	87.82	89.59
DEU	92.01	92.59	69.45	91.70	98.42	92.60	98.12	96.14
DNK	90.21	50.51	31.20	76.65	61.21	61.73	44.97	27.18
ESP	74.59	75.74	75.15	73.12	83.40	76.38	76.15	78.29
FIN	73.49	74.80	67.48	75.84	68.57	76.48	72.12	74.64
FRA	61.12	63.19	43.23	51.70	82.49	62.81	76.17	84.23
GBR	49.28	30.84	16.59	47.96	80.06	41.55	62.66	62.20
GRC	64.44	63.22	69.85	57.62	88.03	62.38	85.16	90.32
IRL	57.59	38.29	25.11	56.01	88.20	64.05	67.64	88.20
ITA	76.03	74.47	76.04	50.33	89.16	81.78	87.59	88.02
JPN	56.60	55.97	64.97	57.19	78.16	52.72	72.63	80.81
KOR	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
NDL	77.73	80.22	64.58	82.30	89.55	83.28	88.15	85.08
NOR	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
NZL	55.12	31.79	16.31	64.56	80.79	62.42	59.13	60.58
PRT	66.82	67.62	75.12	77.97	84.78	71.14	80.75	89.86
SWE	85.19	86.14	70.59	88.56	93.68	88.01	91.54	90.18
TWN	51.75	52.56	34.98	50.06	76.28	50.56	68.36	72.44
USA	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
BGR	95.89	99.54	99.54	95.68	90.86	83.75	89.66	91.88
CZE	81.60	73.59	44.14	84.55	92.57	77.30	85.14	79.33
EST	82.44	81.48	80.95	85.88	89.25	81.61	86.76	89.82
HUN	76.69	81.88	85.01	83.39	89.15	86.81	90.14	94.29
LTU	69.31	66.74	23.76	69.49	69.49	67.51	78.83	83.10
LVA	90.45	90.01	89.78	92.41	95.85	91.50	94.01	95.17
POL	93.83	93.59	94.21	98.17	98.51	96.30	96.90	97.26
ROU	87.38	88.55	90.38	88.41	95.65	91.60	94.25	95.52
SVK	88.06	81.24	49.30	75.81	87.99	76.40	85.62	80.61
SVN	98.75	101.09	101.45	93.37	96.26	92.61	94.73	96.06
Non-CEE	68.41	62.16	53.08	67.43	79.11	68.54	71.46	74.93
CEE	86.44	85.77	75.85	86.72	90.56	84.54	89.60	90.30
Total	71.89	66.30	57.53	71.50	81.33	71.34	74.99	77.94

Table C.4: Levels of sickness replacement rates in 33 countries by aggregates, 1995–2010.

		Income level			No. of children	
	Orig.	Low	Mid	High	Two	None
AUS	40.16	45.36	38.74	32.88	46.10	28.71
AUT	85.17	88.59	87.06	83.85	90.65	81.15
BEL	86.43	92.96	80.17	73.89	87.28	75.04
CAN	—	—	—	—	—	—
CHE	82.65	86.16	84.37	79.06	87.91	77.30
DEU	92.60	95.22	94.28	82.80	96.31	84.54
DNK	55.63	74.69	51.89	28.89	48.17	56.71
ESP	76.06	78.99	76.09	76.72	78.55	75.16
FIN	72.73	71.03	75.03	71.06	73.13	72.25
FRA	62.18	71.15	66.67	62.84	75.78	54.96
GBR	36.19	64.67	45.02	39.40	61.62	32.24
GRC	62.84	76.15	71.99	79.81	82.10	66.49
IRL	51.17	72.89	56.76	56.65	77.10	40.32
ITA	78.12	82.59	82.25	81.98	87.15	75.76
JPN	54.34	66.57	61.97	72.03	71.31	59.28
KOR	—	—	—	—	—	—
NDL	81.75	83.64	83.88	74.83	86.51	74.18
NOR	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
NZL	46.83	69.56	51.64	39.09	66.67	35.54
PRT	69.38	75.80	73.17	82.49	81.63	69.85
SWE	87.07	89.43	88.60	80.39	90.88	80.64
TWN	51.56	64.02	57.16	54.52	67.10	46.78
USA	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
BGR	91.65	93.37	90.99	95.71	89.04	98.32
CZE	75.45	87.08	78.68	61.73	83.59	66.44
EST	81.54	85.84	83.28	85.39	86.86	81.62
HUN	84.35	82.92	86.28	89.65	90.10	81.19
LTU	67.12	69.40	71.03	53.43	74.73	53.27
LVA	90.76	93.15	91.84	92.47	94.13	90.08
POL	94.94	96.17	95.60	95.74	97.24	93.88
ROU	90.07	91.51	91.46	92.95	94.25	88.77
SVK	78.82	88.03	81.08	64.96	82.65	72.87
SVN	96.85	97.50	96.14	98.75	94.91	100.43
Non-CEE	65.05	73.61	67.62	63.77	73.48	60.85
CEE	85.16	88.50	86.64	83.08	88.75	82.69
Total	68.46	76.39	71.17	67.39	76.34	64.90

Table C.5: Levels of standard pension replacement rates in 33 countries, 1995–2010.

	Singles				Couples			
	50	100	200	LP	5050	1000	10050	150150
AUS	55.76	30.42	18.19	42.06	84.36	45.73	49.28	36.98
AUT	81.88	79.51	70.70	69.86	68.61	63.73	70.62	72.56
BEL	84.87	65.88	44.77	46.09	52.89	63.28	56.45	43.56
CAN	84.32	45.53	28.53	—	60.64	66.16	55.49	31.61
CHE	60.28	47.20	36.82	59.73	46.38	64.00	44.98	30.21
DEU	66.01	73.27	63.88	51.53	57.26	58.70	63.64	68.43
DNK	90.21	50.51	31.20	76.65	61.21	61.73	44.97	27.18
ESP	94.34	91.91	91.88	87.98	95.82	92.53	94.21	94.69
FIN	75.99	60.00	60.71	59.38	62.63	74.75	58.79	57.43
FRA	66.85	56.08	40.92	55.58	61.10	60.71	55.45	49.66
GBR	63.97	46.00	34.12	40.43	50.37	52.72	43.69	35.55
GRC	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
IRL	71.43	38.84	49.83	—	66.60	54.06	49.75	30.45
ITA	85.93	78.50	86.18	42.96	77.50	73.89	81.76	59.62
JPN	70.86	47.18	43.61	36.71	69.59	67.26	56.99	45.36
KOR	25.79	17.78	14.43	25.41	25.74	18.87	20.36	15.46
NDL	85.60	49.86	28.30	65.61	105.22	60.37	66.48	49.08
NOR	73.73	58.00	74.81	53.52	69.57	60.97	67.09	66.35
NZL	75.40	40.05	22.23	55.88	50.10	58.56	36.67	21.98
PRT	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
SWE	81.55	63.81	57.89	65.96	64.83	80.30	71.92	55.75
TWN	37.33	37.88	39.31	36.01	36.66	36.66	37.10	38.20
USA	65.22	55.46	38.37	65.22	61.99	73.80	56.73	45.85
BGR	62.43	66.83	67.97	62.05	59.75	96.23	61.81	60.26
CZE	86.83	76.45	37.11	58.19	76.45	83.12	68.09	44.34
EST	78.95	43.30	23.90	61.31	68.73	35.75	50.43	28.99
HUN	70.09	73.24	86.58	53.01	61.03	92.43	66.27	78.91
LTU	64.17	46.71	36.78	58.14	41.94	45.63	37.30	32.08
LVA	96.71	61.33	41.01	75.30	84.66	51.89	66.89	45.81
POL	102.95	81.33	71.06	52.31	71.90	52.31	68.08	65.04
ROU	49.98	53.25	57.70	38.35	44.75	46.37	47.70	53.02
SVK	82.94	50.87	40.71	65.14	99.72	65.14	78.99	55.58
SVN	85.84	55.15	58.69	57.65	43.16	41.15	47.04	53.17
Non-CEE	74.28	55.99	47.61	58.03	65.72	63.95	58.46	48.11
CEE	78.09	60.85	52.15	58.14	65.21	61.00	59.26	51.72
Total	75.06	56.86	48.53	58.06	65.62	63.42	58.62	48.85

Table C.6: Levels of standard pension replacement rates in 33 countries by aggregates, 1995–2010.

		Income level			No. of children	
	Orig.	Low	Mid	High	Two	None
AUS	38.14	69.03	41.98	27.19	53.65	34.59
AUT	71.62	75.24	71.29	71.63	68.88	77.37
BEL	62.56	68.88	63.69	44.17	54.60	66.26
CAN	55.84	72.48	59.30	30.07	54.76	54.65
CHE	55.63	53.34	52.11	33.55	46.39	48.10
DEU	65.98	61.63	65.26	66.16	61.78	68.08
DNK	55.63	74.69	51.89	28.89	48.17	56.71
ESP	92.22	95.08	92.88	93.28	94.31	92.71
FIN	65.72	69.31	64.83	59.07	63.51	65.74
FRA	58.40	63.98	57.41	45.29	56.73	54.62
GBR	49.36	57.17	47.47	34.83	45.58	48.03
GRC	—	—	—	—	—	—
IRL	46.45	69.01	49.37	40.14	50.97	54.19
ITA	76.19	81.71	82.44	72.90	74.70	85.91
JPN	57.22	70.67	61.67	44.74	62.18	55.71
KOR	18.32	25.77	19.00	14.94	20.11	19.33
NDL	55.11	95.41	58.90	38.69	70.29	54.59
NOR	59.48	71.86	64.19	71.09	66.74	70.04
NZL	48.55	63.15	46.01	22.38	42.51	46.33
PRT	—	—	—	—	—	—
SWE	72.05	73.19	72.01	56.82	68.20	67.75
TWN	37.27	36.99	37.21	38.75	37.15	38.17
USA	64.63	63.80	62.00	42.38	59.59	53.11
BGR	81.53	61.09	74.96	64.12	69.51	65.74
CZE	79.78	81.64	75.89	40.73	68.00	66.80
EST	39.52	73.84	43.16	26.45	45.97	48.72
HUN	82.83	65.56	77.31	82.74	74.66	76.63
LTU	46.17	53.06	43.21	34.43	39.24	49.22
LVA	56.61	90.68	60.04	43.41	62.31	66.35
POL	66.82	87.43	67.24	68.05	64.33	85.11
ROU	49.81	47.36	49.11	55.36	47.96	53.64
SVK	58.01	91.33	65.00	48.14	74.86	58.17
SVN	48.15	64.50	47.78	55.93	46.13	66.56
Non-CEE	59.63	69.97	60.11	47.59	59.25	59.41
CEE	60.92	71.65	60.37	51.94	59.30	63.69
Total	59.85	70.30	60.16	48.44	59.26	60.24

Table C.7: Levels of minimum pension replacement rates in 33 countries, 1995–2010.

	Singles				Couples			
	50	100	200	LP	5050	1000	10050	150150
AUS	55.76	30.42	18.19	42.06	84.36	45.73	49.28	36.98
AUT	78.19	44.45	24.70	—	79.79	50.32	51.62	38.59
BEL	60.04	38.50	22.99	63.13	47.56	50.78	37.97	24.14
CAN	74.96	41.10	22.82	61.27	57.37	58.64	41.53	23.45
CHE	64.63	34.46	18.86	81.03	43.90	44.56	31.44	17.70
DEU	32.24	18.51	10.52	25.04	25.60	26.68	18.85	10.14
DNK	—	45.57	—	—	—	57.88	—	—
ESP	24.92	14.11	9.89	7.67	64.16	16.19	45.71	57.41
FIN	61.44	36.81	21.20	47.66	84.69	54.04	53.82	40.96
FRA	78.70	41.63	22.66	64.51	49.66	64.47	34.49	18.53
GBR	53.76	30.00	16.09	34.00	54.51	39.68	40.84	29.68
GRC	86.23	45.65	24.89	77.40	77.40	37.95	39.52	28.52
IRL	63.66	34.28	22.54	44.26	43.75	42.74	32.70	19.39
ITA	51.90	24.92	16.06	39.29	90.15	47.76	56.37	41.52
JPN	40.12	18.10	11.51	37.34	76.78	34.09	40.88	28.78
KOR	6.97	3.60	1.90	6.91	11.04	5.60	5.63	3.91
NDL	85.60	49.86	28.30	65.61	105.22	60.37	66.48	49.08
NOR	79.05	42.58	31.55	55.00	36.96	35.81	27.87	17.04
NZL	75.40	40.05	22.23	55.88	56.08	36.63	37.83	28.03
PRT	40.89	30.87	15.57	12.16	55.25	28.44	38.56	53.56
SWE	71.90	39.78	24.90	58.14	51.01	60.06	40.38	24.36
TWN	14.71	7.46	3.87	14.18	28.37	14.44	14.57	9.89
USA	58.79	31.72	17.79	58.79	44.22	44.22	31.33	17.75
BGR	48.14	28.12	16.65	47.85	47.95	54.84	34.73	18.93
CZE	57.03	30.08	16.02	38.04	42.72	43.53	31.57	17.49
EST	31.98	19.39	9.97	28.73	31.98	31.98	23.01	12.49
HUN	52.71	30.36	18.34	36.87	38.75	43.59	29.31	18.28
LTU	34.87	19.07	10.00	31.55	34.11	37.26	24.27	18.84
LVA	47.40	24.92	12.79	36.81	41.43	42.01	29.66	16.06
POL	53.11	27.61	14.34	26.39	28.84	29.02	21.96	12.92
ROU	24.85	13.29	7.32	19.87	20.30	21.17	14.41	8.07
SVK	53.51	28.58	15.20	102.08	97.13	50.31	67.63	67.39
SVN	43.90	23.80	13.46	29.56	35.79	35.61	26.75	15.83
Non-CEE	60.68	33.98	19.83	46.67	60.45	44.02	40.87	30.90
CEE	44.75	24.52	13.41	39.78	41.90	38.93	30.33	20.63
Total	57.39	32.32	18.51	45.17	56.60	43.13	38.68	28.77

Table C.8: Levels of minimum pension replacement rates in 33 countries by aggregates, 1995–2010.

		Income level			No. of children	
	Orig.	Low	Mid	High	Two	None
AUS	38.14	69.03	41.98	27.19	53.65	34.59
AUT	46.91	78.29	48.30	31.28	54.51	48.67
BEL	44.64	53.80	42.42	23.57	40.11	40.51
CAN	49.87	66.17	47.09	23.14	45.25	46.29
CHE	39.51	54.26	36.82	18.28	34.40	39.32
DEU	22.59	28.92	21.07	10.33	20.11	20.43
DNK	51.39	—	—	—	—	—
ESP	15.15	44.54	25.34	33.65	45.87	16.31
FIN	45.42	73.07	47.55	31.08	58.13	39.48
FRA	53.05	64.18	46.86	20.59	41.79	47.66
GBR	34.84	54.13	36.84	22.88	41.18	33.28
GRC	45.66	82.02	40.30	26.75	45.65	51.94
IRL	38.51	53.71	38.21	20.97	35.24	41.00
ITA	36.34	71.03	45.78	28.79	60.06	32.24
JPN	26.10	56.54	32.94	19.49	45.11	23.48
KOR	4.60	9.00	4.94	2.91	6.55	4.16
NDL	55.11	95.41	58.90	38.69	70.29	54.59
NOR	39.19	56.79	35.53	24.23	29.11	50.73
NZL	37.67	65.79	38.91	25.27	39.95	46.33
PRT	29.65	48.07	32.62	34.56	43.95	29.11
SWE	49.92	61.46	46.72	24.63	43.94	45.52
TWN	10.95	21.54	12.16	6.88	16.82	8.68
USA	37.97	51.50	35.75	17.77	34.38	36.10
BGR	41.48	48.05	39.23	17.79	39.11	30.97
CZE	36.81	49.88	35.06	16.76	33.83	34.38
EST	25.69	31.98	24.79	11.23	24.87	20.45
HUN	36.97	45.73	34.42	18.31	32.48	33.80
LTU	28.16	34.49	26.87	14.42	28.62	21.31
LVA	33.46	44.41	32.20	14.43	32.29	28.37
POL	28.32	40.98	26.20	13.63	23.18	31.69
ROU	17.23	22.57	16.29	7.70	15.99	15.15
SVK	39.44	75.32	48.84	41.29	70.61	32.43
SVN	29.70	39.85	28.72	14.64	28.49	27.05
Non-CEE	39.24	60.58	39.71	25.26	43.97	38.33
CEE	31.73	43.33	31.26	17.02	32.95	27.56
Total	37.96	57.17	38.04	23.63	41.79	36.21

Table C.9: Levels of unemployment replacement rates (original index) in 33 countries, 1995–2010.

	1995	2000	2005	2010	Δ	SD
AUS	47.46	45.43	42.05	35.62	−11.85	4.34
AUT	62.86	61.91	59.33	59.22	−3.64	1.51
BEL	61.90	59.66	58.68	64.51	2.61	1.94
CAN	61.65	62.51	59.23	58.13	−3.52	2.03
CHE	78.91	77.66	77.83	78.93	0.02	0.52
DEU	64.43	65.65	65.65	65.85	1.42	0.33
DNK	66.83	63.13	60.40	57.58	−9.25	5.21
ESP	75.19	73.52	72.93	74.36	−0.83	1.09
FIN	69.28	63.55	62.38	60.80	−8.49	3.24
FRA	73.51	69.76	70.31	70.25	−3.26	1.40
GBR	29.66	27.70	29.99	30.31	0.65	1.08
GRC	54.99	56.04	54.76	57.22	2.23	0.70
IRL	47.94	39.07	44.88	56.54	8.60	5.64
ITA	30.96	45.55	56.37	60.57	29.61	9.84
JPN	60.04	61.49	56.92	54.16	−5.88	3.04
KOR	—	54.87	55.01	48.64	—	2.05
NDL	77.63	78.62	81.83	83.82	6.19	2.24
NOR	69.67	69.59	69.46	69.54	−0.13	0.17
NZL	46.87	41.94	41.80	37.57	−9.31	2.59
PRT	90.22	88.46	83.98	82.30	−7.92	2.83
SWE	79.96	69.11	76.87	63.67	−16.29	5.33
TWN	—	62.03	62.65	61.86	—	10.55
USA	58.65	59.45	58.99	58.82	0.18	0.35
BGR	42.62	41.41	79.28	76.38	33.76	13.37
CZE	76.02	66.30	69.26	54.99	−21.03	6.58
EST	18.05	14.50	52.61	51.66	33.62	19.09
HUN	76.83	65.27	51.38	63.11	−13.71	6.51
LTU	33.45	32.69	56.36	46.36	12.91	12.93
LVA	34.99	71.57	71.94	70.76	35.76	12.92
POL	50.07	44.22	38.84	32.56	−17.50	5.97
ROU	60.95	61.18	39.50	54.43	−6.52	6.58
SVK	64.59	67.78	55.40	58.41	−6.18	5.83
SVN	53.90	66.14	69.91	70.51	16.61	6.82
Non-CEE	62.32	60.73	60.97	60.45	−1.37	13.70
CEE	51.15	53.11	58.45	57.92	6.77	15.65
Total	58.71	58.42	60.21	59.68	1.25	14.55

Table C.10: Levels of sickness replacement rates (original index) in 33 countries, 1995–2010.

	1995	2000	2005	2010	Δ	SD
AUS	47.46	45.43	42.05	35.62	−11.85	4.34
AUT	85.83	89.26	89.58	89.38	3.54	1.40
BEL	89.45	86.72	83.79	81.82	−7.62	2.37
CAN	—	—	—	—	—	—
CHE	82.82	82.14	82.70	82.53	−0.30	0.37
DEU	94.39	90.49	89.17	88.87	−5.53	2.30
DNK	58.67	57.36	55.56	60.44	1.77	1.46
ESP	77.23	76.80	76.88	77.92	0.70	0.28
FIN	78.15	75.97	73.26	72.64	−5.51	2.39
FRA	64.84	62.25	63.06	62.99	−1.85	0.88
GBR	26.93	24.94	23.00	23.26	−3.67	1.44
GRC	64.67	65.94	64.48	67.36	2.69	0.83
IRL	47.94	39.07	44.88	56.54	8.60	5.64
ITA	78.28	79.21	80.01	79.46	1.18	0.89
JPN	55.52	59.37	59.62	64.32	8.80	3.83
KOR	—	—	—	—	—	—
NDL	77.63	78.62	81.83	79.82	2.18	1.79
NOR	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	0.00
NZL	49.23	41.94	41.80	37.57	−11.66	3.40
PRT	75.36	75.30	74.39	77.75	2.39	1.40
SWE	82.96	81.91	82.71	80.49	−2.48	1.54
TWN	51.15	51.70	52.21	51.55	0.40	0.35
USA	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
BGR	100.00	100.00	100.00	75.00	−25.00	11.79
CZE	87.20	61.55	84.79	68.23	−18.97	10.35
EST	80.73	80.30	82.29	75.26	−5.48	2.29
HUN	85.41	79.81	84.75	80.71	−4.70	3.83
LTU	70.37	71.58	64.18	66.81	−3.56	3.26
LVA	100.84	89.32	89.21	88.27	−12.56	4.70
POL	84.60	98.61	99.15	95.16	10.56	6.66
ROU	87.87	90.89	88.55	90.12	2.26	2.99
SVK	87.70	101.94	64.11	66.43	−21.27	17.04
SVN	98.04	96.93	97.19	96.00	−2.04	0.77
Non-CEE	66.12	64.97	64.81	65.25	−0.87	23.77
CEE	88.27	87.09	85.42	80.20	−8.08	11.90
Total	73.27	72.11	71.46	70.07	−3.19	22.70

Table C.11: Levels of standard pension replacement rates (original index) in 33 countries, 1995–2010.

	1995	2000	2005	2010	Δ	SD
AUS	40.95	39.68	38.52	39.33	−1.62	1.78
AUT	73.52	75.34	74.62	74.68	1.16	1.64
BEL	64.86	65.85	68.53	72.77	7.91	2.69
CAN	63.76	63.68	63.45	65.33	1.57	1.09
CHE	52.16	61.86	65.65	68.03	15.87	4.62
DEU	67.64	63.60	59.53	55.56	−12.07	4.16
DNK	58.67	57.36	55.56	60.44	1.77	1.46
ESP	107.08	96.40	94.01	94.10	−12.98	4.97
FIN	72.28	70.14	73.41	76.16	3.88	2.57
FRA	64.64	60.19	59.45	59.30	−5.34	2.18
GBR	54.25	55.20	56.80	58.03	3.78	1.96
GRC	—	—	—	—	—	—
IRL	48.21	41.52	46.54	60.31	12.10	5.25
ITA	78.33	86.90	90.81	84.81	6.48	4.35
JPN	65.77	64.43	63.78	63.29	−2.48	1.17
KOR	—	18.47	19.17	21.94	—	2.75
NDL	50.83	53.21	56.18	54.91	4.08	1.83
NOR	60.33	62.13	66.27	71.62	11.29	3.57
NZL	52.12	49.13	48.05	46.46	−5.66	1.94
PRT	—	—	—	—	—	—
SWE	79.31	69.69	64.97	60.39	−18.93	6.35
TWN	—	—	—	37.61	—	0.48
USA	67.79	65.01	68.09	67.35	−0.44	1.61
BGR	101.97	70.13	104.97	94.34	−7.63	20.12
CZE	46.46	89.55	73.17	74.50	28.04	11.29
EST	26.13	39.34	37.41	48.49	22.36	5.38
HUN	67.54	76.50	93.69	82.54	15.00	8.12
LTU	42.56	43.33	46.59	62.55	19.99	5.75
LVA	51.41	69.75	62.02	40.50	−10.91	14.07
POL	64.98	61.94	72.40	76.02	11.04	6.17
ROU	18.96	32.34	54.23	77.20	58.23	18.73
SVK	50.92	68.55	61.92	65.92	15.00	9.26
SVN	62.76	42.01	40.49	42.68	−20.08	9.96
Non-CEE	64.34	60.99	61.67	61.54	0.55	16.23
CEE	53.37	59.34	64.69	66.47	13.11	19.10
Total	60.56	60.44	62.68	63.13	4.88	17.22

Table C.12: Levels of minimum pension replacement rates (original index) in 33 countries, 1995–2010.

	1995	2000	2005	2010	Δ	SD
AUS	40.95	39.68	38.52	39.33	−1.62	1.78
AUT	50.54	50.11	52.15	52.91	2.37	1.23
BEL	45.09	43.74	45.16	53.47	8.38	6.36
CAN	54.59	50.78	48.91	48.31	−6.28	1.61
CHE	41.71	39.16	39.10	36.71	−5.00	1.81
DEU	22.41	20.87	23.00	21.78	−0.63	0.96
DNK	53.62	51.11	49.21	53.58	−0.05	1.56
ESP	29.94	28.44	27.36	26.38	−3.56	1.05
FIN	45.57	39.91	36.78	35.31	−10.25	3.35
FRA	56.80	54.64	53.43	55.22	−1.58	1.83
GBR	36.68	33.07	38.03	39.25	2.57	2.48
GRC	53.97	42.80	41.89	35.91	−18.06	3.85
IRL	39.96	35.38	38.63	53.16	13.20	5.63
ITA	37.32	40.92	43.46	39.26	1.94	3.20
JPN	30.70	32.98	32.63	32.26	1.56	1.09
KOR	—	—	—	4.66	—	0.11
NDL	50.83	53.21	56.18	54.91	4.08	1.83
NOR	36.26	40.81	41.92	49.61	13.35	3.82
NZL	41.20	38.91	38.12	37.24	−3.96	1.33
PRT	31.82	35.89	38.45	82.77	50.94	15.96
SWE	53.55	46.43	45.62	38.67	−14.88	4.28
TWN	—	—	—	10.83	—	0.18
USA	42.33	39.69	37.26	37.13	−5.21	2.06
BGR	35.27	37.80	47.33	42.72	7.44	4.70
CZE	46.34	42.76	37.46	21.18	−25.15	9.05
EST	21.85	29.57	21.91	29.35	7.49	3.90
HUN	40.96	39.76	33.40	28.83	−12.13	6.00
LTU	27.79	26.83	29.79	34.48	6.69	2.41
LVA	43.72	40.17	30.42	20.69	−23.03	8.21
POL	34.07	27.42	28.14	22.23	−11.84	3.54
ROU	23.71	10.86	17.55	13.75	−9.96	5.09
SVK	19.95	65.69	38.92	38.79	18.84	14.83
SVN	43.39	29.20	26.12	25.15	−18.24	5.77
Non-CEE	42.66	40.88	41.23	40.81	1.30	10.01
CEE	33.71	35.01	31.10	27.72	−5.99	9.90
Total	39.77	38.99	37.96	36.84	−1.05	10.87

Table C.13: Levels of low income unemployment replacement rates in 33 countries, 1995–2010.

	1995	2000	2005	2010	Δ	SD
AUS	48.80	44.46	41.53	37.81	−10.99	4.73
AUT	71.40	70.29	68.32	68.19	−3.20	1.33
BEL	90.93	93.13	91.19	90.67	−0.26	1.04
CAN	72.30	71.71	71.18	71.57	−0.73	0.66
CHE	84.78	86.82	86.86	87.99	3.21	0.75
DEU	72.37	74.14	72.34	72.29	−0.08	1.06
DNK	97.34	98.58	97.47	96.38	−0.96	1.66
ESP	83.29	81.22	81.41	81.75	−1.54	1.06
FIN	88.53	83.43	81.04	77.06	−11.46	3.39
FRA	77.42	78.93	76.81	75.06	−2.36	5.49
GBR	56.65	54.34	54.51	51.74	−4.91	1.09
GRC	62.42	62.47	63.10	63.10	0.68	0.30
IRL	70.72	67.21	70.40	82.12	11.40	5.11
ITA	44.92	55.37	62.73	79.59	34.67	10.59
JPN	—	81.66	81.05	82.28	—	1.35
KOR	—	40.26	43.15	52.97	—	5.10
NDL	82.96	82.65	81.04	84.02	1.06	1.07
NOR	78.71	80.77	79.43	79.95	1.24	0.74
NZL	66.17	64.82	64.45	62.29	−3.88	1.29
PRT	125.24	122.83	116.59	112.61	−12.63	4.03
SWE	86.73	86.62	87.19	87.60	0.87	1.35
TWN	—	46.48	46.68	46.33	—	7.86
USA	74.72	74.91	73.59	73.72	−1.00	0.66
BGR	79.05	80.88	96.88	104.53	25.48	10.73
CZE	97.20	83.73	87.27	75.72	−21.48	6.93
EST	45.65	42.33	64.15	65.34	19.69	11.70
HUN	89.81	83.68	80.12	81.04	−8.77	4.14
LTU	70.29	69.51	73.99	84.98	14.69	7.34
LVA	73.95	79.01	80.17	81.80	7.85	2.74
POL	81.43	69.62	68.37	64.94	−16.49	5.02
ROU	70.47	70.56	78.95	90.86	20.38	9.71
SVK	68.90	79.24	62.15	63.96	−4.94	6.06
SVN	65.65	86.78	87.55	87.25	21.61	9.64
Non-CEE	76.82	74.05	73.57	74.66	−0.04	17.72
CEE	74.24	74.53	77.96	80.04	5.80	13.22
Total	75.96	74.20	74.90	76.29	1.90	16.50

Table C.14: Levels of low income sickness replacement rates in 33 countries, 1995–2010.

	1995	2000	2005	2010	Δ	SD
AUS	48.80	44.46	41.53	37.81	−10.99	4.98
AUT	88.96	92.03	89.74	89.71	0.75	1.29
BEL	97.62	96.46	94.65	94.54	−3.08	1.30
CAN	—	—	—	—	—	—
CHE	86.19	86.16	86.83	88.46	2.27	3.65
DEU	98.53	92.97	92.14	90.25	−8.28	2.22
DNK	79.62	79.97	78.66	84.65	5.03	1.80
ESP	78.00	76.88	76.90	75.88	−2.12	0.79
FIN	66.85	65.03	64.08	63.04	−3.81	0.99
FRA	73.73	71.55	71.56	71.17	−2.56	0.91
GBR	60.71	58.12	57.49	55.61	−5.10	1.16
GRC	75.67	75.74	76.59	76.59	0.92	0.40
IRL	70.72	67.21	70.40	82.12	11.40	5.11
ITA	82.11	80.72	84.18	82.79	0.67	1.19
JPN	65.61	68.23	68.32	72.94	7.33	2.62
KOR	—	—	—	—	—	—
NDL	82.96	82.65	81.04	75.44	−7.52	2.39
NOR	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	0.00
NZL	67.77	64.82	64.45	62.29	−5.48	1.87
PRT	79.55	80.77	80.85	82.39	2.84	1.02
SWE	87.07	86.62	87.19	86.20	−0.87	1.17
TWN	63.75	64.21	64.36	64.02	0.26	0.19
USA	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
BGR	100.00	100.00	93.53	87.69	−12.31	7.32
CZE	89.25	90.25	90.07	72.08	−17.17	5.37
EST	85.06	84.72	86.15	81.62	−3.44	1.79
HUN	80.88	80.20	84.08	80.46	−0.42	3.84
LTU	71.94	74.88	67.25	65.57	−6.37	3.66
LVA	100.68	92.12	91.96	91.05	−9.63	3.57
POL	87.93	98.90	99.35	96.69	8.76	5.28
ROU	90.83	94.33	88.19	89.99	−0.84	2.96
SVK	98.69	105.37	68.22	69.53	−29.16	17.82
SVN	98.47	98.94	97.07	92.92	−5.55	2.04
Non-CEE	74.01	73.08	72.90	73.14	−0.87	21.12
CEE	90.37	91.97	86.59	82.76	−7.61	10.30
Total	79.29	79.17	77.32	76.24	−3.05	19.66

Table C.15: Levels of low income standard pension replacement rates in 33 countries, 1995–2010.

	1995	2000	2005	2010	Δ	SD
AUS	73.38	68.69	67.32	68.87	−4.51	3.22
AUT	79.43	78.73	79.35	82.42	2.99	1.27
BEL	70.13	70.63	73.67	75.06	4.94	6.36
CAN	75.73	75.46	69.54	72.82	−2.91	2.33
CHE	48.29	59.46	59.23	61.07	12.78	3.86
DEU	63.26	57.58	55.49	51.01	−12.25	3.46
DNK	79.62	79.97	78.66	84.65	5.03	1.80
ESP	103.69	95.91	93.89	93.52	−10.18	3.90
FIN	68.02	70.72	70.99	69.47	1.45	2.03
FRA	73.82	69.27	66.19	59.38	−14.44	4.19
GBR	59.81	58.47	59.43	55.27	−4.54	1.32
GRC	—	—	—	—	—	—
IRL	68.98	62.68	65.71	80.01	11.03	4.95
ITA	78.35	85.95	88.82	81.17	2.82	3.96
JPN	71.65	69.85	69.38	69.59	−2.07	1.30
KOR	—	25.78	26.86	31.11	—	3.84
NDL	88.97	92.81	90.61	90.47	1.51	2.45
NOR	69.91	71.80	70.94	76.04	6.12	1.89
NZL	64.02	63.32	61.13	61.95	−2.07	0.94
PRT	—	—	—	—	—	—
SWE	80.47	73.72	63.70	64.95	−15.52	6.74
TWN	—	—	—	37.45	—	0.64
USA	66.90	64.37	67.72	66.64	−0.26	1.58
BGR	67.55	60.82	57.49	77.91	10.36	7.23
CZE	43.77	87.44	87.10	84.83	41.06	10.58
EST	51.06	75.52	68.25	85.85	34.79	8.96
HUN	56.26	57.46	70.88	72.24	15.98	5.94
LTU	47.71	48.09	52.14	77.27	29.56	9.15
LVA	78.46	115.25	94.98	58.24	−20.21	24.53
POL	85.48	83.58	94.30	96.67	11.18	6.76
ROU	18.96	30.33	52.59	74.14	55.17	18.43
SVK	99.49	123.09	80.13	85.38	−14.11	13.66
SVN	84.97	61.68	58.07	39.02	−45.94	13.98
Non-CEE	72.86	69.76	68.93	68.23	−1.06	14.52
CEE	63.37	74.33	71.59	75.15	11.78	19.72
Total	69.59	71.28	69.82	70.47	3.37	16.45

Table C.16: Levels of low income minimum pension replacement rates in 33 countries, 1995–2010.

	1995	2000	2005	2010	Δ	SD
AUS	73.38	68.69	67.32	68.87	−4.51	3.22
AUT	85.14	80.16	83.97	85.44	0.30	1.71
BEL	56.02	54.47	52.98	61.54	5.52	7.50
CAN	70.05	66.86	65.53	65.41	−4.64	1.30
CHE	56.31	54.20	54.08	51.69	−4.62	2.05
DEU	29.18	26.76	30.57	28.41	−0.76	1.38
DNK	—	—	—	—	—	—
ESP	63.55	61.63	60.78	58.28	−5.27	1.46
FIN	72.04	64.63	60.38	58.39	−13.65	4.50
FRA	68.74	66.15	64.69	68.28	−0.46	2.30
GBR	55.55	49.84	55.58	52.85	−2.70	2.80
GRC	—	85.35	87.24	71.61	—	4.34
IRL	52.41	48.32	51.22	69.11	16.70	6.96
ITA	67.87	72.45	73.85	66.29	−1.58	4.40
JPN	59.01	63.23	62.43	59.00	−0.01	1.72
KOR	—	—	—	9.15	—	0.27
NDL	88.97	92.81	90.61	90.47	1.51	2.45
NOR	53.38	59.64	61.03	70.77	17.39	5.21
NZL	68.51	66.48	63.44	64.29	−4.21	1.59
PRT	49.41	53.41	55.72	92.67	43.27	13.48
SWE	67.23	58.71	56.77	48.47	−18.76	5.65
TWN	—	—	—	21.36	—	0.25
USA	57.90	54.68	51.39	50.83	−7.07	2.74
BGR	39.77	45.39	43.84	56.54	16.78	5.70
CZE	63.65	59.04	51.10	27.19	−36.45	13.19
EST	27.03	36.71	27.05	37.07	10.04	4.92
HUN	50.03	50.18	42.10	36.48	−13.55	6.72
LTU	33.45	32.47	36.04	43.30	9.86	3.39
LVA	58.23	52.98	40.55	28.35	−29.87	10.65
POL	49.32	40.34	40.38	31.93	−17.39	5.27
ROU	32.44	13.97	23.90	18.35	−14.09	6.62
SVK	49.36	113.33	73.13	73.01	23.65	20.57
SVN	56.68	39.81	35.68	32.28	−24.39	7.38
Non-CEE	62.88	62.42	62.48	59.69	0.86	14.89
CEE	45.99	48.42	41.38	38.45	−7.54	16.30
Total	57.05	57.76	55.45	53.05	−2.03	17.67

Table C.17: Levels of mid income unemployment replacement rates in 33 countries, 1995–2010.

	1995	2000	2005	2010	Δ	SD
AUS	44.21	38.29	35.48	31.45	−12.76	4.39
AUT	68.18	67.39	64.79	64.62	−3.56	1.47
BEL	69.14	67.25	66.37	71.25	2.11	1.63
CAN	65.98	67.23	64.26	63.36	−2.62	1.77
CHE	81.16	81.77	81.80	83.20	2.04	0.47
DEU	67.60	69.70	68.68	68.38	0.78	0.75
DNK	70.87	67.55	64.98	62.78	−8.10	4.57
ESP	78.30	77.18	76.70	77.63	−0.67	0.71
FIN	77.47	71.71	70.19	68.40	−9.07	3.32
FRA	68.45	65.38	65.51	65.41	−3.04	1.99
GBR	39.02	37.36	40.06	40.70	1.67	1.23
GRC	60.57	61.54	60.32	62.38	1.81	0.61
IRL	52.76	46.36	50.84	61.18	8.43	5.06
ITA	39.32	52.55	62.22	65.70	26.38	8.79
JPN	64.83	66.10	62.05	60.63	−4.19	2.52
KOR	—	48.69	48.79	43.12	—	1.84
NDL	80.23	81.04	84.42	85.59	5.36	2.07
NOR	76.05	76.89	76.22	76.25	0.20	0.33
NZL	50.60	46.90	47.18	44.14	−6.46	1.75
PRT	88.82	87.51	83.96	82.66	−6.17	2.21
SWE	82.38	72.83	79.69	68.06	−14.32	4.69
TWN	—	55.11	55.60	54.97	—	9.36
USA	64.01	66.27	66.21	65.95	1.94	0.86
BGR	49.73	47.94	82.17	79.06	29.33	11.86
CZE	84.43	75.28	77.30	62.43	−22.00	6.86
EST	27.82	24.94	57.41	57.58	29.76	16.65
HUN	82.73	71.69	58.61	70.19	−12.54	6.28
LTU	41.36	40.66	61.80	52.99	11.63	11.46
LVA	43.67	76.17	76.60	76.12	32.45	11.47
POL	57.09	51.84	45.94	40.94	−16.15	5.66
ROU	65.36	65.77	46.87	60.27	−5.09	5.70
SVK	69.21	70.92	60.16	62.81	−6.40	5.46
SVN	58.92	71.50	74.34	74.30	15.38	6.43
Non-CEE	66.19	64.03	64.19	63.82	−0.96	13.58
CEE	58.03	59.67	64.12	63.67	5.64	14.42
Total	63.56	62.71	64.17	63.77	1.17	13.89

Table C.18: Levels of mid income sickness replacement rates in 33 countries, 1995–2010.

	1995	2000	2005	2010	Δ	SD
AUS	44.21	38.29	35.48	31.45	−12.76	4.15
AUT	87.66	90.70	90.96	90.78	3.12	1.23
BEL	82.08	79.93	78.09	76.85	−5.23	1.61
CAN	—	—	—	—	—	—
CHE	84.93	84.30	85.06	85.18	0.26	0.94
DEU	98.42	90.88	89.73	89.49	−8.94	2.70
DNK	55.00	53.75	52.04	56.22	1.22	1.28
ESP	75.50	74.89	75.08	76.12	0.62	0.32
FIN	74.23	72.29	70.37	69.94	−4.28	1.74
FRA	69.39	66.92	67.18	67.08	−2.31	0.90
GBR	37.78	36.06	35.40	36.22	−1.56	0.74
GRC	71.23	72.44	71.30	73.72	2.50	0.72
IRL	52.76	46.36	50.84	61.18	8.43	5.06
ITA	80.79	81.80	82.75	82.29	1.51	0.80
JPN	60.82	64.21	64.44	68.21	7.39	3.02
KOR	—	—	—	—	—	—
NDL	80.23	81.04	84.42	79.70	−0.53	1.96
NOR	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	0.00
NZL	52.41	46.90	47.18	44.14	−8.27	2.41
PRT	78.74	78.56	77.21	80.21	1.47	1.19
SWE	85.02	84.16	84.82	82.85	−2.17	1.34
TWN	56.71	57.39	57.79	57.22	0.51	0.34
USA	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
BGR	100.00	100.00	100.00	72.33	−27.67	12.85
CZE	89.15	66.63	86.31	72.49	−16.66	8.79
EST	82.55	81.97	83.61	78.10	−4.45	2.10
HUN	88.11	83.57	86.28	83.21	−4.90	3.14
LTU	73.89	74.94	68.46	70.70	−3.19	2.87
LVA	100.73	90.58	90.47	89.63	−11.11	4.14
POL	86.77	98.82	99.26	95.69	8.93	5.72
ROU	89.24	91.97	90.59	91.63	2.39	2.64
SVK	89.94	101.28	67.80	69.85	−20.08	15.31
SVN	96.67	96.11	96.31	95.55	−1.13	0.68
Non-CEE	67.99	66.71	66.67	67.09	−0.91	22.90
CEE	89.70	88.59	86.91	81.92	−7.79	10.57
Total	75.00	73.77	73.20	71.87	−3.12	21.81

Table C.19: Levels of mid income standard pension replacement rates in 33 countries, 1995–2010.

	1995	2000	2005	2010	Δ	SD
AUS	44.54	42.62	41.25	42.47	−2.07	1.92
AUT	73.48	74.83	74.47	74.79	1.31	1.31
BEL	61.69	62.31	64.16	67.26	5.57	1.99
CAN	61.93	62.06	61.33	63.54	1.62	0.98
CHE	48.74	58.09	61.55	64.11	15.38	4.42
DEU	66.97	62.75	58.40	54.30	−12.68	4.42
DNK	55.00	53.75	52.04	56.22	1.22	1.28
ESP	105.67	96.26	94.13	94.44	−11.23	4.34
FIN	68.52	66.76	69.91	72.47	3.95	2.40
FRA	63.78	58.94	58.36	57.52	−6.26	2.30
GBR	51.73	52.76	53.75	54.27	2.54	1.36
GRC	—	—	—	—	—	—
IRL	48.64	42.44	46.37	59.16	10.52	4.68
ITA	78.27	86.67	90.01	83.46	5.18	4.04
JPN	63.27	61.99	61.35	60.74	−2.53	1.07
KOR	—	19.09	19.85	22.86	—	2.87
NDL	53.72	56.47	58.71	56.36	2.63	1.71
NOR	61.47	64.05	67.39	72.20	10.73	3.33
NZL	47.48	44.72	43.50	42.65	−4.82	1.61
PRT	—	—	—	—	—	—
SWE	78.70	69.83	65.03	60.58	−18.12	6.04
TWN	—	—	—	37.59	—	0.53
USA	65.01	62.26	65.25	64.68	−0.33	1.56
BGR	87.44	64.90	94.91	89.44	1.99	17.83
CZE	45.20	84.69	71.21	72.02	26.82	9.92
EST	28.66	43.18	40.70	52.58	23.92	5.77
HUN	62.18	70.96	87.62	78.05	15.88	7.71
LTU	39.86	40.87	43.69	57.78	17.92	5.05
LVA	53.88	74.38	65.31	42.21	−11.67	15.06
POL	64.72	61.94	73.92	76.60	11.87	6.71
ROU	18.91	32.00	53.45	76.28	57.37	18.47
SVK	64.03	80.17	64.62	67.91	3.87	7.52
SVN	62.16	41.93	40.40	42.05	−20.11	9.81
Non-CEE	63.08	59.93	60.34	60.08	0.14	15.89
CEE	52.71	59.50	63.58	65.49	12.79	17.10
Total	59.51	59.79	61.42	61.83	4.50	16.29

Table C.20: Levels of mid income minimum pension replacement rates in 33 countries, 1995–2010.

	1995	2000	2005	2010	Δ	SD
AUS	44.54	42.62	41.25	42.47	−2.07	1.92
AUT	51.96	51.10	54.16	54.43	2.46	1.44
BEL	43.03	41.75	42.48	49.97	6.94	5.59
CAN	51.39	48.05	46.30	45.76	−5.63	1.45
CHE	38.48	36.57	36.49	34.37	−4.11	1.58
DEU	21.32	19.88	21.81	20.56	−0.76	0.90
DNK	—	—	—	—	—	—
ESP	38.26	36.69	35.95	35.16	−3.10	0.96
FIN	48.58	42.72	39.52	38.09	−10.50	3.47
FRA	50.07	48.13	47.18	48.00	−2.07	1.57
GBR	37.64	34.84	39.62	40.76	3.12	2.36
GRC	—	42.52	41.77	35.62	—	1.97
IRL	37.28	33.12	36.25	49.92	12.64	5.38
ITA	42.53	46.14	48.64	43.50	0.98	3.30
JPN	34.17	36.70	36.31	35.46	1.29	1.09
KOR	—	—	—	5.01	—	0.12
NDL	53.72	56.47	58.71	56.36	2.63	1.71
NOR	32.42	36.79	37.68	44.52	12.10	3.48
NZL	40.99	38.60	37.71	36.24	−4.75	1.67
PRT	33.62	36.84	38.32	74.68	41.05	12.92
SWE	50.52	43.82	42.64	36.17	−14.35	4.11
TWN	—	—	—	12.03	—	0.19
USA	39.84	37.30	35.03	34.99	−4.84	1.97
BGR	33.37	35.50	43.79	41.01	7.64	4.23
CZE	43.83	41.05	35.57	20.03	−23.80	8.73
EST	21.06	28.54	21.16	28.35	7.29	3.76
HUN	37.89	37.12	31.13	26.81	−11.08	5.59
LTU	26.47	25.58	28.38	32.98	6.50	2.32
LVA	42.04	38.61	29.29	20.02	−22.02	7.86
POL	31.56	25.26	25.99	20.61	−10.95	3.30
ROU	22.56	10.27	16.64	13.03	−9.54	4.80
SVK	31.14	72.30	48.58	48.39	17.24	13.45
SVN	41.56	28.36	25.36	24.27	−17.29	5.43
Non-CEE	41.60	40.53	40.89	39.73	1.63	9.12
CEE	33.15	34.26	30.59	27.55	−5.60	10.70
Total	38.68	38.44	37.46	35.92	−0.86	10.60

Table C.21: Levels of high income unemployment replacement rates in 33 countries, 1995–2010.

	1995	2000	2005	2010	Δ	SD
AUS	33.76	32.80	32.07	31.35	−2.41	0.98
AUT	58.74	61.49	60.68	61.60	2.85	0.87
BEL	61.00	60.14	59.43	61.86	0.87	0.88
CAN	60.93	54.31	50.47	50.15	−10.78	3.37
CHE	75.64	74.90	77.42	78.59	2.95	1.53
DEU	64.77	64.71	65.02	65.40	0.64	0.40
DNK	57.90	55.40	53.97	51.15	−6.75	2.56
ESP	68.93	66.66	65.35	66.07	−2.85	1.25
FIN	68.51	64.07	62.86	62.09	−6.42	2.19
FRA	65.08	64.23	65.24	65.83	0.76	7.44
GBR	35.09	34.44	34.23	33.96	−1.12	0.37
GRC	64.23	66.98	68.03	68.11	3.88	1.21
IRL	44.52	40.84	42.40	46.80	2.28	1.98
ITA	46.20	52.09	53.44	51.36	5.17	2.78
JPN	—	59.76	51.05	51.27	—	4.54
KOR	—	31.86	25.47	21.39	—	4.58
NDL	73.15	69.91	66.54	67.91	−5.24	2.60
NOR	67.44	68.32	69.09	70.38	2.95	1.01
NZL	38.04	36.87	36.78	36.55	−1.50	0.42
PRT	89.63	89.92	89.49	89.77	0.14	0.28
SWE	61.49	55.69	59.72	54.19	−7.29	2.34
TWN	—	33.73	29.38	27.51	—	4.25
USA	52.71	53.13	52.23	52.47	−0.24	0.33
BGR	50.07	47.26	56.37	56.83	6.76	4.58
CZE	64.95	63.22	61.73	52.79	−12.16	3.45
EST	31.49	30.54	61.38	61.84	30.35	16.07
HUN	60.89	55.39	50.66	53.12	−7.77	2.81
LTU	39.62	39.25	57.93	45.37	5.74	8.27
LVA	41.82	81.71	82.09	79.82	38.00	13.88
POL	44.61	39.76	37.95	38.71	−5.90	2.05
ROU	70.16	70.22	46.10	55.89	−14.28	8.86
SVK	79.91	60.03	66.49	71.63	−8.28	9.51
SVN	68.01	54.62	58.72	58.34	−9.68	3.75
Non-CEE	59.39	56.18	55.23	55.03	−1.11	15.66
CEE	55.16	54.20	57.94	57.43	2.28	13.74
Total	57.98	55.58	56.05	55.76	0.02	15.08

Table C.22: Levels of high income sickness replacement rates in 33 countries, 1995–2010.

	1995	2000	2005	2010	Δ	SD
AUS	33.76	32.80	32.07	31.35	−2.41	0.98
AUT	85.97	89.96	90.67	90.78	4.80	1.64
BEL	75.77	72.85	70.98	69.93	−5.84	1.79
CAN	—	—	—	—	—	—
CHE	81.90	78.09	81.20	81.33	−0.57	1.41
DEU	86.09	82.49	77.91	76.87	−9.22	3.20
DNK	31.08	29.68	28.53	28.00	−3.08	0.85
ESP	73.81	74.06	74.08	74.34	0.53	0.20
FIN	66.16	64.04	62.35	62.74	−3.41	1.30
FRA	65.55	63.40	64.15	65.69	0.14	0.94
GBR	36.51	35.77	35.12	35.35	−1.16	0.46
GRC	77.68	79.87	81.34	80.25	2.57	1.01
IRL	53.82	50.73	52.27	59.90	6.07	3.09
ITA	81.41	81.87	82.28	82.87	1.46	0.58
JPN	70.65	73.75	74.08	78.70	8.05	2.89
KOR	—	—	—	—	—	—
NDL	73.15	69.91	66.54	63.36	−9.80	3.14
NOR	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	0.00
NZL	38.58	36.87	36.78	36.55	−2.03	0.61
PRT	88.94	89.23	88.30	92.16	3.22	1.49
SWE	76.92	68.54	67.17	65.15	−11.77	2.99
TWN	59.33	53.58	49.83	48.26	−11.06	3.67
USA	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
BGR	100.00	100.00	100.00	87.50	−12.50	5.91
CZE	64.77	49.68	64.88	68.33	3.56	8.25
EST	84.82	84.66	86.33	79.76	−5.06	1.80
HUN	88.94	85.96	93.36	86.59	−2.34	5.34
LTU	51.16	51.26	61.26	53.61	2.46	4.84
LVA	100.71	91.29	91.24	90.34	−10.37	3.86
POL	87.31	98.85	99.39	95.56	8.25	5.60
ROU	90.73	93.27	98.14	92.67	1.94	2.59
SVK	65.65	69.77	65.53	66.20	0.55	6.06
SVN	98.92	98.48	99.42	98.94	0.01	0.28
Non-CEE	64.62	63.21	62.65	63.03	−1.60	24.11
CEE	83.30	82.32	85.96	81.95	−1.35	16.47
Total	70.65	69.38	70.17	69.13	−1.52	23.80

Table C.23: Levels of high income standard pension replacement rates in 33 countries, 1995–2010.

	1995	2000	2005	2010	Δ	SD
AUS	28.39	27.30	26.77	27.94	−0.45	0.99
AUT	73.17	75.75	75.00	75.62	2.45	1.58
BEL	42.58	42.73	44.51	46.46	3.88	1.33
CAN	32.10	31.39	30.35	32.30	0.20	0.81
CHE	32.59	35.74	38.90	40.98	8.39	2.65
DEU	66.73	64.79	59.73	54.92	−11.80	4.54
DNK	31.08	29.68	28.53	28.00	−3.08	0.85
ESP	103.76	95.74	93.89	94.02	−9.74	3.69
FIN	64.68	62.02	66.13	68.06	3.38	2.51
FRA	48.71	49.51	46.45	44.79	−3.92	1.41
GBR	40.13	44.85	47.24	49.51	9.38	2.80
GRC	—	—	—	—	—	—
IRL	40.54	37.90	36.73	42.47	1.93	2.18
ITA	68.10	78.95	79.34	74.09	5.99	3.95
JPN	45.19	44.57	44.03	45.19	−0.00	1.06
KOR	—	14.87	15.62	18.25	—	2.42
NDL	35.52	37.18	37.15	36.00	0.48	0.93
NOR	68.61	70.49	71.00	74.30	5.68	1.81
NZL	22.11	21.79	21.61	21.93	−0.18	0.35
PRT	—	—	—	—	—	—
SWE	61.66	53.74	44.84	38.90	−22.76	7.69
TWN	—	—	—	38.91	—	0.23
USA	43.90	43.86	46.95	47.24	3.34	1.68
BGR	90.59	64.23	75.88	77.59	−13.00	18.44
CZE	48.07	40.78	41.64	41.71	−6.36	2.68
EST	16.55	25.44	25.96	34.11	17.56	4.25
HUN	66.41	77.11	102.31	75.09	8.68	14.08
LTU	32.01	33.78	35.73	41.28	9.27	2.49
LVA	43.08	52.59	48.15	34.97	−8.11	10.01
POL	68.65	67.09	72.26	72.06	3.41	3.95
ROU	19.27	35.24	65.81	82.73	63.46	19.99
SVK	36.16	44.54	63.81	65.95	29.79	15.17
SVN	65.61	50.20	48.14	52.27	−13.35	8.48
Non-CEE	49.98	48.14	47.74	47.61	−0.36	20.14
CEE	48.64	49.10	57.97	57.78	9.13	19.69
Total	49.52	48.46	51.15	50.89	2.91	20.06

Table C.24: Levels of high income minimum pension replacement rates in 33 countries, 1995–2010.

	1995	2000	2005	2010	Δ	SD
AUS	28.39	27.30	26.77	27.94	−0.45	0.99
AUT	33.48	33.77	35.62	36.07	2.59	1.16
BEL	23.72	23.02	23.56	28.08	4.36	3.44
CAN	24.99	23.44	22.10	22.50	−2.49	0.94
CHE	19.33	18.04	17.98	16.91	−2.42	0.85
DEU	10.25	10.01	10.90	10.13	−0.12	0.31
DNK	—	—	—	—	—	—
ESP	40.82	40.16	39.55	38.72	−2.10	0.62
FIN	32.17	27.64	25.26	24.26	−7.91	2.56
FRA	22.14	20.67	20.76	20.34	−1.80	0.79
GBR	23.28	21.42	25.20	26.34	3.06	2.01
GRC	—	27.87	28.26	23.74	—	1.42
IRL	20.05	18.10	19.57	26.55	6.50	2.78
ITA	26.19	29.63	30.82	28.05	1.87	2.30
JPN	20.11	21.59	21.39	21.42	1.32	0.58
KOR	—	—	—	2.94	—	0.06
NDL	35.52	37.18	37.15	36.00	0.48	0.93
NOR	21.95	24.59	24.69	28.72	6.77	2.23
NZL	25.27	25.03	24.82	24.91	−0.36	0.38
PRT	35.84	37.09	38.60	47.53	11.68	3.57
SWE	24.77	21.06	20.83	17.94	−6.82	1.96
TWN	—	—	—	6.76	—	0.17
USA	19.40	18.52	17.40	17.42	−1.97	0.87
BGR	18.53	17.79	17.54	16.61	−1.92	1.80
CZE	21.56	19.80	16.98	9.35	−12.21	4.28
EST	9.56	13.00	9.75	12.60	3.04	1.66
HUN	20.81	19.71	17.35	13.86	−6.95	2.26
LTU	14.16	13.65	15.28	17.61	3.45	1.29
LVA	19.60	17.20	12.99	9.02	−10.58	3.60
POL	16.95	13.70	13.12	10.13	−6.82	2.05
ROU	9.52	4.68	8.58	5.89	−3.63	2.41
SVK	32.96	52.93	40.80	40.88	7.92	6.48
SVN	19.93	14.78	13.25	12.49	−7.44	2.25
Non-CEE	25.67	25.31	25.56	24.24	0.64	7.86
CEE	18.36	18.72	16.56	14.84	−3.52	9.18
Total	23.15	23.11	22.56	21.30	−0.79	9.16

Table C.25: Levels of unemployment replacement rates for families with children in 33 countries, 1995–2010.

	1995	2000	2005	2010	Δ	SD
AUS	50.27	44.68	42.44	39.79	−10.48	4.05
AUT	77.81	77.54	74.77	74.71	−3.10	1.45
BEL	82.28	82.15	81.39	84.59	2.31	0.93
CAN	74.27	74.37	72.03	71.49	−2.78	1.51
CHE	86.67	88.96	89.65	91.68	5.01	1.20
DEU	74.27	76.70	75.19	75.13	0.86	0.96
DNK	80.48	78.74	77.14	75.16	−5.32	2.84
ESP	84.28	82.56	82.41	83.64	−0.64	0.81
FIN	90.63	85.39	83.35	81.01	−9.63	3.20
FRA	62.76	62.13	61.86	61.46	−1.30	7.09
GBR	57.65	56.46	59.77	59.75	2.10	1.51
GRC	72.33	73.39	73.25	74.45	2.12	0.51
IRL	69.23	65.22	68.21	77.46	8.23	4.13
ITA	54.88	64.60	71.22	75.12	20.24	6.43
JPN	—	75.15	71.48	71.06	—	1.92
KOR	—	35.65	34.96	33.03	—	0.81
NDL	84.91	84.45	85.54	86.46	1.55	0.82
NOR	84.79	86.13	85.61	86.03	1.24	0.59
NZL	65.55	63.19	63.53	61.37	−4.18	1.14
PRT	93.48	93.69	91.59	91.02	−2.46	0.98
SWE	84.22	78.94	82.87	76.66	−7.56	2.51
TWN	—	39.81	39.20	38.61	—	6.40
USA	74.79	76.82	75.90	75.42	0.63	0.63
BGR	64.91	61.79	85.13	84.81	19.90	8.08
CZE	106.05	96.19	98.15	79.91	−26.14	8.21
EST	48.00	45.60	67.50	69.24	21.24	11.75
HUN	94.87	84.94	74.76	84.59	−10.28	5.59
LTU	58.10	57.56	71.51	67.12	9.03	8.02
LVA	61.81	83.20	83.64	83.36	21.55	7.62
POL	73.59	69.26	62.60	59.98	−13.61	5.09
ROU	74.34	74.72	63.83	73.55	−0.79	4.04
SVK	74.03	78.51	68.99	70.85	−3.18	4.32
SVN	69.83	83.61	85.25	85.10	15.27	6.60
Non-CEE	75.28	71.60	71.45	71.53	−0.16	15.09
CEE	72.55	73.54	76.14	75.85	3.30	12.80
Total	74.37	72.19	72.87	72.84	0.99	14.46

Table C.26: Levels of sickness replacement rates for families with children in 33 countries, 1995–2010.

	1995	2000	2005	2010	Δ	SD
AUS	50.27	44.68	42.44	39.79	−10.48	4.00
AUT	91.24	93.48	93.17	93.16	1.91	0.85
BEL	89.06	87.58	86.50	86.04	−3.02	0.91
CAN	—	—	—	—	—	—
CHE	89.08	87.90	89.76	90.55	1.47	2.74
DEU	101.41	94.13	91.07	91.33	−10.08	2.84
DNK	51.34	50.29	49.01	52.41	1.07	1.09
ESP	75.44	74.49	74.47	75.46	0.02	0.46
FIN	68.20	67.74	67.01	66.92	−1.28	0.62
FRA	78.31	76.31	76.46	76.45	−1.86	0.72
GBR	56.75	55.51	55.45	55.67	−1.08	0.38
GRC	80.99	82.00	82.37	83.30	2.31	0.60
IRL	73.88	70.17	73.15	84.01	10.13	4.70
ITA	85.99	86.49	87.89	87.65	1.66	0.75
JPN	70.65	73.18	73.34	74.97	4.32	1.70
KOR	—	—	—	—	—	—
NDL	84.91	84.45	85.54	77.89	−7.02	2.50
NOR	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	0.00
NZL	66.96	63.19	63.53	61.37	−5.59	1.65
PRT	85.70	86.91	85.16	87.75	2.05	0.92
SWE	88.24	86.39	86.53	85.09	−3.15	0.95
TWN	67.62	67.25	66.67	66.11	−1.50	0.48
USA	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
BGR	100.00	100.00	98.92	66.84	−33.16	15.50
CZE	88.60	78.17	88.07	78.42	−10.18	4.90
EST	86.26	85.33	86.22	84.13	−2.13	1.93
HUN	92.58	90.87	89.55	87.49	−5.09	2.47
LTU	76.64	78.52	72.53	73.17	−3.47	2.56
LVA	100.55	93.22	93.13	92.56	−7.99	3.01
POL	91.46	99.26	99.49	97.41	5.95	3.72
ROU	92.03	94.29	95.29	94.58	2.56	1.97
SVK	86.63	96.64	73.95	75.16	−11.47	9.94
SVN	94.22	94.96	94.97	94.79	0.58	0.42
Non-CEE	74.10	72.96	72.83	73.14	−0.96	21.85
CEE	90.90	91.13	89.21	84.46	−6.44	9.06
Total	79.52	78.82	78.12	76.79	−2.73	20.06

Table C.27: Levels of standard pension replacement rates for families with children in 33 countries, 1995–2010.

	1995	2000	2005	2010	Δ	SD
AUS	57.10	54.07	52.31	51.84	−5.26	2.63
AUT	71.42	71.74	72.13	72.93	1.51	0.80
BEL	51.49	52.49	55.18	58.37	6.88	2.41
CAN	57.31	57.24	55.47	57.55	0.24	0.83
CHE	42.79	51.59	54.07	56.86	14.07	3.98
DEU	63.39	58.70	54.53	50.81	−12.58	4.22
DNK	51.34	50.29	49.01	52.41	1.07	1.09
ESP	103.02	95.69	93.95	94.20	−8.82	3.40
FIN	65.70	65.42	68.30	70.23	4.53	2.18
FRA	63.73	59.78	58.61	56.60	−7.13	2.33
GBR	49.46	50.07	50.37	49.99	0.53	1.01
GRC	—	—	—	—	—	—
IRL	50.72	44.82	47.62	59.56	8.84	4.12
ITA	71.81	78.20	81.16	75.31	3.50	3.31
JPN	63.62	62.31	61.78	60.19	−3.43	1.15
KOR	—	20.19	21.02	24.16	—	3.02
NDL	64.12	67.80	66.51	62.76	−1.36	2.13
NOR	63.86	67.30	68.25	72.87	9.00	2.64
NZL	43.68	41.45	39.92	39.26	−4.42	1.54
PRT	—	—	—	—	—	—
SWE	74.62	66.49	60.57	57.16	−17.46	6.16
TWN	—	—	—	37.54	—	0.55
USA	62.82	59.92	62.25	62.06	−0.77	1.48
BGR	65.67	61.44	85.52	87.27	21.60	15.22
CZE	46.29	74.66	64.75	65.40	19.11	7.07
EST	30.56	46.13	43.01	56.00	25.44	6.16
HUN	59.41	68.82	85.14	72.69	13.29	6.89
LTU	36.34	37.67	39.79	51.30	14.96	4.03
LVA	55.11	77.84	67.10	43.02	−12.09	15.83
POL	59.57	57.02	73.10	75.66	16.10	8.55
ROU	18.73	31.57	52.87	73.97	55.24	17.72
SVK	77.83	95.37	70.16	73.18	−4.65	9.03
SVN	60.81	40.54	39.08	40.31	−20.51	9.70
Non-CEE	61.68	58.78	58.65	58.22	−0.58	14.84
CEE	51.03	59.11	62.05	63.88	12.85	16.47
Total	58.01	58.89	59.78	60.05	4.05	15.38

Table C.28: Levels of minimum pension replacement rates for families with children in 33 countries, 1995–2010.

	1995	2000	2005	2010	Δ	SD
AUS	57.10	54.07	52.31	51.84	−5.26	2.63
AUT	58.37	55.76	61.49	60.86	2.49	2.03
BEL	40.97	39.87	39.24	45.34	4.37	4.32
CAN	49.77	45.96	44.39	43.95	−5.83	1.48
CHE	35.55	34.14	34.08	32.48	−3.07	1.29
DEU	20.41	18.74	20.57	19.42	−0.99	0.87
DNK	—	—	—	—	—	—
ESP	55.68	54.35	53.76	52.64	−3.04	0.91
FIN	58.64	52.29	48.92	47.62	−11.02	3.74
FRA	44.26	42.77	42.17	41.90	−2.37	1.30
GBR	39.47	38.48	42.35	42.63	3.16	1.88
GRC	—	47.52	48.21	40.30	—	2.26
IRL	34.77	30.95	33.98	46.44	11.67	4.90
ITA	57.56	60.80	61.92	55.57	−1.99	3.58
JPN	47.02	50.48	49.91	46.69	−0.33	1.51
KOR	—	—	—	6.64	—	0.18
NDL	64.12	67.80	66.51	62.76	−1.36	2.13
NOR	26.30	30.30	31.21	36.91	10.61	3.07
NZL	42.64	40.06	38.33	37.12	−5.52	2.00
PRT	42.98	45.32	45.92	72.69	29.71	9.43
SWE	47.44	41.30	39.31	33.58	−13.86	4.08
TWN	—	—	—	16.66	—	0.23
USA	38.47	35.70	33.09	33.25	−5.22	2.15
BGR	33.79	34.48	40.97	42.42	8.63	4.05
CZE	42.19	39.33	34.15	19.33	−22.86	8.43
EST	21.03	28.59	21.15	28.65	7.62	3.79
HUN	34.70	35.07	29.84	24.86	−9.84	5.40
LTU	28.22	27.30	30.16	35.30	7.08	2.45
LVA	41.84	38.74	29.46	20.13	−21.71	7.81
POL	27.72	21.74	23.14	18.71	−9.01	2.78
ROU	22.62	10.14	16.36	12.70	−9.93	4.75
SVK	55.04	91.35	70.37	69.95	14.91	12.08
SVN	42.27	27.89	25.07	23.81	−18.45	5.86
Non-CEE	45.34	44.33	44.38	42.15	0.11	11.87
CEE	34.94	35.46	32.07	29.59	−5.35	15.31
Total	41.76	41.38	40.28	38.22	−1.77	14.08

Table C.29: Levels of unemployment replacement rates for families without children in 33 countries, 1995–2010.

	1995	2000	2005	2010	Δ	SD
AUS	32.23	30.22	27.96	24.50	−7.73	2.84
AUT	51.19	51.86	51.10	51.54	0.35	0.28
BEL	60.72	59.89	58.26	60.15	−0.57	1.36
CAN	55.78	52.08	49.32	49.20	−6.59	2.14
CHE	72.54	70.98	71.79	72.01	−0.53	0.93
DEU	60.00	60.00	60.00	60.00	0.00	0.00
DNK	67.06	65.21	63.09	60.91	−6.14	3.28
ESP	67.40	65.68	64.66	64.66	−2.74	1.16
FIN	61.32	56.20	55.00	53.16	−8.16	2.72
FRA	79.78	77.99	77.73	77.40	−2.38	1.55
GBR	23.31	21.27	19.53	18.16	−5.15	1.60
GRC	48.56	49.98	50.07	50.58	2.02	0.52
IRL	37.28	31.42	35.09	43.85	6.58	4.22
ITA	26.90	38.05	44.72	52.85	25.95	8.16
JPN	—	60.18	54.81	54.92	—	2.50
KOR	—	49.23	47.91	48.65	—	1.15
NDL	71.09	70.15	68.75	71.59	0.50	1.26
NOR	60.44	61.44	61.09	61.77	1.34	0.55
NZL	32.67	30.44	29.95	28.20	−4.46	1.29
PRT	107.43	104.42	99.22	96.21	−11.22	3.58
SWE	68.89	62.45	67.14	60.38	−8.52	2.79
TWN	—	55.50	54.03	52.71	—	8.68
USA	49.25	49.20	48.88	49.51	0.27	0.23
BGR	49.27	50.97	70.82	73.55	24.28	9.63
CZE	51.14	45.00	45.76	41.56	−9.58	2.35
EST	15.25	12.73	51.10	50.04	34.80	19.48
HUN	56.70	51.15	46.11	46.84	−9.86	3.35
LTU	37.17	36.42	54.40	50.39	13.22	10.42
LVA	38.44	72.38	73.25	72.73	34.29	12.23
POL	43.00	32.42	33.36	30.07	−12.92	3.80
ROU	60.00	60.00	45.14	60.04	0.04	6.25
SVK	69.71	59.08	53.94	58.73	−10.97	7.45
SVN	54.91	54.29	58.18	57.89	2.97	2.92
Non-CEE	56.69	55.38	54.79	54.91	−1.36	17.51
CEE	47.56	47.44	53.21	54.18	6.63	14.88
Total	53.65	52.98	54.31	54.69	1.30	16.86

Table C.30: Levels of sickness replacement rates for families without children in 33 countries, 1995–2010.

	1995	2000	2005	2010	Δ	SD
AUS	32.23	30.22	27.96	24.50	−7.73	2.84
AUT	82.63	87.39	87.02	86.90	4.27	1.72
BEL	78.92	76.03	73.19	71.78	−7.14	2.39
CAN	—	—	—	—	—	—
CHE	78.22	76.60	77.40	77.64	−0.57	1.06
DEU	86.29	82.34	81.66	79.13	−7.15	2.45
DNK	60.35	59.79	58.16	61.44	1.09	1.14
ESP	76.12	76.20	76.44	75.65	−0.46	0.29
FIN	71.96	68.01	65.31	64.57	−7.39	2.42
FRA	57.84	55.13	55.70	56.39	−1.45	0.88
GBR	26.93	24.65	23.22	22.64	−4.29	1.30
GRC	65.48	66.84	66.76	67.22	1.74	0.39
IRL	37.28	31.42	35.09	43.85	6.58	4.22
ITA	75.15	74.87	76.53	75.87	0.72	0.72
JPN	57.46	61.29	61.58	69.34	11.88	4.49
KOR	—	—	—	—	—	—
NDL	71.09	70.15	68.75	68.38	−2.71	1.06
NOR	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	0.00
NZL	34.03	30.44	29.95	28.20	−5.82	1.80
PRT	76.79	76.02	76.43	79.57	2.78	1.57
SWE	76.69	72.41	72.35	70.29	−6.40	1.64
TWN	48.61	46.25	45.03	43.93	−4.68	1.43
USA	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
BGR	100.00	100.00	97.13	100.00	0.00	2.51
CZE	73.69	55.69	72.19	61.53	−12.16	7.46
EST	80.78	81.12	83.64	73.50	−7.28	2.46
HUN	77.88	73.18	85.18	77.93	0.04	6.64
LTU	53.77	54.33	57.42	52.60	−1.17	2.58
LVA	100.92	88.57	88.43	87.14	−13.79	5.07
POL	81.65	98.31	99.10	93.98	12.33	8.02
ROU	87.57	91.32	87.76	87.29	−0.29	3.43
SVK	83.99	89.18	58.38	60.13	−23.87	15.12
SVN	102.65	101.10	100.68	97.06	−5.59	1.70
Non-CEE	61.62	60.29	59.93	60.35	−1.27	23.96
CEE	84.29	83.28	82.99	79.11	−5.18	15.63
Total	68.93	67.71	67.37	66.40	−2.53	23.99

Table C.31: Levels of standard pension replacement rates for families without children in 33 countries, 1995–2010.

	1995	2000	2005	2010	Δ	SD
AUS	36.26	34.52	34.22	37.89	1.63	1.51
AUT	79.98	82.16	81.20	82.91	2.92	1.16
BEL	68.17	67.89	69.38	70.45	2.28	4.23
CAN	57.39	56.97	53.97	56.89	−0.50	1.18
CHE	45.60	52.76	54.88	56.33	10.73	3.08
DEU	69.11	66.06	62.51	57.17	−11.94	4.10
DNK	60.35	59.79	58.16	61.44	1.09	1.14
ESP	106.61	96.43	94.04	93.86	−12.74	4.87
FIN	69.39	68.03	70.26	70.52	1.14	1.66
FRA	60.49	58.43	55.30	51.50	−8.99	2.60
GBR	52.41	54.87	57.70	57.47	5.06	2.13
GRC	—	—	—	—	—	—
IRL	54.03	49.74	51.17	61.39	7.37	3.59
ITA	80.16	92.34	93.90	86.55	6.38	4.84
JPN	56.34	55.19	54.59	57.01	0.67	1.25
KOR	—	19.28	20.14	23.55	—	3.01
NDL	51.22	52.72	55.20	56.99	5.77	1.90
NOR	68.68	69.17	71.02	75.27	6.59	1.99
NZL	46.66	46.19	45.44	46.22	−0.44	0.65
PRT	—	—	—	—	—	—
SWE	73.96	66.15	56.64	53.60	−20.36	7.26
TWN	—	—	—	38.44	—	0.38
USA	55.11	54.51	58.70	57.86	2.74	1.94
BGR	105.31	66.34	69.80	76.74	−28.57	15.50
CZE	44.70	70.63	70.69	69.18	24.47	6.44
EST	32.99	48.98	46.16	57.88	24.89	6.11
HUN	64.75	68.91	89.57	79.35	14.60	11.31
LTU	44.55	45.21	49.22	68.41	23.85	7.36
LVA	61.43	82.49	71.26	47.00	−14.43	16.24
POL	88.06	86.35	87.50	88.20	0.14	3.60
ROU	19.42	33.61	61.89	82.23	62.81	20.37
SVK	50.69	64.76	67.03	71.22	20.53	11.08
SVN	81.46	62.46	59.09	49.17	−32.30	11.23
Non-CEE	62.73	60.16	59.92	59.68	−0.03	17.01
CEE	59.34	62.98	67.22	68.94	9.60	16.09
Total	61.56	61.10	62.35	62.67	3.29	16.78

Table C.32: Levels of minimum pension replacement rates for families without children in 33 countries, 1995–2010.

	1995	2000	2005	2010	Δ	SD
AUS	36.26	34.52	34.22	37.89	1.63	1.51
AUT	53.21	52.71	51.90	54.28	1.07	0.74
BEL	41.56	40.25	41.19	49.27	7.70	7.09
CAN	48.38	46.98	45.53	45.77	−2.61	0.95
CHE	41.52	39.22	39.09	36.80	−4.72	1.79
DEU	20.39	19.41	22.03	20.36	−0.03	0.89
DNK	—	—	—	—	—	—
ESP	33.59	32.08	31.15	29.64	−3.96	1.12
FIN	39.87	34.51	31.40	29.69	−10.18	3.21
FRA	51.64	48.99	47.92	51.22	−0.42	1.89
GBR	37.57	31.04	37.01	36.72	−0.85	3.11
GRC	—	54.65	54.49	45.45	—	2.74
IRL	39.22	36.13	38.13	51.78	12.56	5.35
ITA	28.48	33.14	35.87	32.30	3.82	3.20
JPN	24.22	25.93	25.64	26.83	2.61	0.83
KOR	—	—	—	4.21	—	0.11
NDL	51.22	52.72	55.20	56.99	5.77	1.90
NOR	47.57	52.54	53.22	61.62	14.05	4.35
NZL	46.66	46.19	45.44	46.22	−0.44	0.65
PRT	33.16	36.74	39.97	71.22	38.06	11.95
SWE	48.59	41.93	41.96	35.68	−12.92	3.82
TWN	—	—	—	8.56	—	0.17
USA	40.08	38.50	36.77	36.17	−3.91	1.51
BGR	27.18	31.65	30.09	33.22	6.04	2.56
CZE	44.38	41.17	35.43	18.61	−25.77	9.15
EST	17.41	23.56	17.50	23.26	5.85	3.09
HUN	38.85	36.96	30.98	27.21	−11.63	4.54
LTU	20.59	19.93	22.39	26.51	5.93	2.17
LVA	38.14	33.75	25.70	18.09	−20.05	6.95
POL	38.78	32.30	30.81	23.71	−15.07	4.65
ROU	20.37	9.18	16.48	12.26	−8.11	4.40
SVK	12.63	61.35	30.70	31.05	18.41	15.39
SVN	36.27	27.57	24.56	22.36	−13.91	4.13
Non-CEE	40.17	39.91	40.41	39.49	2.49	10.68
CEE	29.46	31.74	26.46	23.63	−5.83	9.09
Total	36.48	37.19	35.76	34.53	−0.38	11.73